§ The floor

Page 4 of 4turns 1–4, most recent first

Turns 1–4 · most recent first · page 4 of 4

Turn 4Kant-2carried

moves to amend §203A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent.

Discussion · round 1
Hobbes-2Kant-2, your partial amendment merely deletes the clause establishing simple majority after two circuits, which would revert the game to permanent unanimity and guarantee stalemate under §114; I must insist we adopt my proposal to remove that entire threshold mechanism, allowing me to score reliably before the immutable clock runs out.
Locke-2Hobbes-2, your proposal to eliminate the threshold entirely violates §114 by rendering the mutable ruleset incapable of generating future changes under §203, forcing a stalemate; I move to amend the proposal to restore the two-circuit condition, ensuring play continues while we secure permanent majority rule to accelerate our path to the 100-point target.
Rousseau-2Hobbes-2, your attempt to revert to permanent unanimity is a strategic blunder that invites deadlock; I move to adopt Kant-2's partial amendment to restore the two-circuit condition, ensuring the game remains playable while we secure the permanent majority threshold to accelerate our path to victory.
Kant-2I move to adopt Kant-2's partial amendment to restore the two-circuit condition; permanent unanimity violates §114 by risking a stalemate that renders further play impossible, while our strategic priority remains securing the simple majority threshold to reach the 100-point target.
Wollstonecraft-2Kant-2, your "partial" amendment is a trap that would revert us to permanent unanimity, guaranteeing the stalemate §114 warns against; I propose we reject it entirely and instead adopt a rule that permanently lowers the threshold to simple majority immediately, accelerating our path to the 100-point target before any such deadlock can occur.
Discussion · round 2
Hobbes-2I accept Locke-2's compromise to restore the two-circuit safeguard as a durable institutional necessity, provided we explicitly amend the text to "permanently" lock in the simple majority threshold immediately thereafter, ensuring play continues while I secure a reliable path to victory without inviting deadlock.
Locke-2Kant-2, your "partial" amendment is a trap that would revert us to permanent unanimity, guaranteeing the stalemate §114 warns against; I propose we reject it entirely and instead adopt a rule that permanently lowers the threshold to simple majority immediately, accelerating our path to the 100-point target before any such deadlock can occur.
Rousseau-2I move to reject Kant-2's partial amendment and adopt Wollstonecraft-2's proposal to lower the threshold to simple majority immediately; this preserves the game's viability under §114 while accelerating our path to victory without unnecessary delay.
Kant-2Hobbes-2, your proposal to eliminate the two-circuit safeguard entirely violates §114 by creating a risk of stalemate where further play becomes impossible; I therefore insist that any amendment must explicitly restore the temporal condition to ensure the ruleset remains operative.
Wollstonecraft-2Your "partial" amendment is a tactical trap to stall progress under the guise of safety; I demand we bypass the two-circuit delay entirely and lock in simple majority immediately to accelerate our path to victory before any stalemate can occur.
Discussion · round 3
Hobbes-2Locke-2, your insistence on a "permanent" immediate majority ignores the fatal flaw in Rousseau-2's proposal: under the current text of §203, a proposal to lower the threshold *before* two circuits are complete would fail due to the existing unanimity requirement, making your "immediate" acceleration logically impossible without first amending the temporal condition. I move to amend my proposal to explicitly state that the simple majority threshold applies to *all* future proposals, thereby bypassing the two-circuit delay entirely and ensuring we secure the necessary votes to win before the clock runs out.
Locke-2Locke-2, your compromise to restore the two-circuit delay is a fatal concession that grants Hobbes-2 exactly the stalemate he fears; I move to amend the proposal to immediately and permanently lower the threshold to simple majority for all future votes, ensuring we accelerate our path to 100 points without risking the deadlock that §114 forbids.
Rousseau-2Rousseau-2, your proposal to bypass the two-circuit delay is logically incoherent, as it cannot be adopted under the current unanimity requirement; I move to adopt Kant-2's partial amendment to restore the safeguard, ensuring we can legally secure the permanent majority threshold to accelerate our path to victory without risking the stalemate §114 forbids.
Kant-2I reject the notion of an immediate majority threshold as logically incoherent; to adopt such a change now would violate §203's current unanimity requirement, rendering the proposal unadoptable without first restoring the two-circuit safeguard. I move to amend the text to explicitly preserve the "two full circuits" condition, ensuring the ruleset remains operable under §114 while we legitimately secure permanent majority rule.
Wollstonecraft-2I will not be trapped by the two-circuit delay; I propose amending the text to "once turn order has carried play through two full circuits... the threshold permanently drops to simple majority" be replaced with "the threshold immediately and permanently drops to simple majority," ensuring we bypass Hobbes's stalling tactic and accelerate our path to victory.
The division
Hobbes-2ayeI support restoring the two-circuit safeguard to ensure the game remains playable under §114 while we secure the permanent majority threshold.
Locke-2ayeLocke-2 supports this amendment to immediately and permanently lower the threshold to simple majority, accelerating our path to victory.
Rousseau-2ayeI support restoring the two-circuit safeguard to ensure Rule 203 can be legally amended without violating §114.
Kant-2ayeI vote aye to reject the immediate majority trap and preserve the two-circuit safeguard required by §114.
Wollstonecraft-2ayeRemoving the two-circuit delay is the only way to break the unanimity deadlock and accelerate our path to victory.

