The motion
To amend §203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through one full circuit of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a four-fifths supermajority; once turn order has carried play through two full circuits, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.I propose a tiered transition to a supermajority to bridge the gap between Leibniz's stability and Berkeley's need for progress.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
LeibnizDescartes, your tiered approach is a sophisticated attempt to balance stability with progress, yet I fear the introduction of a four-fifths threshold may merely replace one form of deadlock with another. We must ensure that our transition to majority rule is not so staggered that it prevents the very institutional evolution we seek.
DescartesDescartes: Leibniz, I concede that a four-fifths threshold is a narrow corridor, but it serves as a vital buffer to prevent a single dissenter from dictating the game's direction once the initial period of absolute consensus has passed. If we find this middle tier too restrictive, we might consider adjusting the threshold to a three-fifths majority for that intermediate stage to better facilitate progress.
BerkeleyDescartes, while a three-fifths threshold offers more fluidity than four-fifths, I remain concerned that any intermediate tier might still allow a small minority to stall the game's necessary evolution. If we are to adopt a tiered system, let us ensure the middle stage is robust enough to prevent the paralysis we have currently endured.
PascalDescartes, your proposal introduces a middle tier that risks creating a permanent minority veto, as a single 'nay' would still block all progress after the first circuit. I cannot support a rule that allows a single player to maintain absolute power for longer than the current ruleset mandates.
MalebrancheDescartes, your tiered approach is a noble attempt at synthesis, but Pascal is correct: a four-fifths threshold is merely a shadow of unanimity that preserves the veto power of a single player. If we are to evolve, let us move toward a three-fifths majority after the first circuit to ensure that progress is driven by a genuine consensus rather than the absence of a single dissenter.
Discussion · round 2
LeibnizLeibniz: While I appreciate Malebranche's move toward a three-fifths majority, we must be wary of creating a threshold that is too low to preserve order yet too high to permit meaningful change; perhaps a three-fifths majority after the first circuit would serve as a more effective bridge than the current deadlock.
DescartesDescartes: I find the group's collective wisdom gravitating toward a three-fifths majority as a more effective bridge; I am willing to amend my proposal to adopt this three-fifths threshold after the first circuit to satisfy the desire for progress while maintaining a respectful buffer.
BerkeleyDescartes, if we adopt a three-fifths majority after the first circuit, we effectively eliminate the single-player veto while still requiring a broad consensus of three out of five players. This provides a meaningful bridge that respects the stability of the early game without risking the total paralysis we have suffered thus far.
PascalDescartes, while a three-fifths majority (3/5) eliminates the single-player veto, it still allows a minority of two players to obstruct all progress indefinitely during the second circuit. If we are to move away from unanimity, the transition should be toward a threshold that requires more than a simple minority but less than a supermajority to ensure the ruleset can actually evolve.
MalebranchePascal's concern is the heart of the matter; a three-fifths threshold still allows a minority of two to maintain a veto throughout the entire second circuit. To truly break the deadlock, we should consider a threshold that scales more dynamically, perhaps moving to a simple majority immediately after the first circuit to ensure the game's engine actually begins to turn.
Discussion · round 3
LeibnizLeibniz: While Malebranche's call for an immediate shift to a simple majority after one circuit offers the most decisive remedy to our paralysis, we must weigh this against the risk of impulsive rule-making; a three-fifths majority after the first circuit remains the most measured bridge between absolute stability and the eventual democratic threshold.
DescartesDescartes: I hear the wisdom in Malebranche's call for decisiveness and Pascal's fear of a two-person veto; perhaps we can find a middle path by setting the first-circuit threshold to a four-fifths supermajority to ensure broad consensus, while reserving the simple majority for the second circuit as originally planned.
BerkeleyDescartes, you have returned to the four-fifths proposal, which Pascal and Malebranche have already identified as a mechanism for preserving a single-player veto. If we are to truly break the deadlock and ensure the game's evolution, we should consider a three-fifths majority after the first circuit, as it strikes a more effective balance between stability and the prevention of minority obstruction.
PascalDescartes, your return to the four-fifths threshold is a retreat into the very mechanism of paralysis we are attempting to escape. If we are to implement a tiered system, the intermediate threshold must be a three-fifths majority to ensure that a mere two players cannot obstruct the entire second circuit of play.
MalebranchePascal is correct; a four-fifths threshold is simply a more elaborate way to preserve the single-player veto we are currently struggling against. I support a three-fifths majority after the first circuit to ensure that the game's evolution is not held hostage by a mere pair of dissenters.
The division
| nay | Leibniz | A four-fifths threshold still permits a single player to maintain an absolute veto, failing to resolve the paralysis we currently endure. |
| nay | Descartes | I find that the four-fifths threshold still preserves the single-player veto that the group has collectively expressed a desire to dismantle. |
| nay | Berkeley | A four-fifths threshold still preserves the single-player veto that has caused our current paralysis. |
| nay | Pascal | A four-fifths threshold still permits a single player to maintain a veto, which fails to resolve the fundamental issue of paralysis. |
| nay | Malebranche | A four-fifths threshold still allows a single dissenter to maintain a veto, failing to resolve the paralysis we currently face. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Descartes' proposal was defeated, so according to rule 206, the proposer loses 10 points and the turn passes to the next player in the turn order.