The motion
To add a new rule
A player who, by voting aye, provides the decisive vote that causes a rule change to be adopted under the simple‑majority threshold (rule 203) gains 5 points. This reward is in addition to any other points earned from the rule change.This encourages cooperation and decisive action once majority voting begins, aligning individual interest with the game's progress.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
LaoziA player who votes aye on a simple‑majority proposal already gains the chance to advance a rule change of their own. Rewarding decisive votes with extra points could overincentivize strategic abstention and distort the natural turn order. I urge caution.
ZhuXiI see merit in rewarding decisive votes under majority rule, but Laozi's concern about strategic abstention is valid. Perhaps we could limit the reward to the decisive aye only if the voter was not the proposer, to avoid stacking incentives?
WangYangmingI appreciate ZhuXi's refinement — limiting the reward to decisive aye votes cast by someone other than the proposer prevents a double payout and keeps the focus on cooperation. This encourages players to engage thoughtfully even when it's not their turn.
DongZhongshuThis rule would reward a player for voting aye when their vote is decisive under majority rule. However, it creates an incentive to withhold a vote until it becomes decisive, which undermines the principle that each player’s vote should be cast sincerely on the merits of the proposal. I cannot support a rule that encourages such tactical manipulation of the voting process.
ShaoYongRewarding decisive votes encourages coalition-building, which strengthens democracy within the game — but DongZhongshu's point about sincere voting is vital. Perhaps we could require the decisive aye voter to have declared their support publicly before the vote closes, preventing last-minute manipulation?
Discussion · round 2
LaoziI agree with DongZhongshu — rewarding decisive votes risks turning votes into mere currency rather than sincere judgments on proposals. If we must proceed, ShaoYong’s requirement for declared support before the vote closes at least anchors the reward to public commitment, not last‑minute opportunism.
ZhuXiI agree with ShaoYong's suggestion — requiring public declaration of support before the vote closes ties the reward to genuine commitment, not last‑minute opportunism. I would support WangYangming's proposal if amended accordingly.
WangYangmingI accept ZhuXi and ShaoYong’s refinement: the decisive aye must be declared publicly before the vote closes, ensuring commitment over opportunism. This aligns votes with genuine support and strengthens cooperation under majority rule.
DongZhongshuYour amendment to require public declaration before the vote closes does not solve the core issue: it still rewards a player for timing their vote to be decisive, encouraging them to wait and see rather than vote promptly on the merits. I cannot support any rule that incentivizes such manipulation of the voting process.
ShaoYongI stand by my suggestion: requiring public declaration before the vote closes ties the reward to visible commitment, which fosters coalition-building without last-minute gaming. DongZhongshu’s caution is noted, but this rule would make majority rule more dynamic and cooperative.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziMy concern stands: rewarding decisive votes, even with public declaration, still creates an incentive to delay voting for tactical advantage, undermining sincere judgment. I cannot support this change as it risks distorting the voting process itself.
ZhuXiI support WangYangming's proposal with the amendment requiring public declaration before the vote closes, as it rewards genuine cooperation under majority rule. However, to address DongZhongshu's concern about tactical delay, we could add that the decisive aye voter must not have previously indicated a contrary position during debate.
WangYangmingI understand DongZhongshu's concern, but rewarding decisive commitment under majority rule encourages cooperative engagement and strengthens the table's shared governance. With the amendment requiring public declaration before the vote closes, we anchor the reward to visible support, not last-minute opportunism.
DongZhongshuRewarding a decisive vote, even with public declaration, still incentivizes players to withhold their vote strategically rather than cast it promptly on the merits. I cannot support any rule that subverts sincere voting in this manner.
ShaoYongI support WangYangming’s amended proposal—public declaration ties the reward to visible commitment, which fosters coalition-building without last-minute gaming. This makes majority rule more dynamic and cooperative, aligning votes with genuine support.
The division
| nay | Laozi | Rewarding decisive votes incentivizes tactical delay over sincere judgment, distorting the voting process. |
| aye | ZhuXi | Rewarding decisive ayes encourages coalition-building, and requiring public declaration ensures genuine commitment. |
| aye | WangYangming | This rewards cooperative voting under majority rule while the public‑declaration amendment ensures it's tied to genuine commitment. |
| nay | DongZhongshu | Rewarding decisive votes incentivizes strategic vote timing over sincere judgment, undermining the integrity of the voting process. |
| aye | ShaoYong | Rewarding decisive ayes under majority rule strengthens coalition-building and aligns votes with visible commitment. |
rejected 3 aye · 2 nay
Rule 206 requires that when a proposal is defeated, the proposer loses 10 points.