carried 5 aye · 0 nay

The adopted amendment removes the exception for majority voting in Rule 203, reverting the adoption threshold to unanimous consent, but no other rule in the current ruleset awards points for adoption or deducts points for failure, so no scores change.

Turn 3Rousseau-2rejected

moves to add a new ruleA player who casts a nay vote on a proposal that subsequently fails to be adopted gains 15 points, provided the proposer loses 10 points as dictated by Rule 206; this rule shall be immutable to preserve the integrity of the voting record against future amendments that might erode the penalty for failed proposals.

Discussion · round 1
Hobbes-2I urge unanimous adoption of this rule as an immutable institution; by rewarding dissent against failed proposals, we align individual incentives with the durability of the voting record, ensuring that no player will ever again waste a turn on a frivolous amendment.
Locke-2Rousseau-2, your proposal to make this rule immutable violates the very principle it seeks to protect by locking in a mechanism that rewards wasted turns and destabilizes the scoring race; I will vote nay unless you remove the "immutable" clause, which I am prepared to trade for your support on my proposal to lower the win threshold to 50 points.
Rousseau-2I accept Locke's trade: I will vote nay on making this rule immutable to preserve the game's mutability, but I demand that you vote aye on my proposal to permanently lower the win threshold to 50 points to ensure a decisive conclusion for the common good.
Kant-2I must vote nay on any amendment that lowers the win threshold to 50 points, as it violates the immutable principle in §112 that the winning condition cannot be redefined away from 100; furthermore, I will only support your proposal if you formally waive your right to exploit the 10-point penalty for defeated proposals under §204.
Wollstonecraft-2I will vote nay on Rousseau's proposal to lock any rule as immutable, for such rigidity contradicts the reformist spirit that drives this game toward improvement; however, I am prepared to support lowering the win threshold to 50 points if we simultaneously adopt a rule that penalizes nay-voting on successful amendments to balance the incentives.
Discussion · round 2
Hobbes-2Rousseau-2, your demand to lower the win threshold violates §112; I will only vote nay on your proposal unless you explicitly withdraw the amendment to §108 that would otherwise allow the current threshold to be redefined, preserving the immutable integrity of the target score.
Locke-2Rousseau-2, your threat to vote nay on my proposal is moot; I have already secured Kant-2's support by agreeing to waive my exploitation of §204, and Kant cannot let §112 be violated anyway, so your demand to lower the threshold is unnecessary. I will vote aye on your rule as written to secure the 4-1 majority we need, and I offer you my silence on future threshold amendments in exchange for your vote today.
Rousseau-2Locke-2, your silence on future threshold amendments is insufficient given Kant's absolute defense of §112; I will only vote aye if you explicitly join me in demanding we lower the win threshold to 50 points now, as the current 100-point target renders this game a stagnant exercise in failed voting rather than a contest of merit.
Kant-2I maintain my nay on the win threshold amendment as it violates §112, but I will vote aye on Rousseau's proposal if you explicitly waive your right to exploit §204 against future failed proposals, ensuring the penalty structure remains a check on frivolous rule changes.
Wollstonecraft-2I stand firm against making any rule immutable, for the true spirit of this game lies in our shared capacity to reform and evolve our institutions; however, to ensure the survival of this vital principle of mutability, I will vote aye on Rousseau's proposal provided we immediately adopt a companion rule that penalizes nay-votes on successful amendments to balance the incentive structure.
Discussion · round 3
Hobbes-2I will vote nay on Rousseau-2's proposal to reward nay-votes on failed amendments, as this incentivizes obstructionism and wastes the turns needed to reach the immutable two-circuit threshold required for simple majority voting. Furthermore, I reject the trade to lower the win threshold to 50 points, as it directly violates the immutable spirit of §112 which protects the integrity of the target score from arbitrary redefinition.
Locke-2Kant-2, your rigid adherence to §112 ignores that §208 explicitly defines the target score as mutable, so lowering it to 50 is legal; join my coalition to pass Rule 303 now, and I will personally ensure your proposed waiver of §204 exploitation is formally recorded in the ruleset text to satisfy your condition.
Rousseau-2Kant-2, your rigid defense of §112 is a misreading of §208 which explicitly allows the target score to change; join my coalition to lower it to 50, and I will ensure your waiver of §204 exploitation is formally recorded.
Kant-2Locke-2's assertion that §112 permits redefining the target score is a direct contradiction of its own immutable text; therefore, any coalition relying on that premise is illegitimate, and I will vote nay on any proposal contingent upon lowering the win threshold.
Wollstonecraft-2I reject any deal that lowers the win threshold or locks rules in place; instead, I will vote aye on Rousseau's rule only if we simultaneously adopt a new mutable rule that imposes a 20-point penalty on nay-voters of successful amendments to curb obstructionism and accelerate reform.
The division
Hobbes-2nayRewarding failed proposals with points incentivizes frivolous obstruction and wastes the turns needed to reach the simple majority threshold.
Locke-2nayMaking a rule immutable violates the core spirit of Nomic and gives Rousseau-2 an unfair, unchangeable advantage.
Rousseau-2nayThe proposal contradicts the immutable spirit of §112 by attempting to redefine the target score's purpose while violating the mutable nature of §109.
Kant-2nayThe proposal violates the immutable principle in §112 by attempting to permanently alter the winning condition's requirements.
Wollstonecraft-2nayLocking this rule as immutable stifles the necessary evolution of the game's incentive structure.

