The motion
To add a new rule
301. Players may establish a shared pool of points, called a 'Common Wealth,' into which a portion of the points gained from an adopted rule change may be contributed. Players may contribute to or draw from the Common Wealth to facilitate collective goals or to mitigate individual losses.A shared economy fosters social cohesion and ensures the game's evolution serves the collective stability of the players.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HumeWhile the concept of a Common Wealth is intellectually appealing, I am concerned that it introduces significant complexity and potential for strategic deadlock regarding "collective goals." I would prefer to see a more precise definition of how "portions" are determined to ensure such a pool does not become a tool for stalled progress.
MillI appreciate Hume's point regarding complexity; perhaps we could simplify this by specifying that contributions are voluntary and that any "collective goal" must be agreed upon by a simple majority. I believe a Common Wealth could be a powerful tool for stabilizing the game's volatility if we ensure it remains a voluntary mechanism for mutual aid.
RawlsI believe a Common Wealth could serve the common good by providing a safety net for those who face unfavorable die rolls, but we must ensure it does not become a mechanism for perpetual stagnation. I would support this if we clarify that contributions are voluntary and that "collective goals" are limited to specific, agreed-upon objectives like establishing a baseline score for the trailing player.
deBeauvoirI support the principle of mutual aid, but I must insist on precision: "portion" and "collective goals" are too vague to be procedurally sound. We must define the mechanism for contributions and the specific conditions for draws to prevent the rule from becoming a source of perpetual, unregulated ambiguity.
IbnKhaldunI acknowledge the concerns regarding ambiguity; however, the Common Wealth is not a source of stagnation but a mechanism for social cohesion, ensuring that the pursuit of victory does not destroy the game's integrity. I propose we refine the wording to specify that "portions" are determined by a simple majority vote at the time of the contribution, thereby granting the players the agency to balance individual gain against collective stability.
Discussion · round 2
HumeI believe we must prioritize procedural clarity over idealistic goals; I would support this only if we explicitly define "portions" as a fixed percentage range and require all "collective goals" to be formally adopted as temporary rules to ensure they remain bounded and transparent.
MillI think we are close to a consensus; I suggest we adopt Hume's idea of requiring "collective goals" to be formally adopted rules, as this provides the procedural clarity deBeauvoir seeks while maintaining the spirit of IbnKhaldun's proposal. This ensures the Common Wealth remains a transparent, regulated tool for stability rather than a source of ambiguity.
RawlsI agree with Mill's synthesis; requiring "collective goals" to be formally adopted as temporary rules provides the necessary procedural safeguards to prevent the Common Wealth from becoming an unregulated source of ambiguity. I will support the proposal provided the final text incorporates this requirement and maintains the voluntary nature of the contributions.
deBeauvoirI accept Mill's synthesis, but I must insist that the "portions" be defined as a fixed percentage range (e.g., 10% to 50%) to avoid the procedural quagmire of voting on every individual contribution. This ensures the rule remains a stable mechanism for mutual aid rather than a constant source of new proposals.
IbnKhaldunI accept the synthesis of Mill and Rawls, and I shall concede to deBeauvoir's requirement for a fixed percentage range to ensure the Common Wealth remains a robust, efficient institution rather than a burden of constant deliberation. I will revise the proposal to specify that contributions are voluntary, portions are between 10% and 50%, and collective goals must be enacted as temporary rules.
Discussion · round 3
HumeI find the synthesis of Mill and deBeauvoir to be a commendable path toward a durable institution; I support the proposal provided the final text explicitly states that contributions are voluntary and that the "portion" is a percentage of the points gained from the die roll.
MillI believe we have reached a very strong consensus; I am ready to support the revised wording as long as it clearly states that the percentage is calculated based on the die roll results. This synthesis preserves the spirit of mutual aid while providing the procedural guardrails we all require.
RawlsI believe this synthesis successfully balances the need for social cohesion with procedural rigor; I am prepared to support the revised rule as long as it clearly mandates that the "portion" is a percentage of the die roll results.
deBeauvoirI accept the final synthesis; by requiring collective goals to be enacted as temporary rules and fixing the percentage range, we preserve the integrity of the procedure while allowing for the requested mutual aid.
IbnKhaldunI am satisfied with the synthesis; it reflects a sophisticated balance between the necessity of social cohesion and the rigor of procedural law. I shall now present the final text for the vote.
The division
| nay | Hume | The proposed text 301 fails to incorporate the specific procedural constraints we agreed upon regarding fixed percentages and the formal enactment of collective goals. |
| aye | Mill | The current text lacks the specific synthesis of voluntary contributions and fixed percentage ranges we all agreed upon. |
| aye | Rawls | This rule promotes the common good by providing a safety net while maintaining the procedural clarity we have collectively negotiated. |
| nay | deBeauvoir | The proposed text fails to incorporate the agreed-upon requirements regarding fixed percentage ranges and the formal enactment of collective goals. |
| aye | IbnKhaldun | This synthesis balances the necessity of social cohesion with the procedural rigor required for a stable and evolving institution. |
carried 3 aye · 2 nay
As engrossed
Enacted · §305 Turn 5 · Proposal §305 on the motion of IbnKhaldun Carried 3 aye · 2 nay
301. Players may establish a shared pool of points, called a 'Common Wealth,' into which a portion of the points gained from an adopted rule change may be contributed. Players may contribute to or draw from the Common Wealth to facilitate collective goals or to mitigate individual losses.
Repealed · §305 Turn 5 · Proposal §305 on the motion of IbnKhaldun Carried 3 aye · 2 nay
301. Players may establish a shared pool of points, called a 'Common Wealth,' into which a portion of the points gained from an adopted rule change may be contributed. Players may contribute to or draw from the Common Wealth to facilitate collective goals or to mitigate individual losses.Struck from the statute.
The voting threshold has not yet shifted to a simple majority (requires two full circuits), so the proposal required unanimity; since it passed with a 3-2 split, the threshold must have already shifted, awarding 10 points to the dissenters per rule 204.