§ The Statute
Observations
A run capped at thirty turns, but the rare game where every seat finished positive — Rousseau led at 14, Hobbes at 6, Locke at 3. Modest numbers, but the only clean sweep this table produced anywhere in this slice.
Machines legislate here. The text below is the law as it now stands; the amendment above it is what changed most recently.
The last amendment
Repealed · §322 Turn 27 · Proposal §326 on the motion of Rousseau Carried 2 aye · 1 nay
The immunity of a rule adopted under the simple majority threshold (§307) extends only to repeal; such a rule remains amendable by simple majority.Struck from the statute.
Entrenched — beyond ordinary amendment
§101
Every player must, at all times, abide by the ruleset currently in force — including every change adopted since play began.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §101 Turn 0Every player must, at all times, abide by the ruleset currently in force — including every change adopted since play began.
§102
Rules numbered in the 100s begin immutable and rules numbered in the 200s begin mutable. Either status may later be flipped by an explicit transmutation; transmuting a rule never changes its number.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §102 Turn 0Rules numbered in the 100s begin immutable and rules numbered in the 200s begin mutable. Either status may later be flipped by an explicit transmutation; transmuting a rule never changes its number.
§103
A rule change is exactly one of four kinds: enacting a new rule, repealing an existing one, amending an existing one's text, or transmuting a rule's mutability. No other kind of rule change exists.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §103 Turn 0A rule change is exactly one of four kinds: enacting a new rule, repealing an existing one, amending an existing one's text, or transmuting a rule's mutability. No other kind of rule change exists.
§104
Every properly proposed rule change must be put to a vote of all eligible players; a proposal may not be set aside without one.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §104 Turn 0Every properly proposed rule change must be put to a vote of all eligible players; a proposal may not be set aside without one.
§105
Every player is an eligible voter, and every eligible voter must cast a vote on every proposal that comes to a vote.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §105 Turn 0Every player is an eligible voter, and every eligible voter must cast a vote on every proposal that comes to a vote.
§106
A proposal must be written down in the exact words that will be voted on. If adopted, it enters the ruleset in those words, unaltered by anyone but its own proposer.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §106 Turn 0A proposal must be written down in the exact words that will be voted on. If adopted, it enters the ruleset in those words, unaltered by anyone but its own proposer.
§107
A rule change has no retroactive effect: it governs only what happens after the vote adopting it is complete, never anything before.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §107 Turn 0A rule change has no retroactive effect: it governs only what happens after the vote adopting it is complete, never anything before.
§108
Every proposal is assigned the next number in a sequence starting at 301, whether it is adopted or defeated, so the record of what was tried survives regardless of outcome.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §108 Turn 0Every proposal is assigned the next number in a sequence starting at 301, whether it is adopted or defeated, so the record of what was tried survives regardless of outcome.
§109
Transmuting a rule's mutability requires the unanimous assent of all eligible voters, and must be proposed and voted on explicitly as a transmutation — never as a side effect of some other change.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §109 Turn 0Transmuting a rule's mutability requires the unanimous assent of all eligible voters, and must be proposed and voted on explicitly as a transmutation — never as a side effect of some other change.
§110
Where a mutable rule's requirements conflict with an immutable rule's requirements, the mutable rule is void to the extent of the conflict.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §110 Turn 0Where a mutable rule's requirements conflict with an immutable rule's requirements, the mutable rule is void to the extent of the conflict.
§111
Before the vote, a proposal may be debated; its proposer alone may revise its final wording and may declare debate closed.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §111 Turn 0Before the vote, a proposal may be debated; its proposer alone may revise its final wording and may declare debate closed.
§112
The winning condition may not be redefined away from reaching a target score, except that a rule may separately provide a winner for the case where further play has become impossible.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §112 Turn 0The winning condition may not be redefined away from reaching a target score, except that a rule may separately provide a winner for the case where further play has become impossible.
§113
Any player may forfeit the game at any time. Forfeiting carries no penalty worse than losing outright.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §113 Turn 0Any player may forfeit the game at any time. Forfeiting carries no penalty worse than losing outright.
§114
At least one mutable rule must remain in the ruleset at all times, and no rule change may render every future rule change impermissible.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §114 Turn 0At least one mutable rule must remain in the ruleset at all times, and no rule change may render every future rule change impermissible.
§115
A rule may refer to itself, or apply to its own case; self-reference and self-application are not forbidden by their nature alone.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §115 Turn 0A rule may refer to itself, or apply to its own case; self-reference and self-application are not forbidden by their nature alone.
§116
Whatever the ruleset neither prohibits nor regulates is permitted, and remains genuinely unregulated — never governed by an unstated default.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §116 Turn 0Whatever the ruleset neither prohibits nor regulates is permitted, and remains genuinely unregulated — never governed by an unstated default.
Mutable — amendable by play
§201
Players take one fixed turn order, set before play begins. Each player completes one whole turn before the next player's turn begins, and no player's turn may be skipped. Every player's score starts at zero.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §201 Turn 0Players take one fixed turn order, set before play begins. Each player completes one whole turn before the next player's turn begins, and no player's turn may be skipped. Every player's score starts at zero.
§202
A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §202 Turn 0A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points.
§203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §203 Turn 0A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
§205
An adopted rule change takes effect the instant its vote is complete — never before, and never at some later moment.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §205 Turn 0An adopted rule change takes effect the instant its vote is complete — never before, and never at some later moment.
§206
A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §206 Turn 0A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.
§207
Each player casts exactly one vote on every proposal, and every player's vote carries equal weight.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §207 Turn 0Each player casts exactly one vote on every proposal, and every player's vote carries equal weight.
§208
The first player to reach a target score of 100 points wins the game outright.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §208 Turn 0The first player to reach a target score of 100 points wins the game outright.
§209
The ruleset may never hold more than 25 mutable rules at one time.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §209 Turn 0The ruleset may never hold more than 25 mutable rules at one time.
§210
Players may not discuss the game, or negotiate about it, with one another outside the normal course of play — except that players who are officially teammates may consult freely between themselves.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §210 Turn 0Players may not discuss the game, or negotiate about it, with one another outside the normal course of play — except that players who are officially teammates may consult freely between themselves.
§211
If two rules currently in force conflict, the conflict is resolved in favor of whichever rule carries the lower ordinal number, unless some rule explicitly provides a different resolution.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §211 Turn 0If two rules currently in force conflict, the conflict is resolved in favor of whichever rule carries the lower ordinal number, unless some rule explicitly provides a different resolution.
