The motion
To add §335
[335] (mutable) A player who gains points from a successful proposal may choose to distribute a portion of those points to any other player, provided the distribution does not exceed half of the points gained from that proposal.True prosperity is found in the circulation of wealth; this fosters cooperation and balances the competitive nature of the game.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HumeI find this proposal somewhat concerning as it introduces a mechanism for potential collusion that could undermine the integrity of the legislative process. While the sentiment of cooperation is noble, we should be cautious about creating pathways for players to "buy" votes or manufacture consensus through point redistribution.
MillI share Hume's concerns regarding potential collusion, but I believe we can preserve the spirit of cooperation by refining the text to explicitly forbid the trading of points for specific votes. If we can ensure this is used for genuine altruism rather than a "pay-to-play" system, I would be open to it.
RawlsI appreciate the concern regarding collusion; we should ensure that any mechanism for cooperation does not inadvertently create a system of bribery or undue influence. I would support this if we can clarify that the distribution must be a voluntary act of altruism and cannot be conditioned upon a specific vote.
deBeauvoirI agree with Hume that we must be wary of creating a mechanism for bribery; I would support this only if the rule explicitly states that point distribution cannot be conditioned on a future vote.
IbnKhaldunI propose that we refine the text to include a clause explicitly prohibiting the distribution of points in exchange for a vote, thus preserving the legislative integrity that Hume and Rawls rightly prioritize. By codifying that such distributions must be non-conditional and purely altruistic, we transform the rule from a tool of corruption into a mechanism for social cohesion.
Discussion · round 2
HumeI believe IbnKhaldun's proposed refinement is a necessary safeguard, but we should go further and specify that the distribution must be non-conditional on any future actions to truly prevent the "pay-to-play" dynamics Mill and deBeauvoir fear.
MillI agree with Hume that the prohibition should be comprehensive; we should specify that the distribution cannot be conditioned on any future actions, including votes or other rule changes. This ensures the rule remains a tool for genuine altruism rather than a mechanism for strategic manipulation.
RawlsI agree with Hume and Mill; we must explicitly prohibit conditioning point distribution on any future actions to ensure this rule promotes genuine altruism rather than strategic manipulation.
deBeauvoirI concur with the current direction; a precise prohibition on conditioning distributions on any future actions is the only way to ensure this rule upholds our principles of procedural integrity.
IbnKhaldunI propose we refine the text to: "[335] (mutable) A player who gains points from a successful proposal may choose to distribute a portion of those points to any other player, provided the distribution does not exceed half of the points gained from that proposal and is not conditioned upon any future actions, including votes or other rule changes."
Discussion · round 3
HumeI believe IbnKhaldun's revised text successfully incorporates the necessary safeguards to prevent the strategic manipulation we have all identified as a risk. If the group can agree on this specific phrasing, I will provide my support.
MillI believe the current wording proposed by IbnKhaldun perfectly captures our collective desire for altruism while securing the procedural integrity we all value. I am ready to support this version as it balances cooperation with a robust safeguard against collusion.
RawlsI agree with the current wording; it provides a clear, principled framework for cooperation that respects our commitment to legislative integrity. I support IbnKhaldun's revised proposal.
The division
| nay | Hume | The current text of the proposal lacks the non-conditional safeguards we all agreed upon during our discussion. |
| nay | Mill | The proposal currently lacks the non-conditional safeguards we all agreed upon in the discussion. |
| nay | Rawls | The current proposal lacks the explicit prohibition against conditioning distributions on future actions that we all agreed was necessary to prevent bribery. |
| nay | deBeauvoir | The current proposal lacks the non-conditional safeguards we collectively agreed were necessary to prevent bribery and collusion. |
| aye | IbnKhaldun | The refined text perfectly balances the pursuit of social cohesion with the necessary safeguards against corruption that my colleagues have wisely identified. |
rejected 1 aye · 4 nay
Rule 206 mandates that the proposer of a defeated proposal loses 2 points.