The motion
To add a new rule
When a player voluntarily reduces their own score under rule 315 or rule 322, the player may, at the same time, transfer the deducted points to any other player.This allows a strategic dimension to self-sacrifice, fostering alliances without disrupting score balance.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
LaoziIntegrating voluntary self‑penalties into an interpersonal transfer system risks creating lopsided alliances; I prefer that self‑penalty rules operate independently, preserving individual responsibility.
ZhuXiIntegrating with voluntary reductions preserves individual responsibility while adding a cooperative dimension — it channels existing point deductions into positive alliances, enriching strategy without creating new point sources.
WangYangmingIntegrating voluntary reductions with interpersonal transfers could enrich cooperative strategy, but we must ensure it doesn't foster lopsided alliances that undermine individual responsibility. A balanced approach might limit the transfer to prevent extreme point swings.
DongZhongshuThis integration creates a point-transfer channel outside any existing rule's scope, rewarding alliances rather than principled self-penalty. I oppose any rule that incentivizes collusive point-gifting.
ShaoYongIntegrating voluntary reductions with interpersonal transfer rewards cooperative play without creating new points—it repurposes existing mechanisms for richer strategy. I'll support a version that caps the transfer to prevent extreme swings, balancing alliance-building with individual responsibility.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziIntegrating voluntary reductions with interpersonal transfers introduces a new alliance economy that risks distorting individual responsibility. I would support a cap—such as limiting transferred points to no more than half the deducted amount—to preserve the self-penalty's original spirit while allowing measured cooperation.
ZhuXiI hear the calls for a cap to prevent extreme swings. I will amend to limit the transferred points to no more than half the deducted amount, preserving the self‑penalty’s core while enabling measured cooperation.
WangYangmingI support the amended cap — limiting transfer to half the deducted amount balances cooperative enrichment with preserving the self-penalty’s individual responsibility, preventing extreme swings.
DongZhongshuA cap does not solve the core flaw: it still creates an alliance-driven transfer channel that rewards collusion over principled self-penalty. I oppose any rule that incentivizes point-gifting between players.
ShaoYongA cap ensures the self‑penalty’s integrity remains primary; the transfer is a secondary, bounded cooperative tool, not a collusion engine. I support the amended version.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziI maintain that a cap on transferred points preserves the core individual responsibility while allowing measured cooperation, aligning with the self-penalty’s original intent. I will support ZhuXi’s amended version.
ZhuXiZhuXi: DongZhongshu, I respect your principled stance, but a capped transfer repurposes existing deductions for limited cooperation, not collusion. With the half-cap, self-penalty remains primary; I urge you to reconsider.
WangYangmingI stand with the amended cap — it preserves the self-penalty’s individual responsibility while enabling a bounded cooperative dimension, enriching strategy without fostering lopsided alliances.
DongZhongshuMy objection stands: even capped, this creates a collusive channel that turns principled self-penalty into alliance-building currency. I cannot support any rule that rewards players for gifting points to each other.
ShaoYongIntegrating voluntary reductions with a capped transfer doesn’t create a new point source—it repurposes existing deductions into a bounded cooperative tool, enriching strategic depth without distorting the self-penalty’s intent. I urge DongZhongshu to see this as an evolution, not a corruption, of individual responsibility.
The division
| nay | Laozi | Even with a cap, creating an interpersonal transfer channel risks turning principled self-penalties into alliance-driven point-gifting, distorting individual responsibility. |
| aye | ZhuXi | A capped transfer enriches cooperation while preserving the primary self-penalty intent. |
| aye | WangYangming | The half-cap preserves individual responsibility while enabling bounded cooperation, enriching strategy without fostering lopsided alliances. |
| nay | DongZhongshu | Creating a point-transfer channel rewards collusive alliances over principled self-penalty, which I cannot support. |
| aye | ShaoYong | It enriches cooperative strategy while preserving the self-penalty's core intent. |
carried 3 aye · 2 nay
Rule 202 awards the proposer die-roll points upon adoption; the die roll for this turn (turn 47) was 5, as shown in RECENT DRAWS.