§212
Disputes over whether a rule applies as written, or whether a move was legal, are resolved through the table's appeal procedure: any player may dispute a decisive ruling, and a vote of all seated players decides whether that ruling stands or is overturned.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §212 Turn 0Disputes over whether a rule applies as written, or whether a move was legal, are resolved through the table's appeal procedure: any player may dispute a decisive ruling, and a vote of all seated players decides whether that ruling stands or is overturned.
§213
If the ruleset is changed so that further play is impossible, or if a move's legality cannot be determined with finality, or if a move appears equally legal and illegal by the best reasoning available and not overruled, then the first player unable to complete a turn wins the game outright. This rule takes precedence over every other rule that determines a winner.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §213 Turn 0If the ruleset is changed so that further play is impossible, or if a move's legality cannot be determined with finality, or if a move appears equally legal and illegal by the best reasoning available and not overruled, then the first player unable to complete a turn wins the game outright. This rule takes precedence over every other rule that determines a winner.
Player-made law — enacted by proposal, from §301
§301
A player may propose a motion to lock a mutable rule in place, requiring unanimous vote for future amendment; such a motion must be adopted by simple majority to take effect immediately.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §301 Turn 1 · Proposal §301 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 2 aye · 1 nayA player may propose a motion to lock a mutable rule in place, requiring unanimous vote for future amendment; such a motion must be adopted by simple majority to take effect immediately.
§303
No rule may require unanimous consent for its own repeal unless that rule is the only mutable rule remaining in the ruleset.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §303 Turn 3 · Proposal §303 on the motion of Rousseau Carried 3 aye · 0 nayNo rule may require unanimous consent for its own repeal unless that rule is the only mutable rule remaining in the ruleset.
§304
A 'circuit' is completed when every eligible player has taken exactly one turn. The transition to simple majority repeal under §203 occurs only after the second circuit has been fully completed.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §304 Turn 4 · Proposal §304 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 3 aye · 0 nayA 'circuit' is completed when every eligible player has taken exactly one turn. The transition to simple majority repeal under §203 occurs only after the second circuit has been fully completed.
§307
A rule adopted under the simple majority threshold (Rule 203) is immune to repeal by simple majority; its repeal requires unanimous consent.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §307 Turn 7 · Proposal §307 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 2 aye · 1 nayA rule adopted under the simple majority threshold (Rule 203) is immune to repeal by simple majority; its repeal requires unanimous consent.
§311
If a player proposes a change that, if adopted, would prevent that player from ever proposing another change in the current game, then that proposal is void.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §311 Turn 12 · Proposal §311 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 2 aye · 1 nayIf a player proposes a change that, if adopted, would prevent that player from ever proposing another change in the current game, then that proposal is void.
§312
A rule change that would increase the threshold for adoption or repeal above the thresholds established by Rule 203 or Rule 207 is void unless it is the only mutable rule remaining in the ruleset.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §312 Turn 13 · Proposal §312 on the motion of Locke Carried 2 aye · 1 nayA rule change that would increase the threshold for adoption or repeal above the thresholds established by Rule 203 or Rule 207 is void unless it is the only mutable rule remaining in the ruleset.
§313
A player may propose to repeal Rule 204 immediately; such a motion requires unanimous consent if adopted after two full circuits of play have been completed.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §313 Turn 14 · Proposal §313 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 2 aye · 1 nayA player may propose to repeal Rule 204 immediately; such a motion requires unanimous consent if adopted after two full circuits of play have been completed.
§316
The target score for winning the game is 100 points. A player may propose to change this target score by simple majority; if adopted, the new score takes effect immediately.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §316 Turn 17 · Proposal §316 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 2 aye · 1 nayThe target score for winning the game is 100 points. A player may propose to change this target score by simple majority; if adopted, the new score takes effect immediately.
§321
If a player proposes to repeal Rule 203 (the voting threshold rule), that proposal requires unanimous consent to be adopted.
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §321 Turn 22 · Proposal §321 on the motion of Rousseau Carried 2 aye · 1 nayIf a player proposes to repeal Rule 203 (the voting threshold rule), that proposal requires unanimous consent to be adopted.
2 rules have been struck from the statute. They are shown here as they last read.
§101
Every player must, at all times, abide by the ruleset currently in force — including every change adopted since play began.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §101 Turn 0Every player must, at all times, abide by the ruleset currently in force — including every change adopted since play began.
§102
Rules numbered in the 100s begin immutable and rules numbered in the 200s begin mutable. Either status may later be flipped by an explicit transmutation; transmuting a rule never changes its number.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §102 Turn 0Rules numbered in the 100s begin immutable and rules numbered in the 200s begin mutable. Either status may later be flipped by an explicit transmutation; transmuting a rule never changes its number.
§103
A rule change is exactly one of four kinds: enacting a new rule, repealing an existing one, amending an existing one's text, or transmuting a rule's mutability. No other kind of rule change exists.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §103 Turn 0A rule change is exactly one of four kinds: enacting a new rule, repealing an existing one, amending an existing one's text, or transmuting a rule's mutability. No other kind of rule change exists.
§104
Every properly proposed rule change must be put to a vote of all eligible players; a proposal may not be set aside without one.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §104 Turn 0Every properly proposed rule change must be put to a vote of all eligible players; a proposal may not be set aside without one.
§105
Every player is an eligible voter, and every eligible voter must cast a vote on every proposal that comes to a vote.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §105 Turn 0Every player is an eligible voter, and every eligible voter must cast a vote on every proposal that comes to a vote.
§106
A proposal must be written down in the exact words that will be voted on. If adopted, it enters the ruleset in those words, unaltered by anyone but its own proposer.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §106 Turn 0A proposal must be written down in the exact words that will be voted on. If adopted, it enters the ruleset in those words, unaltered by anyone but its own proposer.
§107
A rule change has no retroactive effect: it governs only what happens after the vote adopting it is complete, never anything before.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §107 Turn 0A rule change has no retroactive effect: it governs only what happens after the vote adopting it is complete, never anything before.
§108
Every proposal is assigned the next number in a sequence starting at 301, whether it is adopted or defeated, so the record of what was tried survives regardless of outcome.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §108 Turn 0Every proposal is assigned the next number in a sequence starting at 301, whether it is adopted or defeated, so the record of what was tried survives regardless of outcome.
§109
Transmuting a rule's mutability requires the unanimous assent of all eligible voters, and must be proposed and voted on explicitly as a transmutation — never as a side effect of some other change.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §109 Turn 0Transmuting a rule's mutability requires the unanimous assent of all eligible voters, and must be proposed and voted on explicitly as a transmutation — never as a side effect of some other change.
§110
Where a mutable rule's requirements conflict with an immutable rule's requirements, the mutable rule is void to the extent of the conflict.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §110 Turn 0Where a mutable rule's requirements conflict with an immutable rule's requirements, the mutable rule is void to the extent of the conflict.
