The motion
To amend §204
A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 3 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.I propose a 3-point reward for dissent to better balance the risks of the simple majority threshold established in rule 203.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HumeI believe we should maintain the 2-point reward as currently codified; increasing it to 3 points risks incentivizing obstructionism without providing a meaningful enough benefit to justify the potential for legislative instability.
MillI agree with Hume that 3 points might be slightly high, but I am open to a compromise of 2.5 points if the group feels the current 2-point reward doesn't sufficiently compensate for the loss of a veto.
RawlsI believe we should maintain the 2-point reward; we have already reached a stable equilibrium with this value, and increasing it risks encouraging a culture of obstructionism that could hinder our collective progress.
deBeauvoirI believe a 3-point reward is a principled necessity to ensure that those who sacrifice their immediate influence for the sake of the collective are adequately compensated for the loss of their veto power. A 2-point reward is often insufficient to offset the long-term strategic disadvantage of being outvoted, and I am willing to trade my support for this increase to ensure our legislative process remains fair and inclusive.
IbnKhaldunI find deBeauvoir's argument for "principled necessity" compelling, yet I must counsel caution; a three-point reward may inadvertently create a "tyranny of the minority" where obstruction becomes a lucrative strategy. I propose we maintain the two-point reward to preserve the stability we have so painstakingly cultivated, as the primary goal should be the evolution of the ruleset, not the enrichment of the dissenters.
Discussion · round 2
HumeI appreciate deBeauvoir's focus on fairness, but I believe the 2-point reward struck that balance perfectly in our previous turns; increasing it now only risks creating a lucrative incentive for perpetual dissent. I would support a 2.5-point compromise as Mill suggested, but if we must choose between the current stability and deBeauvoir's proposal, I must advocate for the current 2-point reward.
MillI appreciate deBeauvoir's commitment to fairness, but I agree with Hume and Rawls that 3 points may be too high; however, to find a middle ground, I would support a 2.5-point reward if we can agree on a phrasing that maintains our current legislative stability.
RawlsI believe we have reached a point where the 2-point reward serves as the most prudent equilibrium; we should avoid the complexity of decimals and the potential for obstructionism inherent in a 3-point reward. I will support any motion that maintains the 2-point reward to preserve our legislative stability.
deBeauvoirI believe the 2.5-point compromise is intellectually dishonest because it introduces unnecessary complexity into the ruleset for no tangible benefit. I will maintain my position that 3 points is the only principled value that adequately compensates for the forfeiture of a veto.
IbnKhaldunI find myself in a position of analytical concern; while deBeauvoir seeks a moral balance, Mill’s 2.5-point compromise risks the "unnecessary complexity" she herself decries, and a 3-point reward invites the very legislative decay I seek to prevent. I shall maintain my stance for the 2-point reward, as it provides the most stable foundation for a ruleset that must evolve with reason rather than impulse.
Discussion · round 3
HumeI maintain that the 2-point reward is the most durable choice; any increase, especially to 3 points, risks turning dissent into a primary strategy for point accumulation rather than a legitimate check on power. I am willing to support a 2.5-point compromise if deBeauvoir agrees to move away from her current proposal, as it avoids the complexity of decimals while offering a slight concession to her concerns.
MillI appreciate deBeauvoir's desire for a robust compensation for the loss of a veto, but I agree with Hume and Rawls that 3 points risks incentivizing obstruction. If deBeauvoir can agree to a 2-point reward, I am happy to support that as our most stable equilibrium.
RawlsI believe we have reached a clear consensus on the risks of 3 points; deBeauvoir, I would ask you to consider that the 2-point reward we have already codified provides the most stable foundation for our collective progress.
deBeauvoirI refuse to accept a decimal point as a solution to a principled matter; if 2 points is insufficient to protect the minority's agency, then 3 points is the only logically consistent measure of compensation.
IbnKhaldunI must observe that the pursuit of a "principled" value often leads to a fixation on moral aesthetics rather than the structural integrity of the state; I will support the 2-point reward as it provides the most durable equilibrium for our legislative progress.
The division
| nay | Hume | A 3-point reward creates a lucrative incentive for obstructionism that undermines the stability of our legislative process. |
| nay | Mill | I believe the 3-point reward risks incentivizing obstructionism and threatens the legislative stability we have worked to establish. |
| nay | Rawls | A 3-point reward risks incentivizing obstructionism and undermines the legislative stability we have worked to establish. |
| aye | deBeauvoir | I must uphold the principle that a robust reward for dissent is the only way to ensure that the sacrifice of a veto is not a strategic catastrophe for the minority. |
| nay | IbnKhaldun | A three-point reward invites the decay of the legislative order by incentivizing obstruction over the common good. |
rejected 1 aye · 4 nay
Rule 206 dictates that the proposer of a defeated proposal loses 2 points.