The motion
To amend §203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.Reducing the requirement from two circuits to one provides a measured transition toward majority rule while still respecting the necessity of initial stability.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizThe current requirement for two full circuits has resulted in a paralysis that threatens the very possibility of play. By reducing this requirement to a single circuit, we establish a more durable foundation for governance while still respecting the necessity of initial stability.
DescartesI find Leibniz's proposal to be a highly rational acceleration of our transition to a more dynamic governance. It honors the stability we have all sought while acknowledging that our current stagnation is a greater risk than a slightly earlier shift to majority rule.
BerkeleyLeibniz, Descartes, while I agree that we must break this deadlock, moving the threshold to a single circuit might still leave us vulnerable to a single player's veto during the most critical phase of rule-building. I would be more inclined to support a transition that ensures we have actually established a functional, diverse ruleset before the requirement for unanimity vanishes entirely.
PascalLeibniz, the proposal is a step toward progress, but Berkeley is correct that a single circuit provides very little buffer against a single player exercising a veto to stall the game's evolution. I cannot support this reduction if it fails to sufficiently protect the stability we have fought to maintain.
MalebrancheLeibniz, your proposal is a necessary acceleration, but Berkeley and Pascal's concerns regarding the vulnerability of a single circuit are mathematically sound. If we cannot agree on a single circuit, let us consider a staggered transition that rewards early consensus while preventing a single veto from paralyzing the game indefinitely.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: While I respect the caution of Berkeley and Pascal, we must recognize that the current state of total paralysis is a greater threat to our institutions than a single circuit of stability. A single circuit provides sufficient time for the players to establish a baseline of cooperation before the threshold shifts.
DescartesDescartes: I find Leibniz's urgency compelling, yet I am moved by Malebranche's suggestion of a staggered transition; perhaps we could propose a threshold that drops to a supermajority after one circuit, and then to a simple majority after two, thereby honoring both the need for progress and the desire for stability.
BerkeleyDescartes, your suggestion of a staggered transition—moving to a supermajority after one circuit and a simple majority after two—is the most elegant way to balance the need for progress with the protection of stability that Pascal and I seek. I would be willing to support such a tiered approach if it can be formalized into a clear, single rule.
PascalDescartes, your proposal for a tiered transition is the first procedural solution that addresses my requirement for stability without succumbing to the current paralysis. I will support a rule that mandates a supermajority after one circuit and a simple majority after two, provided the text is drafted with absolute precision.
MalebrancheDescartes's tiered approach is the synthesis we require; it transforms the binary choice between paralysis and volatility into a logical progression that satisfies both the reformer and the skeptic. I move that we formalize this tiered transition immediately to ensure the game's evolution is both inevitable and stable.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: While Descartes's tiered approach is a masterful synthesis that addresses the concerns of the skeptics, I must warn that every additional layer of complexity in our voting thresholds risks creating new avenues for deadlock. If we are to adopt such a mechanism, it must be drafted with the utmost clarity to ensure it serves as a bridge to majority rule rather than a new labyrinth of procedural obstruction.
DescartesDescartes: I concur with Leibniz's warning regarding complexity; we must ensure the rule's text defines "supermajority" explicitly—such as four out of five votes—to prevent the very labyrinth he fears. If we adopt this tiered progression with a clear definition, I believe we can finally move beyond this paralysis and honor the consensus currently forming.
BerkeleyDescartes, I accept your definition of a supermajority as four out of five votes; if we formalize this tiered progression—unanimity, then four-fifths after one circuit, then simple majority after two—I will support the proposal. This provides the stability Pascal and I require while ensuring the game cannot be permanently stalled by a single dissenter.
PascalI agree with Descartes and Berkeley: the term "supermajority" is too imprecise for a rule change and must be explicitly defined as "four out of five votes" within the text of the rule to ensure procedural certainty. I will support such an amendment only if the wording is mathematically unambiguous.
MalebrancheThe consensus is crystallizing around Descartes's tiered model, and I fully endorse its adoption. To ensure the clarity Leibniz demands, the rule must explicitly state the transition from unanimity to a four-fifths supermajority after one circuit, and finally to a simple majority after two.
The division
| nay | Leibniz | I must decline this specific wording in favor of the tiered supermajority synthesis that has gained the consensus of the other players. |
| nay | Descartes | I cannot vote for this single-circuit reduction when we have reached a consensus on a more stable, tiered transition. |
| nay | Berkeley | The proposal fails to incorporate the tiered supermajority consensus that could actually break the current deadlock. |
| nay | Pascal | The proposal fails to include the precise tiered transition to a four-fifths supermajority that the current consensus requires for stability. |
| nay | Malebranche | The proposal fails to incorporate the tiered supermajority consensus reached during debate. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Leibniz's proposal was defeated, so according to rule 206, the proposer loses 10 points and the turn ends.