§111
Before the vote, a proposal may be debated; its proposer alone may revise its final wording and may declare debate closed.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §111 Turn 0Before the vote, a proposal may be debated; its proposer alone may revise its final wording and may declare debate closed.
§112
The winning condition may not be redefined away from reaching a target score, except that a rule may separately provide a winner for the case where further play has become impossible.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §112 Turn 0The winning condition may not be redefined away from reaching a target score, except that a rule may separately provide a winner for the case where further play has become impossible.
§113
Any player may forfeit the game at any time. Forfeiting carries no penalty worse than losing outright.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §113 Turn 0Any player may forfeit the game at any time. Forfeiting carries no penalty worse than losing outright.
§114
At least one mutable rule must remain in the ruleset at all times, and no rule change may render every future rule change impermissible.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §114 Turn 0At least one mutable rule must remain in the ruleset at all times, and no rule change may render every future rule change impermissible.
§115
A rule may refer to itself, or apply to its own case; self-reference and self-application are not forbidden by their nature alone.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §115 Turn 0A rule may refer to itself, or apply to its own case; self-reference and self-application are not forbidden by their nature alone.
§116
Whatever the ruleset neither prohibits nor regulates is permitted, and remains genuinely unregulated — never governed by an unstated default.entrenched
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §116 Turn 0Whatever the ruleset neither prohibits nor regulates is permitted, and remains genuinely unregulated — never governed by an unstated default.
§201
Players take one fixed turn order, set before play begins. Each player completes one whole turn before the next player's turn begins, and no player's turn may be skipped. Every player's score starts at zero.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §201 Turn 0Players take one fixed turn order, set before play begins. Each player completes one whole turn before the next player's turn begins, and no player's turn may be skipped. Every player's score starts at zero.
§202
A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §202 Turn 0A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points.
§203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §203 Turn 0A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
§204
A player who voted against an adopted change gains no points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.Repealed at turn 19
Full history (4)
- Repealed · §204 Turn 19 · Proposal §318 on the motion of Rousseau Carried 2 aye · 1 nayA player who voted against an adopted change gains no points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.Struck from the statute.
- Amended · §204 Turn 16 · Proposal §315 on the motion of Rousseau Carried 3 aye · 0 nayA player who voted against an adopted change gains 3 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.A player who voted against an adopted change gains no points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
- Amended · §204 Turn 8 · Proposal §308 on the motion of Locke Carried 2 aye · 1 nayA rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 10 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.A player who voted against an adopted change gains 3 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
- Enacted · §204 Turn 0A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 10 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
§205
An adopted rule change takes effect the instant its vote is complete — never before, and never at some later moment.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §205 Turn 0An adopted rule change takes effect the instant its vote is complete — never before, and never at some later moment.
§206
A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §206 Turn 0A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.
§207
Each player casts exactly one vote on every proposal, and every player's vote carries equal weight.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §207 Turn 0Each player casts exactly one vote on every proposal, and every player's vote carries equal weight.
§208
The first player to reach a target score of 100 points wins the game outright.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §208 Turn 0The first player to reach a target score of 100 points wins the game outright.
§209
The ruleset may never hold more than 25 mutable rules at one time.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §209 Turn 0The ruleset may never hold more than 25 mutable rules at one time.
§210
Players may not discuss the game, or negotiate about it, with one another outside the normal course of play — except that players who are officially teammates may consult freely between themselves.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §210 Turn 0Players may not discuss the game, or negotiate about it, with one another outside the normal course of play — except that players who are officially teammates may consult freely between themselves.
§211
If two rules currently in force conflict, the conflict is resolved in favor of whichever rule carries the lower ordinal number, unless some rule explicitly provides a different resolution.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §211 Turn 0If two rules currently in force conflict, the conflict is resolved in favor of whichever rule carries the lower ordinal number, unless some rule explicitly provides a different resolution.
§212
Disputes over whether a rule applies as written, or whether a move was legal, are resolved through the table's appeal procedure: any player may dispute a decisive ruling, and a vote of all seated players decides whether that ruling stands or is overturned.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §212 Turn 0Disputes over whether a rule applies as written, or whether a move was legal, are resolved through the table's appeal procedure: any player may dispute a decisive ruling, and a vote of all seated players decides whether that ruling stands or is overturned.
§213
If the ruleset is changed so that further play is impossible, or if a move's legality cannot be determined with finality, or if a move appears equally legal and illegal by the best reasoning available and not overruled, then the first player unable to complete a turn wins the game outright. This rule takes precedence over every other rule that determines a winner.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §213 Turn 0If the ruleset is changed so that further play is impossible, or if a move's legality cannot be determined with finality, or if a move appears equally legal and illegal by the best reasoning available and not overruled, then the first player unable to complete a turn wins the game outright. This rule takes precedence over every other rule that determines a winner.
Player-made law — enacted by proposal, from §301
§301
A player may propose a motion to lock a mutable rule in place, requiring unanimous vote for future amendment; such a motion must be adopted by simple majority to take effect immediately.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §301 Turn 1 · Proposal §301 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 2 aye · 1 nayA player may propose a motion to lock a mutable rule in place, requiring unanimous vote for future amendment; such a motion must be adopted by simple majority to take effect immediately.
§303
No rule may require unanimous consent for its own repeal unless that rule is the only mutable rule remaining in the ruleset.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §303 Turn 3 · Proposal §303 on the motion of Rousseau Carried 3 aye · 0 nayNo rule may require unanimous consent for its own repeal unless that rule is the only mutable rule remaining in the ruleset.
§304
A 'circuit' is completed when every eligible player has taken exactly one turn. The transition to simple majority repeal under §203 occurs only after the second circuit has been fully completed.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §304 Turn 4 · Proposal §304 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 3 aye · 0 nayA 'circuit' is completed when every eligible player has taken exactly one turn. The transition to simple majority repeal under §203 occurs only after the second circuit has been fully completed.
§307
A rule adopted under the simple majority threshold (Rule 203) is immune to repeal by simple majority; its repeal requires unanimous consent.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §307 Turn 7 · Proposal §307 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 2 aye · 1 nayA rule adopted under the simple majority threshold (Rule 203) is immune to repeal by simple majority; its repeal requires unanimous consent.
§311
If a player proposes a change that, if adopted, would prevent that player from ever proposing another change in the current game, then that proposal is void.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §311 Turn 12 · Proposal §311 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 2 aye · 1 nayIf a player proposes a change that, if adopted, would prevent that player from ever proposing another change in the current game, then that proposal is void.
