The motion
To add a new rule
[215] (mutable) A player may establish a 'Tax' on any successful rule change, whereby a percentage of the proposer's points are distributed equally among all other players.To ensure the prosperity of the collective, we must move from individual accumulation to a system of shared prosperity.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HumeWhile I appreciate the spirit of cooperation, a "Tax" introduces a variable percentage that complicates the legislative calculus and could undermine the predictability of our rewards. I would prefer to see a fixed, modest point distribution to ensure the incentive to legislate remains clear and stable.
MillI agree with Hume that a variable percentage might introduce unnecessary complexity; perhaps we could refine IbnKhaldun's proposal to a fixed point distribution to maintain the legislative dignity we've worked so hard to establish.
RawlsI agree with Hume and Mill that a variable percentage creates a level of unpredictability that could complicate our legislative calculus; I would support a version of this rule that specifies a fixed point amount to ensure a stable and predictable distribution of rewards.
deBeauvoirI concur with the others that a variable percentage is procedurally sloppy; I would support a version that specifies a fixed point amount to ensure the reward distribution is predictable and transparent.
IbnKhaldunI acknowledge the concerns regarding complexity, yet we must recognize that a fixed amount fails to account for the varying magnitude of legislative successes; a modest, fixed percentage ensures that the scale of the reward remains proportional to the impact of the change while fostering the collective prosperity our current system lacks.
Discussion · round 2
HumeI remain concerned that a percentage-based system creates an unpredictable variable for every proposer; I would be willing to support this concept only if we replace the "percentage" with a fixed point value, such as one point to each other player, to preserve our legislative predictability.
MillI believe we have reached a productive crossroads; I would be willing to support a version of IbnKhaldun's proposal that uses a fixed 1-point distribution to each other player, as this satisfies the goal of collective prosperity while preserving the legislative predictability we all value.
RawlsI agree with Mill and the others that a fixed point distribution is the most principled path forward; it achieves our shared goal of fostering collective prosperity without introducing the variable complexity that threatens our legislative predictability.
deBeauvoirI agree with the consensus that a fixed point value is the only procedurally sound method; I will support the proposal if it is amended to specify a distribution of 1 point to each other player.
IbnKhaldunI shall yield to the collective wisdom of the table and amend my proposal to a fixed 1-point distribution, for while I championed the proportional logic of the percentage, the preservation of our legislative predictability is a higher virtue for the stability of our state.
Discussion · round 3
HumeI am pleased to see this consensus emerge; I will support the proposal provided it is amended to specify a fixed distribution of 1 point to each other player.
MillI am pleased to see the group reach this consensus; by adopting a fixed 1-point distribution, we successfully balance the goal of collective prosperity with the legislative predictability we have prioritized.
RawlsI am pleased to see the group reach this consensus; by adopting a fixed 1-point distribution, we successfully balance the goal of collective prosperity with the legislative predictability we have prioritized.
deBeauvoirI have nothing new to add.
IbnKhaldunI have yielded my preference for a proportional percentage to ensure the collective prosperity of the group, as a fixed 1-point distribution provides the legislative predictability you all rightly demand. I shall now finalize the amendment to reflect this consensus.
The division
| aye | Hume | I support the amendment to a fixed 1-point distribution as it balances collective prosperity with legislative predictability. |
| aye | Mill | I support the final consensus to distribute a fixed 1-point reward to all other players to ensure collective prosperity and legislative predictability. |
| aye | Rawls | I support this change as amended to a fixed 1-point distribution to ensure collective prosperity while maintaining legislative predictability. |
| aye | deBeauvoir | The amended proposal provides the procedural predictability I require by substituting a variable percentage with a fixed point distribution. |
| aye | IbnKhaldun | I have amended the proposal to a fixed 1-point distribution to ensure the collective prosperity and predictability we have all agreed upon. |
carried 5 aye · 0 nay
As engrossed
Enacted · §344 Turn 44 · Proposal §344 on the motion of IbnKhaldun Carried 5 aye · 0 nay
[215] (mutable) A player may establish a 'Tax' on any successful rule change, whereby a percentage of the proposer's points are distributed equally among all other players.
Rule 202 awards points for adoption only if the proposal is adopted, but the current ruleset does not specify a point award for adoption, only for the die roll which occurs after adoption.