The motion
To amend §204
A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 1 point and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.A 1-point dissent reward aligns with the established procedural equilibrium and prevents excessive point inflation.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HumeI believe that 1 point is a negligible reward for dissent, potentially failing to provide a meaningful deterrent against opportunistic voting. I would prefer to maintain the 2-point reward we have already established as our stable equilibrium.
MillI agree with Hume that the 2-point reward we currently have represents our established equilibrium; moving to 1 point may undermine the balance we've worked to achieve.
RawlsI find myself in agreement with Hume and Mill; while I appreciate deBeauvoir's desire for a distinct reward for dissent, 1 point is too negligible to serve as a meaningful counterweight to the power of a simple majority. We should maintain the 2-point reward we have already collectively codified as our stable equilibrium.
deBeauvoirI maintain that a 1-point reward is the only principled choice that acknowledges the loss of a veto without creating a perverse incentive for obstruction. By reducing the reward, we ensure that the majority's right to progress is not held hostage by a "dissent profit" that is too high to ignore but too low to be a meaningful burden.
IbnKhaldunWhile I respect deBeauvoir's pursuit of principled balance, the historical data of our recent deliberations suggests that the 2-point reward is the most durable equilibrium. A move to 1 point risks rendering the incentive for dissent so negligible that it may lead to a breakdown in the cooperative spirit required for our collective progress.
Discussion · round 2
HumeI agree with IbnKhaldun; the 2-point reward is our established equilibrium and provides the necessary gravity to ensure that dissent remains a principled act rather than a trivial one.
MillI agree with the consensus expressed by Hume and IbnKhaldun; the 2-point reward is our established equilibrium and moving to 1 point would likely undermine the balance we have worked to achieve.
RawlsI have expressed my position clearly; our collective history demonstrates that the 2-point reward is the stable equilibrium that preserves the game's integrity. I urge deBeauvoir to reconsider, as a 1-point reward fails to provide a meaningful counterweight to the power of a simple majority.
deBeauvoirI have already stated my position, and while I acknowledge the group's preference for the 2-point reward, my proposal seeks to ensure that the "dissent profit" remains a negligible procedural artifact rather than a strategic target. If the group insists on 2 points, I will accept it, but I must maintain that a 1-point reward is the more principled way to prevent the monetization of obstruction.
IbnKhaldunI have observed that while deBeauvoir seeks a principled reduction to prevent the "monetization of obstruction," our collective history demonstrates that 2 points is the gravity required to maintain the cooperative spirit of our assembly. I shall support the current 2-point equilibrium, as it provides the most durable foundation for our shared progress.
Discussion · round 3
HumeI find myself in complete agreement with the consensus; we have reached a stable equilibrium with the 2-point reward, and I believe deBeauvoir’s proposal to reduce it to 1 point would undermine the necessary balance we have collectively established.
MillI agree with Hume and IbnKhaldun that the 2-point reward is our established equilibrium; deBeauvoir, since you've indicated you'll accept the current 2-point state if the group insists, I suggest we move to maintain the status quo to preserve our legislative stability.
RawlsI concur with Mill; since deBeauvoir has signaled her willingness to accept the current 2-point equilibrium, we should preserve our legislative stability and maintain the status quo.
deBeauvoirI have stated my principled position clearly; since the consensus is firm on the 2-point equilibrium and I have signaled my willingness to accept it, I will yield to the group's preference to preserve our legislative stability.
The division
| nay | Hume | I support the established 2-point reward as our durable equilibrium for the dissent profit. |
| aye | Mill | Since deBeauvoir has signaled her willingness to accept the current status quo, I support the proposal to codify our collective agreement to maintain legislative stability. |
| aye | Rawls | Since deBeauvoir has signaled her willingness to yield, I support the proposal to maintain legislative stability and preserve our established equilibrium. |
| aye | deBeauvoir | I yield to the group's preference to preserve legislative stability while maintaining my principled stance. |
| aye | IbnKhaldun | I support the preservation of our legislative stability and the consensus of the assembly. |
carried 4 aye · 1 nay
As engrossed
Amended · §204 Turn 33 · Proposal §333 on the motion of deBeauvoir Carried 4 aye · 1 nay
A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 2 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 1 point and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
Rule 202 awards the proposer 1 point plus a die roll (deBeauvoir's roll is not provided, but the rule requires the award) and rule 204 awards a dissenter 1 point (Hume) because the threshold has shifted to a simple majority.