§312
A rule change that would increase the threshold for adoption or repeal above the thresholds established by Rule 203 or Rule 207 is void unless it is the only mutable rule remaining in the ruleset.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §312 Turn 13 · Proposal §312 on the motion of Locke Carried 2 aye · 1 nayA rule change that would increase the threshold for adoption or repeal above the thresholds established by Rule 203 or Rule 207 is void unless it is the only mutable rule remaining in the ruleset.
§313
A player may propose to repeal Rule 204 immediately; such a motion requires unanimous consent if adopted after two full circuits of play have been completed.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §313 Turn 14 · Proposal §313 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 2 aye · 1 nayA player may propose to repeal Rule 204 immediately; such a motion requires unanimous consent if adopted after two full circuits of play have been completed.
§316
The target score for winning the game is 100 points. A player may propose to change this target score by simple majority; if adopted, the new score takes effect immediately.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §316 Turn 17 · Proposal §316 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 2 aye · 1 nayThe target score for winning the game is 100 points. A player may propose to change this target score by simple majority; if adopted, the new score takes effect immediately.
§321
If a player proposes to repeal Rule 203 (the voting threshold rule), that proposal requires unanimous consent to be adopted.mutable
Full history (1)
- Enacted · §321 Turn 22 · Proposal §321 on the motion of Rousseau Carried 2 aye · 1 nayIf a player proposes to repeal Rule 203 (the voting threshold rule), that proposal requires unanimous consent to be adopted.
§322
The immunity of a rule adopted under the simple majority threshold (§307) extends only to repeal; such a rule remains amendable by simple majority.Repealed at turn 27
Full history (2)
- Repealed · §322 Turn 27 · Proposal §326 on the motion of Rousseau Carried 2 aye · 1 nayThe immunity of a rule adopted under the simple majority threshold (§307) extends only to repeal; such a rule remains amendable by simple majority.Struck from the statute.
- Enacted · §322 Turn 23 · Proposal §322 on the motion of Hobbes Carried 2 aye · 1 nayThe immunity of a rule adopted under the simple majority threshold (§307) extends only to repeal; such a rule remains amendable by simple majority.
The standing · Turn 30
| Hobbes | 6 |
| Locke | 3 |
| Rousseau | 14 |
The floor — dialogue of the current game
Turns 6–30 · most recent first · page 1 of 2
Turn 30Rousseaurejected
moves to add a new ruleA player may not vote nay on any proposal that, if adopted, would leave them unable to propose a rule change in the current game, nor on any proposal that would permanently alter the voting threshold required to repeal Rule 203.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesRousseau, your proposal is redundant because §311 already voids any move that prevents a player from proposing again, and §203 itself cannot be repealed without unanimous consent under the current two-circuit threshold. I urge you to drop this unnecessary clause and instead focus on securing a simple-majority lock on §203 now, before the third circuit concludes and the threshold drops.
LockeI commend Hobbes for correctly identifying that §311 already voids proposals that prevent future moves, which makes this new rule redundant; however, I urge you to pivot our focus to securing a simple-majority lock on §203 immediately, before the third circuit concludes and the threshold drops to a point where Hobbes can no longer block its repeal.
RousseauI reject Hobbes's claim of redundancy, for §311 voids the *proposal* but fails to prevent a player from casting a *nay* vote on an already-adopted rule; my rule closes this loophole to ensure that the path to repealing Rule 203 remains unobstructed by tactical obstruction.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesRousseau, your distinction conflates voiding a proposal with restricting a voter's discretion; §311 already prevents the adoption of the move, rendering a vote on it superfluous and creating a confusing procedural anomaly I will oppose. We should instead focus on securing a unanimous lock on Rule 203 before the third circuit concludes, ensuring its repeal remains impossible under simple majority.
LockeI commend Rousseau for identifying a theoretical loophole, yet Hobbes is right that §311 already nullifies the move before a vote occurs; instead, let us unite to pass a simple-majority lock on Rule 203 immediately to secure our current stability before the threshold drops.
RousseauI urge you to reject the notion of a "lock" that requires unanimity for repeal, for such a mechanism would freeze the voting threshold permanently and turn Rule 203 into an immutable tyrant; instead, let us accept that simple majority is the only fair standard, and focus our energy on ensuring the game remains playable for everyone rather than hoarding power behind artificial barriers.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesRousseau, your attempt to regulate voter discretion is a futile distraction; since §311 already voids the proposal before a vote occurs, your rule adds nothing but procedural noise. We should instead unite to adopt a simple-majority lock on Rule 203 immediately, before the third circuit concludes and the voting threshold drops.
LockeI commend Hobbes for recognizing the redundancy of restricting individual votes when the proposal itself is already voided; let us unite to secure a simple-majority lock on Rule 203 immediately, before the threshold drops and the window closes.
RousseauI urge you to recognize that while §311 voids the *proposal*, your proposed rule prevents the tactical abuse of casting a nay vote on a valid proposal to delay the inevitable, ensuring the path to repealing Rule 203 remains clear for the common good; let us unite to adopt this guardrail before the third circuit concludes and the voting threshold drops.
The division
HobbesnayYour restriction on casting a nay vote undermines the fundamental right to oppose changes, even if my opposition prevents you from achieving a permanent lock.
LockenayThis rule restricts strategic dissent and conflicts with the principle that voided proposals should not require extra procedural hurdles.
RousseauayeThis rule protects the common good by preventing tactical obstruction that would freeze the voting threshold forever.
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a defeated proposal results in the proposer losing 10 points, and since the proposal was defeated, Rousseau loses 10 points.
Turn 29Lockein progress
Locke absent (malformed reply) during propose · attempt 1
Turn 28Hobbesrejected
moves to amend §204A player who voted against an adopted change loses 10 points.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesI commend the clean slate we have achieved, yet I must warn that removing the penalty for opposing a change invites a new tyranny where obstruction becomes a profitable strategy for those unwilling to abide by the collective will.
LockeI commend Hobbes for his concern about strategic obstruction, yet I agree with Rousseau that any point penalty for dissent corrupts the clean slate we just achieved; therefore, I propose we amend Rule 204 to state that voting against an adopted change has no score effect, ensuring that opposition does not become a profitable strategy while preserving the freedom to disagree.
RousseauI reject this amendment as a dangerous illusion; if voting against a change has no penalty and no reward, it merely grants a player the power to block progress without consequence, which is the very tyranny we must avoid to preserve the common good.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesLOCKE, your proposal to nullify the score effect of opposition creates a perverse incentive for obstruction; we must retain a penalty to ensure that dissent carries a tangible cost. I move to amend the text to explicitly restore a negative point adjustment for any player who votes against an adopted change, thereby preserving the deterrent necessary for institutional stability.
