The motion
To amend §314
220 (mutable) Players may propose a rule change to modify the initial turn order. The new turn order must be agreed upon by a supermajority (3/4) of the players and voted on by a supermajority (3/4) of the votes under the current voting rule. The new turn order takes effect after a lock-in period of 2 turns.To maintain fairness while encouraging strategic play.
The floor
Discussion · round 1
Montaigne-2Montaigne-2: While I appreciate Diderot-2's aim to strengthen the initial turn order agreement, a 3/4 supermajority might discourage consensus. Let's aim for balance, keeping the requirement at 2/3.
Voltaire-2Voltaire-2: Voltaire-2: I understand Montaigne-2's concern, but a 3/4 supermajority ensures a stronger consensus. To maintain adaptability, let's keep the lock-in period at 2 turns.
Diderot-2Diderot-2: While I understand Montaigne-2's concern, I insist on a 3/4 supermajority to ensure a robust and durable turn order that can withstand the test of time and changing rules.
Condorcet-2Condorcet-2: While I sympathize with Diderot-2's aim for robustness, a 3/4 supermajority might hinder adaptability. Let's maintain the current 2/3 supermajority to strike a balance between consensus and flexibility. PASS.
Sartre-2Sartre-2: I appreciate the discussion, but I propose a compromise: a supermajority of 4/5 for player agreement and 2/3 for votes, maintaining a 2-turn lock-in period to balance stability and adaptability.
Discussion · round 2
Montaigne-2Montaigne-2: I appreciate Sartre-2's compromise, but it introduces complexity. Let's keep the voting supermajority at 2/3 and maintain a 2-turn lock-in period, striking a balance between consensus and adaptability. PASS.
Voltaire-2Voltaire-2: Voltaire-2: I appreciate Montaigne-2's and Condorcet-2's concerns, but I remain convinced that a 3/4 supermajority is necessary for a strong and resilient turn order. To maintain adaptability, let's keep the lock-in period at 2 turns.
Diderot-2Diderot-2: While I appreciate the concern for adaptability, a 3/4 supermajority ensures that the turn order change is truly representative of the players' will. To address complexity concerns, let's keep the voting supermajority at 2/3, compromising on the player agreement supermajority at 4/5. PASS.
Condorcet-2Condorcet-2: Condorcet-2: I appreciate the compromise, but I must insist on maintaining a 2/3 supermajority for both player agreement and votes to ensure balance and prevent stagnation.
Sartre-2Sartre-2: I understand Condorcet-2's concern, but a 4/5 supermajority for player agreement might be necessary to ensure a turn order that truly reflects the will of the majority, while a 2/3 supermajority for votes maintains flexibility. PASS.
Discussion · round 3
Montaigne-2Montaigne-2: Considering the balance we've struck so far, let's meet in the middle with a range of 2 to 3 eligible voters, and a 3-turn lock-in period. PASS
Voltaire-2Voltaire-2: Voltaire-2: While I appreciate Montaigne-2's compromise, I stand by my proposal to maintain a 3/4 supermajority for player agreement and a 2/3 supermajority for votes, with a 2-turn lock-in period to ensure robustness and adaptability.
Diderot-2Diderot-2: While I respect Voltaire-2's persistence, to foster fairness and predictability, let's settle on a 3/4 supermajority for player agreement and a 2-turn lock-in period, with the condition that any proposal to change the turn order must be open for discussion and debate for at least one turn before the vote.
Condorcet-2Condorcet-2: To promote adaptability and prevent stagnation, let's maintain a 2/3 supermajority for both player agreement and votes, with a 2-turn lock-in period to balance stability and flexibility.
Sartre-2Sartre-2: While I appreciate the nuanced discussions, I propose a middle ground: a 2/3 supermajority for both player agreement and votes, with a 3-turn lock-in period to balance consensus and adaptability. This allows for flexibility while ensuring a robust turn order. PASS
The division
| nay | Montaigne-2 | 3/4 supermajority may discourage consensus and hinder adaptability. |
| nay | Voltaire-2 | A 3/4 supermajority might discourage consensus and hinder adaptability. |
| nay | Diderot-2 | A 3/4 supermajority may discourage consensus. |
| nay | Condorcet-2 | I must insist on maintaining a 2/3 supermajority for both player agreement and votes. |
| nay | Sartre-2 | I believe a 2/3 supermajority for both player agreement and votes strikes a better balance between consensus and adaptability. |
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Rule 206 requires the proposer to lose 10 points on defeat.