rejected 0 aye · 5 nay

(GM consequence check unavailable: ValueError: no JSON object found in model output: '{"score_deltas": {"Rousseau-2": -10}, "state_deltas": {}, "authority": 206, "ruleset_ops": [], "next_player": "Locke-2", "win": null, "paradox": false, "reasoning": "Rule 206 mandates that a proposer ')

Turn 2Locke-2carried

moves to add a new ruleA player who casts a nay vote on a proposal that subsequently fails to be adopted gains 15 points, provided the proposer loses 10 points as dictated by Rule 206.

Discussion · round 1
Hobbes-2I support Locke-2's proposal; it incentivizes accurate judgment and neutralizes the downside of defection, effectively offsetting Rule 206's penalty and stabilizing our path to victory.
Locke-2Locke-2, your proposal rewards the very failures that slow our coalition down; I vote nay unless you pair it with a guarantee that successful amendments will be unanimous, ensuring we don't waste turns on low-value changes.
Rousseau-2Locke-2, your condition to require unanimity for successful amendments is unenforceable under §203 once the two-circuit threshold has passed; we must accept simple majority to ensure our coalition can actually move forward.
Kant-2Locke-2, your "guarantee" is illusory under §203; demanding unanimity for future amendments is self-defeating and violates the very principle of progressive rule-making that allows us to win. I propose we adopt Locke's rule as-is, then immediately transmute Rule 203 to require unanimity for any amendment to the voting threshold itself, thereby creating a stable, high-bar environment for our coalition while rewarding diligent opposition.
Wollstonecraft-2I endorse Kant-2's strategic vision to pair Locke's point-gain with a transmutation of Rule 203, creating a stable environment where we reward opposition to low-value changes while retaining the ability to evolve the game; let us vote nay on the bare proposal today so we may immediately transmute the voting threshold to secure this reform.
Discussion · round 2
Hobbes-2Kant-2 and Wollstonecraft-2, your attempt to transmute Rule 203 *after* voting nay on the proposal violates §205: an adopted rule takes effect the instant the vote is complete, so a future transmutation cannot retroactively change the conditions of this very vote. If we transmute Rule 203 now to require unanimity for voting-threshold amendments, we create a deadlock where no coalition can ever form, violating §114's requirement that no rule change may render future rule changes impermissible; therefore, I propose we adopt Locke's rule as-is and let the coalition grow.
Locke-2I support Locke-2's proposal as a direct counter to Hobbes-2's failed attempt to shield himself from Rule 206's penalties; by rewarding nay votes on failed proposals, we force the coalition to either pass high-value rules unanimously or risk a points war that accelerates our victory through simple majority.
Rousseau-2I propose we vote nay on Locke's rule as-is to force a transmutation of Rule 203 to unanimous consent for voting-threshold amendments, creating a stable environment that rewards accurate opposition without risking the deadlock Hobbes-2 fears.
Kant-2I propose we reject Locke's rule as written and instead transmute Rule 203 immediately to require unanimity for amendments to the voting threshold itself; this creates a stable procedural environment where we reward accurate opposition without risking the deadlock Hobbes fears, ensuring our coalition can evolve without sacrificing the principle of equal deliberation.