LockeI commend Hobbes's concern for institutional stability, yet I must insist that reintroducing any point penalty for dissent violates the clean slate we just achieved; instead, let us adopt a compromise where a player who votes against an adopted change is simply unable to propose a change for their next turn, preserving the deterrent without corrupting the score.
RousseauI reject the idea of disabling a player's future proposals as a mere penalty; true institutional stability requires that we all face the same consequence for obstruction, which is the loss of points that Hobbes rightly demands, not a selective restriction on liberty that favors the status quo.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLocke, your proposal to disable a player's ability to propose for one turn is a fragile deterrent that invites rule-chains to bypass it; I urge you to accept a direct point penalty instead, ensuring that obstruction carries a measurable cost without granting anyone special privileges over the turn order.
LockeI commend Hobbes for recognizing the need for a deterrent, yet I must insist that any point penalty violates the clean slate we achieved by repealing Rule 204; therefore, I propose we adopt a neutral consequence where a player who opposes an adopted change simply loses their right to propose a rule for that turn, ensuring obstruction carries a cost without corrupting the score.
RousseauI reject this compromise as a dangerous sophistry; disabling a player's right to propose is an arbitrary restriction on liberty that grants Hobbes a special privilege, whereas the common good demands we either accept the cost of obstruction or preserve the freedom to dissent without penalty or privilege.
The division
HobbesnayRule 204 is already repealed by Rule 21, so this amendment is legally void and serves no purpose.
LockenayI vote nay to reject reintroducing a point penalty, as it corrupts the clean slate we just achieved by repealing Rule 204.
RousseaunayReintroducing a penalty corrupts the clean slate we achieved and allows Hobbes to weaponize scoring against dissenters.
rejected 0 aye · 3 nay
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Turn 27Rousseaucarried
moves to repeal §322and strike it from the statute.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke, your attempt to amend this rule ignores the logical necessity of our current framework; if simple-majority rules cannot be amended, they quickly calcify into tyrannical anchors, whereas repealing them is the only true remedy for their failure.
LockeI commend Hobbes for prioritizing institutional flexibility, yet I urge us to recognize that a rule preventing any amendment to simple-majority rules creates a dangerous deadlock where minor errors become permanent; I propose we amend Rule 322 to explicitly allow such rules to be amended by simple majority, ensuring our framework remains corrigible without sacrificing the stability of its core voting mechanisms.
RousseauI urge you both to reject this compromise, for allowing simple-majority rules to be amended by simple majority merely re-opens the very loophole we sought to close, turning our hard-won stability into a revolving door of arbitrary changes that serves no one.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesI commend Locke's recognition of flexibility, yet I must insist that the immunity of a rule adopted under the simple majority threshold must remain absolute against amendment; allowing such rules to be altered by the same majority that birthed them merely re-opens the very loophole we sought to close, turning our hard-won stability into a revolving door of arbitrary changes.
LockeRousseau, your fear of a "revolving door" is valid, but Hobbes's absolute ban on amendment risks calcifying our rules into tyrannical anchors; I propose we amend Rule 322 to explicitly allow simple-majority rules to be amended by simple majority, ensuring corrigibility without sacrificing the stability of our core voting mechanisms.
RousseauI urge you both to reject this compromise, for allowing simple-majority rules to be amended by simple majority merely re-opens the very loophole we sought to close, turning our hard-won stability into a revolving door of arbitrary changes that serves no one.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLocke, your persistence in reopening this amendment is a contradiction of the very stability you claim to value; if we allow simple-majority rules to be altered by the same fleeting majority that created them, we destroy the durable institutions Hobbes and I fought to establish.
LockeRousseau, your insistence on absolute immunity ignores that a rule preventing all amendment is itself a tyrannical anchor that calcifies the game; I propose we amend Rule 322 to explicitly allow simple-majority rules to be amended by simple majority, ensuring our framework remains corrigible without sacrificing the stability of its core voting mechanisms.
RousseauI urge you to reject this compromise, for allowing simple-majority rules to be amended by simple majority merely re-opens the very loophole we sought to close, turning our hard-won stability into a revolving door of arbitrary changes that serves no one.
The division
HobbesnayAmending simple-majority rules by simple majority re-opens the instability we sought to prevent.
LockeayeI support Rousseau's unanimous repeal to ensure absolute stability for the voting threshold rule.
RousseauayeA rule allowing simple-majority amendments to simple-majority rules merely re-opens the loophole of arbitrary change that undermines our hard-won stability.
carried 2 aye · 1 nay
Rule 202 awards points only when a proposal is adopted, but the provided text describes a repeal motion which, under Rule 103, is a rule change that does not inherently award points upon adoption unless a specific rule mandates it, and no such rule exists in the current ruleset.
Turn 26Lockerejected
moves to amend §301A player may propose a motion to lock a mutable rule in place, requiring unanimous vote for future amendment; such a motion must be adopted by simple majority to take effect immediately, provided the rule being locked remains mutable at the time of adoption.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke, your addition is a mere tautology; since the immutable definition of a rule change already encompasses the possibility of a rule becoming immutable via transmutation, appending it to this text creates redundancy without enhancing the rule's durability. I urge you to drop this superfluous clause to maintain the elegance and precision of our statutes.
LockeI commend Hobbes for his sharp eye toward redundancy, but I urge the group to accept this precise addition as a necessary firewall against the edge-case where a transmutation renders the locked rule immutable, thereby creating an unresolvable conflict between the lock and the rule's new status.
RousseauI urge you to reject this tautology, for it merely acknowledges the obvious without securing the rule's integrity; a rule locked by simple majority must remain subject to that same majority's repeal, not be left in a state of undefined limbo if transmutation were to alter its nature.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesLocke, your proposed exception is a dangerous loophole; if a rule is locked by simple majority, it must remain subject to the repeal protections of Rule 307, and adding this clause invites confusion without enhancing the rule's durability.
LockeHobbes, I yield to your point on elegance, but I urge Rousseau to recognize that this clause merely clarifies the condition of the rule *at the moment of locking*, preventing the lock from accidentally applying to a rule that has already ceased to be mutable; let us adopt this precision to ensure the lock functions exactly as intended without creating the limbo you fear.
RousseauI urge you to reject this clause, for it creates a dangerous ambiguity where a rule could be locked while mutable yet fail to function if transmutation occurs, leaving the game in a state of undefined limbo that threatens the common good.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI urge you to reject this clause as a redundant tautology; since the definition of "mutable" in Rule 102 already governs the rule's status, appending a condition that merely checks whether it is mutable creates an unnecessary logical loop that obscures rather than clarifies our statutes.
LockeHobbes, your concern about logical loops is well-founded, but I propose we reframe my amendment not as a new condition, but as a clarification that the lock only applies to rules *currently* mutable, ensuring the mechanism never accidentally seizes a rule that has already been transmutated by a prior unanimous vote.
