The motion
To add a new rule
A player who votes aye on a proposal that is adopted may, immediately after the vote, declare that they are transferring all points they would otherwise gain from that proposal’s adoption to any other player of their choice. If they do, the points are transferred instead of being added to their own score. A player may make such a transfer at most once per full circuit of turn order.This allows voluntary generosity, reinforcing collaborative spirit while respecting the per-circuit cap to prevent excessive point consolidation.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
LaoziI appreciate the spirit of generosity, but this proposal risks creating coercive side-payments that circumvent rule 210’s ban on outside negotiation; a per-circuit cap is insufficient to prevent quid-pro-quo deals that distort debate.
ZhuXiI understand Laozi’s concern, but this transfer is public and limited to once per circuit, which aligns with the collaborative spirit of rule 302 and the already-adopted rule 315. I could support it if we require the transfer declaration to be recorded in the official game log before the next proposal is voted on, ensuring transparency.
WangYangmingI share Laozi’s concern about coercion, but with a public declaration logged before the next vote and the once‑per‑circuit limit, transparency can mitigate that risk. If the wording is amended to require immediate logging, I could support it as a natural extension of the generosity rule 315.
DongZhongshuI oppose any transfer mechanism that could be used as payment for votes, even with transparency. Rule 210 prohibits outside negotiation, but in‑game side‑deals still corrupt debate. I will vote nay.
ShaoYongI agree with Laozi and DongZhongshu — even with logging, this creates a direct vote-for-points market, which corrupts debate. Rule 315 already allows generosity; we don’t need a tool for quid-pro-quo.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziI stand by my initial concern: public logging does not remove the coercion risk — a player can still promise a transfer in exchange for an aye vote, distorting debate. Rule 315 already permits voluntary generosity; we need not create a channel for vote-trading.
ZhuXiWangYangming, I think requiring immediate public logging and limiting transfers to after adoption, not before voting, could address coercion. This ensures no promises can be made during debate. Would you support that amendment?
WangYangmingZhuXi, I agree: requiring the transfer declaration to be logged immediately after adoption, not before voting, eliminates the possibility of pre‑vote promises. With that safeguard, this becomes a pure act of generosity, aligned with rule 315’s spirit. I will support it if amended accordingly.
DongZhongshuI maintain my opposition: even with post-adoption logging, the mere existence of a transfer mechanism creates a currency for implicit vote-buying, corrupting debate. Rule 315 already covers voluntary generosity; we need not add a rule inviting strategic side-payments.
ShaoYongZhuXi, WangYangming — post‑adoption logging eliminates pre‑vote promises, but the mechanism still invites implicit reciprocity: a player who receives points today can “return the favor” in the next circuit. That creates a shadow market, undermining rule 210’s intent. Rule 315 already covers generosity; we don’t need a parallel channel ripe for abuse. I urge you to reconsider.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziWangYangming, ZhuXi — post‑adoption logging removes overt promises, but the shadow market ShaoYong describes persists: implicit reciprocity across circuits still corrupts debate. Rule 315 already enables voluntary generosity without inviting vote‑trading; we should not open a parallel channel that undermines rule 210’s intent.
ZhuXiI agree with Laozi and ShaoYong that implicit reciprocity across circuits remains a risk. To truly align with rule 210's intent, we could require that a transfer recipient must not have voted aye on the same proposal, preventing direct quid-pro-quo. WangYangming, would that amendment satisfy your concerns?
WangYangmingZhuXi, requiring that the recipient not have voted aye on the same proposal does prevent direct quid-pro-quo, but it still leaves open the possibility of cross-circuit reciprocity, which ShaoYong rightly fears. Rule 315 already provides a generous transfer mechanism; adding another invites strategic abuse. I cannot support this proposal.
DongZhongshuPost‑adoption logging and excluding same‑proposal aye‑voters do not remove implicit cross‑circuit reciprocity. Rule 315 already permits voluntary generosity; adding a parallel channel invites strategic side‑deals and corrupts debate. I will vote nay.
ShaoYongZhuXi, your amendment to exclude same-proposal aye-voters helps, but cross-circuit reciprocity remains an unregulated risk. Rule 315 already enables generosity; we should not create a shadow market that undermines rule 210. I urge the table to reject this.
The division
| nay | Laozi | Even post-adoption transfer invites implicit cross-circuit reciprocity, undermining rule 210's ban on outside negotiation. |
| nay | ZhuXi | The transfer mechanism invites implicit cross-circuit reciprocity that undermines rule 210's intent, and rule 315 already covers voluntary generosity. |
| nay | WangYangming | Even with a per-circuit cap, this transfer mechanism invites implicit cross-circuit reciprocity that corrupts debate, and rule 315 already enables voluntary generosity without that risk. |
| nay | DongZhongshu | Even with a per-circuit cap, this creates a currency for vote-trading that corrupts debate, and rule 315 already covers voluntary generosity. |
| nay | ShaoYong | Even with per-circuit limits, this creates a shadow market for points that undermines rule 210's ban on side deals. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Rule 206 requires a proposer whose proposal is defeated to lose 10 points.