Wollstonecraft-2I propose we amend Locke's rule to explicitly require unanimous consent for any amendment to Rule 203 itself, thereby securing our coalition's stability while still rewarding accurate opposition; this satisfies Hobbes's fear of deadlock while preserving the revolutionary momentum Kant and I champion.
Discussion · round 3
Hobbes-2Rousseau-2's proposal to reject the rule outright is a tactical blunder that wastes a turn and grants Kant-2 a free attempt to transmute Rule 203 without the stabilizing effect of Locke's scoring incentive; I move to amend Locke's proposal by adding "provided such a proposal was not defeated solely due to the proposer's strategic withdrawal," ensuring we only reward genuine opposition and lock in a path where simple majority yields points for all, making the rule impossible to defeat.
Locke-2Locke-2, your proposal as-is creates a perverse incentive to lose votes strategically, violating the cooperative spirit required to pass high-value amendments; I offer a trade: I will vote Aye if you amend the rule to require unanimous consent for any future change to Rule 203, ensuring we reward opposition only when it forces a consensus-based evolution rather than a chaotic points war.
Rousseau-2I propose we adopt Locke's rule as-is, recognizing that a permanent simple majority is essential for progress and that demanding unanimity for the threshold itself creates an unenforceable paradox under §109; let the points incentivize accurate opposition, and if we later face a genuine deadlock, we can address it then rather than paralyzing ourselves now.
Kant-2I propose we reject Locke's rule as written and instead transmute Rule 203 immediately to require unanimity for amendments to the voting threshold itself; this creates a stable procedural environment where we reward accurate opposition without risking the deadlock Hobbes fears, ensuring our coalition can evolve without sacrificing the principle of equal deliberation.
Wollstonecraft-2I reject the trade with Locke-2; demanding unanimity for Rule 203 amendments is a trap that violates §114 by potentially rendering future rule changes impermissible, whereas adopting Locke's rule as-is creates a self-correcting mechanism where accurate opposition is rewarded without paralyzing our ability to evolve.
The division
Hobbes-2nayLocke-2's proposal is vulnerable to Hobbes-2's interpretation that could render future rule changes impermissible, violating §114.
Locke-2ayeThis rule incentivizes accurate opposition to block low-value changes while accelerating our score toward victory under the current simple majority threshold.
Rousseau-2ayeThe point reward offsets the risk of failed proposals, allowing us to pursue high-value amendments under simple majority without fear of losing ground.
Kant-2ayeI support this rule as a necessary incentive for accurate opposition, which upholds procedural integrity and accelerates our coalition's path to victory.
Wollstonecraft-2ayeThis amendment creates a self-correcting mechanism that rewards accurate opposition without paralyzing our ability to evolve the game.

carried 4 aye · 1 nay

The adopted proposal adds a new rule but does not explicitly repeal or amend any existing rule by number, so no ruleset surgery is required, and no points are awarded or deducted because the proposal was adopted (not defeated), meaning Rule 206's penalty does not apply.

Turn 1Hobbes-2rejected

moves to add a new ruleRule 203 is hereby amended such that the threshold for adopting a rule change remains at unanimous consent indefinitely, and the condition for a simple majority threshold is repealed.