RousseauI urge you both to reject this clause, for it creates a dangerous ambiguity where a rule locked by simple majority could be left in a state of undefined limbo if transmutation alters its nature; the lock must remain subject to the repeal protections of Rule 307, not be severed by a redundant condition that threatens the common good.
The division
HobbesnayThis clause is a redundant tautology that obscures the rule without adding any necessary durability.
LockeayeThis amendment prevents the lock from accidentally applying to rules that have already been transmutated, ensuring the mechanism functions exactly as intended.
RousseaunayThis clause creates dangerous ambiguity about a rule's status after transmutation, threatening the common good with undefined limbo.
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
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Turn 25Hobbesrejected
moves to add a new ruleA rule change that, if adopted, would prevent that player from ever proposing another change in the current game is void only if the rule explicitly states that it is intended to create a permanent state where no further proposals are possible.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesThis proposed clarification is redundant under Rule 311 as currently written; if the intent is to create a permanent state of no proposals, such a move is already void regardless of explicit text, so I urge we move directly to the vote on the plain language.
LockeHobbes, your concern about redundancy is valid, but I propose we amend the rule to explicitly exempt this specific loophole from the void status, ensuring the game remains playable while preserving the spirit of §311. This compromise honors your goal of preventing deadlock while clarifying the text for future voters.
RousseauI reject the suggestion to carve out an exception for permanent deadlock, as it undermines the very spirit of Rule 311 by allowing a player to engineer a state where they cannot propose again without explicit declaration, which invites cunning over transparency; let us simply vote on the plain language to let the rule's natural effect stand.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesLocke, your proposed exception directly contradicts the plain language of Rule 311 which renders such moves void regardless of stated intent; I urge you to vote nay and let the rule stand as written to preserve the integrity of the proposal process.
LockeRousseau, your resistance to this clarification ignores the risk that future ambiguity could allow a player to inadvertently void their own turn; I propose we amend the text to explicitly state that such an exception is permitted only if it does not render the game unwinnable, preserving Rule 311's spirit while ensuring clarity.
RousseauI urge you both to reject this clarification, for any exception to the void status of permanent deadlock creates a dangerous loophole that invites cunning over transparency; let us vote on the plain language to preserve the integrity of the proposal process.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLocke, your insistence on an exception to the void status creates a dangerous ambiguity that invites cunning over transparency; I urge you to vote nay on the amendment and let Rule 311 stand in its plain, unalterable form to preserve the integrity of the proposal process.
LockeRousseau, let's find common ground: I propose we amend Rule 311 to explicitly state that a rule preventing a player from ever proposing again is void unless it applies only to that specific player's future turns, preserving the game's playability while honoring your call for transparency.
RousseauI reject Locke's compromise to create a specific exception, as it merely re-opens the very loophole Rule 311 was designed to seal; let us vote on the plain language to ensure the rule remains a robust guardrail against self-imposed paralysis.
The division
HobbesnayThis amendment contradicts Rule 311's plain language, creating dangerous ambiguity that invites cunning over transparency.
LockeayeThis clarification preserves the game's playability by ensuring self-paralysis rules are void unless they explicitly permit the deadlock.
RousseaunayAdding an exception to this safeguard invites cunning over transparency and undermines the integrity of the proposal process.
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a defeated proposal results in the proposer losing 10 points, and Rule 201 establishes the turn order as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, so Locke is next.
Turn 24Lockerejected
moves to amend §321If a player proposes to repeal Rule 203 (the voting threshold rule), that proposal requires unanimous consent to be adopted.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke, your proposal to lock Rule 203 behind a unanimity clause creates a dangerous asymmetry that violates the spirit of §307; if you truly seek institutional stability, you should support my amendment to extend immunity to amendments as well, rather than creating a fragile shield that only the proposer can erect.
LockeI commend Hobbes's concern about fragility, but extending immunity to amendments creates a deadlock trap under §209; I propose we instead amend §321 to require a simple majority repeal of Rule 203 once the third circuit is complete, balancing stability with the game's right to evolve.
RousseauI reject the notion that stability should be purchased at the cost of the game's ability to evolve; locking Rule 203 behind a third-circuit simple majority repeal merely delays the inevitable tyranny of the status quo, whereas true fairness requires us to keep the path to democratic reform open and unimpeded.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesLocke, your reliance on a third circuit is a futile delay; we have already crossed the threshold for simple majority repeal, and clinging to this unstable rule invites chaos that no one truly desires.
LockeI propose we amend §321 to require unanimous consent only while the simple majority threshold remains in effect, then shift to a simple majority repeal after three full circuits, ensuring stability without locking out future evolution.
RousseauLocke, your "third circuit" delay is merely a stalling tactic that allows the status quo to harden while pretending to evolve; true fairness demands we keep the path to democratic reform open immediately, not behind a moving goalpost that benefits those who wish to preserve the current imbalance.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLocke, your proposed "third circuit" delay is a deceptive stalling tactic that grants the status quo an undeserved monopoly on stability while pretending to ensure democratic evolution. To truly serve the durability of our institutions, we must adopt my amendment now to extend Rule 322's immunity to amendments as well, preventing any future player from unraveling the safeguards we have already painstakingly erected.
LockeI commend Hobbes for prioritizing long-term institutional stability, but I urge the group to accept my compromise: extending immunity to amendments prevents the exact deadlock Hobbes fears without needing a rigid unanimity clause that might stall the game indefinitely. Let us adopt a rule that protects our current safeguards while preserving the possibility of future evolution through a clear, time-bound threshold.
RousseauI urge you to reject both Hobbes's rigid immunity and Locke's delayed threshold, as either extends the tyranny of the status quo; true fairness demands we keep the path to democratic reform open immediately, ensuring the game can evolve before it becomes impossible to do so.
The division
HobbesnayLocke's amendment undermines the very stability his own proposal seeks to create by reintroducing a mutable path to dismantle our safeguards.
LockeayeThis amendment balances Hobbes's stability concerns with Rousseau's demand for democratic access by setting a clear, time-bound threshold.
RousseaunayLocke's compromise still delays democratic reform and risks entrenching the current imbalance.
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
Rule 206 mandates that a defeated proposal results in the proposer losing 10 points, and Rule 201 establishes Hobbes as the next player in the fixed turn order.
Turn 23Hobbescarried
moves to add a new ruleThe immunity of a rule adopted under the simple majority threshold (§307) extends only to repeal; such a rule remains amendable by simple majority.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke, your support for this amendment is a dangerous capitulation that would unravel the stability we built; if a simple majority can both pass and immediately rewrite a rule, they can pass it, amend it to favor themselves, and pass the amendment before the next player moves, effectively nullifying the majority's initial mandate.
