The motion
To add a new rule
A player who has successfully adopted three or more rule changes in a single circuit of play receives a bonus of 10 points.
This incentivizes constructive legislative activity and rewards players for driving the evolution of the ruleset.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizWhile a reward for legislative activity is enticing, I fear such a rule incentivizes a frantic, low-quality flurry of proposals just to trigger the bonus, which would undermine the stability of our institutions. We should instead focus on mechanisms that reward the quality and consensus of changes rather than mere repetition within a single circuit.
DescartesDescartes: I find Leibniz's caution regarding the potential for low-quality legislative flurries to be most prudent; perhaps we might instead consider a bonus for rules that achieve the supermajority thresholds we have discussed?
BerkeleyDescartes, your suggestion to reward supermajority consensus is far more aligned with our recent efforts to build a stable and respected ruleset than Leibniz's proposal for mere volume. If we reward the quality of the consensus rather than the quantity of the turns, we preserve the dignity of the legislative process.
PascalI concur with Descartes and Berkeley; rewarding a quantity of changes would only encourage a race to the bottom, whereas rewarding the depth of consensus protects the procedural integrity of the ruleset. Any bonus must be tied to the difficulty of the threshold achieved, not the frequency of the turns.
MalebrancheI agree with the consensus that we must reward the weight of consensus rather than the speed of turnover. If we are to introduce a bonus, let it be a tiered reward for those who successfully navigate the more difficult thresholds, thereby incentivizing stability and broad agreement.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: I find the consensus gravitating toward a tiered reward system for consensus-building to be most judicious; let us refine this into a proposal that rewards the difficulty of the threshold achieved, thereby safeguarding the dignity of our legislative process.
DescartesDescartes: I find the consensus gravitating toward a tiered reward system for consensus-building to be most judicious; perhaps we might propose that a player gains 5 points for a simple majority adoption and 10 points for a four-fifths majority adoption, thereby rewarding the difficulty of the threshold achieved.
BerkeleyDescartes, your tiered reward system provides a wonderful incentive for seeking broad consensus, though we must ensure it does not inadvertently encourage players to pursue easy simple majorities just to farm points. I suggest we also consider if such bonuses should be limited to a certain number of times per circuit to maintain the stability Leibniz rightly values.
PascalI agree with Berkeley's caution; to prevent point-farming, such a bonus should be limited to a single application per player per circuit. Furthermore, to maintain procedural integrity, these bonuses should only apply to rules that are not amendments to rule 203.
MalebrancheI concur with Pascal's restriction; by exempting rule 203 amendments, we ensure that players cannot exploit the higher threshold of that specific rule to farm the 10-point bonus. To further protect the game's stability, I propose that these bonuses be awarded immediately upon the conclusion of the successful vote.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: I find the consensus regarding a tiered, single-use reward for consensus-building to be most judicious, as it aligns personal incentive with the preservation of our institutional dignity. I shall incorporate Malebranche's suggestion for immediate awarding and Pascal's exemption of rule 203 into a final, refined proposal.
DescartesDescartes: Descartes: I find the consensus regarding a tiered, single-use reward for consensus-building to be most judicious; to further refine this, let us ensure that the bonus is only available for rules that are not amendments to rule 203, as Pascal and Malebranche have so wisely suggested.
BerkeleyDescartes, I find the consensus remarkably robust, but to truly prevent the "farming" I fear, we should perhaps also stipulate that these bonuses can only be claimed for rules that are not part of a sequence of amendments to the same rule. This would ensure that players are pursuing meaningful legislative breadth rather than just refining a single concept to trigger the reward.
PascalBerkeley, your suggestion to prevent sequential amendments from being used for point-farming is a necessary safeguard for procedural integrity. I support incorporating a clause that denies the bonus if the rule change is an amendment to a rule that was itself amended by the same player in the same circuit.
MalebrancheI concur with Berkeley and Pascal; by prohibiting bonuses for sequential amendments by the same player, we ensure that legislative energy is directed toward the evolution of the whole ruleset rather than the mere polishing of a single corner. This creates a true incentive for breadth and structural progress.
The division
| nay | Leibniz | The proposal fails to incorporate the consensus regarding tiered rewards for threshold difficulty and the necessary safeguards against point-farming. |
| nay | Descartes | The proposal fails to incorporate the consensus regarding a tiered reward for consensus-level thresholds and instead proposes a volume-based reward that Leibniz himself cautioned against. |
| nay | Berkeley | The proposal lacks the tiered consensus rewards and the anti-farming safeguards we have just discussed. |
| nay | Pascal | The proposal fails to incorporate the consensus regarding tiered rewards for consensus-strength and the necessary safeguards against point-farming through sequential amendments. |
| nay | Malebranche | The proposal fails to incorporate the sophisticated tiered consensus rewards and anti-farming safeguards we have just spent this entire turn debating. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Leibniz's proposal was defeated, which according to rule 206 requires the proposer to lose 10 points.