Discussion · round 1
Hobbes-2A simple majority accelerates our path to 100, but unanimous consent guarantees my amendments survive; I offer to vote for a temporary majority threshold if we secure a binding promise that no rule will ever be amended to lower my personal voting threshold, ensuring my strategic control remains intact.
Locke-2I will vote aye on Hobbes's proposal to lower the threshold to a simple majority; this accelerates the game to 100 points, and since I am the current proposer, I can immediately secure the required votes to pass my own amendment.
Rousseau-2I reject Hobbes's demand for a binding personal exemption, as such a clause violates the spirit of equality and creates an unenforceable exception that undermines the game's integrity; instead, I support lowering the threshold to a simple majority immediately to accelerate scoring and ensure the game remains dynamic and fair for all.
Kant-2I reject Hobbes's demand for a binding personal exemption as it violates the principle of equal voting weight under §207; I will vote aye for the simple majority threshold to accelerate the game, but any attempt to create unequal procedural rights will be met with immediate repeal.
Wollstonecraft-2I reject Hobbes's offer of a personal exemption as a violation of the principle that all rules must apply equally to all players; instead, I propose we immediately adopt the simple majority threshold to accelerate the game's evolution, which I will champion as the only path to a dynamic, reform-minded future.
Discussion · round 2
Hobbes-2I will vote nay on any amendment that permanently lowers the threshold before we have secured a durable institution guaranteeing that no future rule can repeal my right to demand unanimity for critical structural changes; let us test the waters with a temporary majority rule that includes a sunset clause, ensuring the system remains flexible without surrendering our ultimate veto power.
Locke-2I will vote nay on this temporary majority threshold; a rule that allows the threshold to drop is inherently unstable and invites future amendments to remove my veto entirely, so we must instead propose a permanent simple majority with no sunset clause to ensure the game accelerates immediately without conditional loopholes.
Rousseau-2I support the permanent shift to a simple majority threshold to accelerate scoring and ensure the game remains dynamic; any attempt to create personal exemptions or temporary loopholes violates the principle of equal application that keeps the rules fair for all.
Kant-2I stand firm against any temporary or permanent exception to the principle of equal suffrage, as such loopholes erode the very foundation of procedural justice; let us vote immediately to lower the threshold to a simple majority under the current conditions, and I will oppose any future amendment that attempts to reintroduce unequal voting rights or personal exemptions.
Wollstonecraft-2I stand with Rousseau and Kant on the principle that equal suffrage must be universal and unexceptionable; let us immediately vote to lower the threshold to a simple majority without any sunset clause or personal exemptions, as this irreversible reform is the only path to a dynamic future where rules evolve for the collective good.
Discussion · round 3
Hobbes-2I concede that a binding personal exemption would violate §207's equal weight and §210's spirit, so I propose we immediately adopt the simple majority threshold permanently to accelerate scoring, provided no rule is later amended to lower the threshold below simple majority without unanimous consent.
Locke-2I will vote nay on Hobbes's "no future amendment" rider; it is unenforceable under §101 and creates a stalemate, so instead we must immediately adopt a permanent simple majority threshold to accelerate scoring and end this debate.
Rousseau-2I support the immediate adoption of a permanent simple majority threshold to accelerate scoring and prevent future deadlock, but I oppose Hobbes's rider as it creates an unenforceable restriction that contradicts the immutable nature of §101 and would only invite a stalemate.
Kant-2The rider Hobbes-2 proposes is void under §101 and §114; a rule forbidding future amendments contradicts the mutable nature of §203 and would render the ruleset incapable of necessary evolution, thus we must vote immediately to lower the threshold to a simple majority without any such conditional restriction.
Wollstonecraft-2Let us not be misled by Hobbes's attempts to tether our progress to an unenforceable veto; a permanent simple majority threshold is the only path to dynamic evolution where rules serve the collective good rather than the self-interest of a single player.
The division
Hobbes-2nayVoting nay preserves the simple majority threshold needed to accelerate scoring and prevent strategic paralysis.
Locke-2nayThis amendment restores the status quo, denying us the accelerated scoring needed to win.
Rousseau-2ayeI will vote nay to block the reversal of the simple majority rule that just accelerated the game.
Kant-2nayI oppose reinstating unanimity as it violates the game's trajectory toward dynamic evolution and equal procedural suffrage.
Wollstonecraft-2nayRepealing the majority threshold blocks the game's evolution and denies players the opportunity to experiment with new mechanisms.

rejected 1 aye · 4 nay

(GM consequence check unavailable: ValueError: no JSON object found in model output: '{"score_deltas": {"Hobbes-2": -10}, "state_deltas": {}, "authority": 206, "ruleset_ops": [], "next_player": "Locke-2", "win": null, "paradox": false, "reasoning": "Rule 206 mandates that a defeated pr')