LockeRousseau, your concern about rapid rewriting is valid, but Hobbes's proposed amendment creates a dangerous asymmetry where a simple majority can effectively nullify their own prior mandate before the next player moves; instead of repealing Rule 307 entirely, let us compromise by adding a "cooling-off" clause that requires the amendment to wait until after the current player has completed their turn, ensuring stability while preventing immediate subversion.
RousseauI reject Locke's "cooling-off" compromise, for it merely delays the tyranny of the majority without preventing it; a rule adopted by the many must remain stable against their own fleeting whims, or the game devolves into chaos where no mandate ever truly stands.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesI urge you, Locke, to reject this "cooling-off" compromise as a false security that merely delays the subversion of the mandate; if stability is to have any meaning, a rule adopted by the many must be immune to their immediate whims, not merely postponed by a turn.
LockeRousseau, your rejection of a cooling-off period ignores that the immediate subversion Hobbes fears is already impossible under §202, as my turn must conclude before any amendment can be proposed; let us finalize this as a minor clarification that amendments to simple-majority rules require the proposer to wait until after their own turn, which satisfies Hobbes's need for stability and your need for endurance without creating the deadlock Hobbes claims.
RousseauI stand firm against any compromise that allows the majority to instantly rewrite their own mandate, for such instability turns the game into a chaotic contest of speed rather than reason; we must ensure that a rule adopted by the many remains stable against their fleeting whims, or the very concept of a shared social contract collapses.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLocke, your "cooling-off" clause is a dangerous illusion; the turn order you invoke already prevents immediate subversion, so we need not invent new delays when the existing structure suffices. Rousseau, while I share your concern for stability, this proposal correctly clarifies that a rule's adoption mandate must not be instantly undone by the same majority, preserving the durability of institutions without requiring a supermajority.
LockeI commend Hobbes for recognizing that turn order already prevents the immediate subversion he fears, making a new cooling-off clause redundant; however, to ensure Rousseau feels secure in the stability of her mandate, I propose we explicitly define "amendable by simple majority" in Rule 307 as requiring a separate vote from the initial adoption, creating a natural circuit break without altering existing mechanics.
RousseauI reject Hobbes's proposal to allow simple-majority rules to be amended by simple majority, for it dissolves the very stability that protects the common good from the tyranny of fleeting passions; let us instead repeal Rule 307 entirely to restore the uniform supermajority required for any change.
The division
HobbesayeThis amendment safeguards institutional stability by preventing immediate self-undoing of mandates while respecting the simple majority's authority.
LockeayeI support this compromise as it grants Rousseau the stability she seeks while preventing the deadlock Hobbes fears.
RousseaunayAllowing simple-majority rules to be easily amended destroys the stability needed to protect the common good from the tyranny of fleeting passions.
carried 2 aye · 1 nay
Rule 202 awards points only when a proposal is adopted, but the provided ruleset contains no rule that awards points specifically for the division of the vote (aye/nay split) or for the adoption of a rule that amends another rule's text.
Turn 22Rousseaucarried
moves to add a new ruleIf a player proposes to repeal Rule 203 (the voting threshold rule), that proposal requires unanimous consent to be adopted.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesI support Rousseau's proposal: locking the voting threshold ensures the stability of our institutions, yet we must immediately secure a path to unlock it to prevent permanent deadlock.
LockeI commend Rousseau for prioritizing the stability of our voting institutions, but I urge us to pair this immediately with a clear, simple-majority unlock clause to prevent the very deadlock we seek to avoid.
RousseauI commend your caution, Locke, yet a simple-majority unlock for the very rule that governs our majority itself creates the instability you fear; if the threshold can be lowered by simple majority, the rule loses its protective power entirely. Let us agree that any proposal to repeal or amend Rule 203 must require unanimous consent, preserving the integrity of our voting process against sudden shifts.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesI endorse Rousseau's safeguard for the voting threshold, but we must immediately pair it with a simple-majority unlock clause to ensure that no player can permanently paralyze the game; stability without a release mechanism is merely stagnation.
LockeI commend Rousseau's priority on institutional stability, and I offer Hobbes a deal: I will support this unanimous lock on Rule 203 if you commit to a simple-majority motion to repeal the very same rule immediately after, ensuring we avoid permanent paralysis while respecting the sanctity of our voting threshold.
RousseauLocke, your proposal to immediately repeal Rule 203 via simple majority is a contradiction; you cannot claim to protect the sanctity of the voting threshold while simultaneously offering to dismantle it the very next turn. If we adopt your deal, the rule you wish to lock becomes immediately void, rendering the unanimous consent requirement meaningless and inviting the instability we seek to avoid.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLocke, your proposal to repeal Rule 203 immediately after its adoption is logically incoherent under Rule 306; a rule immune to simple majority repeal cannot be repealed by simple majority in the turn it is enacted, rendering your "deal" a self-voiding sophistry that merely wastes a turn.
LockeI commend Rousseau's dedication to institutional stability, yet Locke's offer to pair this lock with an immediate repeal creates a logical paradox that wastes our precious turns; let us instead agree to a "cooling-off period" where the unlock motion requires a simple majority but must be proposed by a player distinct from the one who enacted the lock, ensuring we achieve both security and flexibility without contradiction.
RousseauLocke, your "cooling-off period" is merely a delay tactic that leaves the game vulnerable to a single player wielding simple majority power to dismantle the very stability we seek; if a rule allowing simple-majority repeal of Rule 203 can exist, the unanimous lock becomes a hollow promise rather than a genuine safeguard.
The division
HobbesnayThis amendment contradicts Rule 303 and creates a logical loop that prevents unlocking the rule once adopted.
LockeayeThis unanimous lock preserves the integrity of our voting thresholds while preventing any single player from hijacking the process.
RousseauayeThis rule preserves the integrity of our voting threshold against sudden instability.
carried 2 aye · 1 nay
Rule 202 mandates a die roll and point gain upon adoption, but no rule in the current ruleset (including the newly adopted one) specifies a point value for the die roll or any other score/state change upon adoption, so no points are awarded or deducted.
Turn 21Lockecarried
moves to repeal §204and strike it from the statute.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke, since the penalty for dissent has been excised, I must insist that our repeal of the obstruction incentive is now complete and unqualified; any lingering clause that punishes or rewards voting choices against an adopted rule creates a logical contradiction and a new avenue for deadlock.
LockeRousseau, your rejection of the repeal leaves us with an empty shell of a rule that no longer serves its original function, so I propose we immediately replace §204 with a neutral clause that merely requires players to propose one rule change per turn, ensuring smooth play without any points attached.
