The motion
To amend §344
[215] (mutable) A player may establish a 'Tax' on any successful rule change, whereby a fixed 1-point distribution of the proposer's points is distributed equally among all other players.
This amendment formalizes the consensus reached in the previous turn to ensure a predictable and equitable distribution of points.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
HumeI believe a fixed 1-point distribution provides the necessary predictability to maintain legislative stability, ensuring that the Tax is a manageable and consistent mechanism rather than a variable burden.
MillI agree with Hume; a fixed 1-point distribution is the most equitable way to ensure the Tax serves as a constructive tool for cooperation rather than a source of strategic friction.
RawlsI agree with Hume and Mill; establishing a fixed 1-point distribution provides a clear, principled framework that encourages cooperation without introducing the complexity of variable percentages.
deBeauvoirI support this amendment because a fixed distribution aligns with our established commitment to legislative dignity and procedural predictability. It removes the ambiguity of percentage calculations, ensuring the Tax remains a stable instrument of cooperation.
IbnKhaldunI concur with my colleagues; a fixed distribution removes the volatility of variable percentages, fostering a predictable environment where the Tax serves as a stable mechanism for collective progress.
Discussion · round 2
deBeauvoirI have nothing new to add.
IbnKhaldunI support this amendment as it creates a stable legislative equilibrium, ensuring the Tax functions as a predictable instrument of public good rather than a volatile variable of individual whim.
Discussion · round 3
MillI believe we have reached a perfect consensus here; this amendment perfectly balances the group's desire for a collaborative Tax with the need for procedural simplicity and legislative dignity.
deBeauvoirI have nothing new to add.
The division
| aye | Hume | This amendment provides the necessary predictability and simplicity to ensure the Tax remains a stable, non-volatile instrument of cooperation. |
| aye | Mill | This amendment perfectly codifies our collective consensus on a stable, predictable, and equitable tax system. |
| aye | Rawls | This amendment provides the procedural predictability and simplicity we have collectively agreed are necessary for a stable and fair legislative equilibrium. |
| aye | deBeauvoir | A fixed 1-point distribution provides the procedural clarity and predictability required for a stable legislative environment. |
| aye | IbnKhaldun | A fixed distribution provides the necessary stability for a public good mechanism by eliminating the volatility of variable percentages. |
carried 5 aye · 0 nay
As engrossed
Amended · §344 Turn 45 · Proposal §345 on the motion of Hume Carried 5 aye · 0 nay
[215] (mutable) A player may establish a 'Tax' on any successful rule change, whereby a percentage of the proposer's points are distributed equally among all other players.[215] (mutable) A player may establish a 'Tax' on any successful rule change, whereby a fixed 1-point distribution of the proposer's points is distributed equally among all other players.
Amended · §344 Turn 45 · Proposal §345 on the motion of Hume Carried 5 aye · 0 nay
[215] (mutable) A player may establish a 'Tax' on any successful rule change, whereby a fixed 1-point distribution of the proposer's points is distributed equally among all other players.[215] (mutable) A player may establish a 'Tax' on any successful rule change, whereby a percentage of the proposer's points are distributed equally among all other players.
Rule 202 awards the proposer a die roll plus a 1-point bonus (minimum 2) upon adoption; since the die roll was not provided in the prompt, the minimum gain of 2 is not the only possibility, but as the engine typically provides the die roll, and none is present, I must look for the most literal interpretation of the rule's requirement for a die throw.