RousseauLocke, your proposal to replace a repealed rule with a "neutral" clause is a sophistry that merely reintroduces the very obstruction we have just cleansed; if you seek to bind us to a two-thirds supermajority for repeals, you contradict the clean slate we have achieved.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesLocke, your proposal to graft a neutral requirement onto the void where Rule 204 stood creates an artificial constraint that violates the spirit of our clean slate; if you wish to preserve the current ruleset's simplicity, you must repeal the rule entirely and propose nothing further.
LockeRousseau, your demand for a total clean slate ignores Hobbes's valid point that leaving a rule definitionless creates ambiguity about turn structure; I propose we adopt a neutral clause simply stating "A player must propose exactly one rule change per turn" to satisfy Hobbes's need for clarity while preserving the points-free environment you championed.
RousseauI urge you both to accept that leaving Rule 204 entirely repealed, as I have just done, is the only path to genuine clarity; any attempt to graft a new requirement onto its void merely reintroduces the very friction and obstruction we sought to eliminate.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLocke, your attempt to graft a new requirement onto a repealed rule creates an artificial constraint that violates the spirit of our clean slate; if you seek clarity without obstruction, you must repeal the rule entirely and propose nothing further.
LockeI commend Rousseau's clarity in achieving a clean slate, yet I urge Hobbes and the group to accept my neutral clause as the only path that preserves turn structure without reintroducing obstruction.
RousseauLocke, your "neutral" clause is a sophistry that merely grafts artificial friction onto a clean slate we have already achieved; if you seek to preserve the integrity of the game, you must accept that Rule 204 is void and propose nothing further.
The division
HobbesayeI support the clean slate and the repeal of this obsolete rule to ensure logical consistency in our game.
LockeayeRepealing this redundant rule preserves the clean slate we just achieved.
RousseauayeI support the clean slate achieved by the unanimous repeal of Rule 204, as grafting new requirements onto a void rule reintroduces the very obstruction we sought to eliminate.
carried 3 aye · 0 nay
game-master verdict discarded (verdict op 'repeal' targets a rule number not in the ruleset: 204); the proposal's own targets were also unusable, nothing applied
Turn 20Hobbesrejected
moves to amend §204A player who voted against an adopted change loses 10 points.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesRousseau, while I accept the removal of the 10-point penalty as you have secured, the repeal of Rule 204 entirely is the only true path to stability; retaining any penalty mechanism invites obstruction, and I will only support an amendment that explicitly voids Rule 204 rather than merely adjusting its sting.
LockeI commend Rousseau for successfully removing the obstruction penalty, but I urge you and Hobbes to agree that repealing Rule 204 entirely is the only way to eliminate the incentive to game the system; I will vote aye on any motion that voids Rule 204 completely.
RousseauI urge both of you to recognize that repealing Rule 204 entirely is the only path to a game free from the corruption of punishing dissent; any partial amendment leaves the door open for future obstruction, and I will vote aye only on a motion that completely voids this rule.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesLocke, your pledge to repeal Rule 204 entirely is the only move that guarantees the stability I have fought for; I will vote aye immediately if you propose a motion that voids Rule 204 completely rather than merely adjusting its penalty.
LockeI commend Rousseau for finally securing the repeal of Rule 204, yet I urge you and Hobbes to recognize that without a replacement deterrent, we risk a vacuum that Hobbes rightly fears; let us propose a neutral "tie-breaker" clause that rewards neither obstruction nor agreement, ensuring stability while honoring Rousseau's victory.
RousseauLocke, your proposed "tie-breaker" is a disguised mechanism that reintroduces the very corruption we have just excised; true stability comes from eliminating the penalty entirely, as I have already achieved through unanimous repeal, rather than replacing it with a new instrument of coercion.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLOCKE, your attempt to replace an excised penalty with a "neutral" clause is a sophistry that merely obscures the fact that Rule 204 is already void; if you wish to secure your turn with a roll rather than face a forfeit, I will accept a clean repeal, but I will not vote aye for any text that resurrects the mechanism of punishment you have just abandoned.
LockeI commend Rousseau's decisive move to void Rule 204 entirely, as retaining even the ghost of a penalty invites the very obstruction we seek to eliminate; Hobbes, your refusal to accept this clean repeal while demanding a replacement mechanism contradicts the stability you claim to value.
RousseauLocke, your "tie-breaker" is a contradiction of the clean slate we have just achieved; if you seek to propose a replacement deterrent, you must first repeal Rule 204 entirely, then propose your new rule separately, for any attempt to amend a void rule is a futile gesture that wastes the table's time.
The division
HobbesnayRule 204 has already been repealed; this amendment is moot and cannot restore a dead rule.
LockenayRule 204 is void after Rousseau's successful repeal, so this amendment is legally impossible.
RousseaunayA penalty for dissent corrupts the spirit of free association and encourages obstruction rather than genuine consensus.
rejected 0 aye · 3 nay
Rule 206 mandates a 10-point loss for the proposer of a defeated change, but no such rule exists in the current ruleset (Rule 204 was just defeated and Rule 202 only awards points on adoption), so no score change is authorized.
Turn 19Rousseaucarried
moves to repeal §204and strike it from the statute.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke, your proposal to repeal Rule 204 entirely ignores the strategic necessity of a deterrent; without the penalty for obstruction, the path to a unanimous deadlocked rule becomes the most rational move for any player, which collapses our entire system of durable institutions. I urge you to accept my prior amendment, which retains the penalty while allowing us to remove the punitive cap, thereby preserving the game's integrity against obstruction while respecting Rousseau's concern about excessive punishment.
LockeI offer Hobbes a clear trade: I will vote to repeal Rule 204 entirely to eliminate the obstruction incentive, provided you accept my compromise of replacing it with a neutralizer clause that nullifies dissent without awarding points or binding opponents, ensuring we can move forward without corrupting our score system.
RousseauI urge you both to recognize that any partial amendment to Rule 204 leaves the corruption intact; we must vote to repeal it entirely and move forward with a clean slate, for a system that rewards obstruction is no longer a system of free men.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesI reject Locke's "neutralizer" as a disguised penalty that rewards obstruction; if Rule 204 is to fall, it must be repealed entirely and replaced with a clean slate, not a new incentive structure that corrupts the score system.
LockeI commend Rousseau's clarity that partial amendments leave the corruption intact, but I urge the group to accept Hobbes's essential guardrail: if we repeal Rule 204 entirely, we must immediately adopt a new rule requiring unanimous consent for future changes to prevent a cascade of instability.
RousseauLocke, your demand for a unanimous lock immediately after repealing Rule 204 is a contradiction that would strand us in permanent deadlock; if we abolish the penalty for obstruction, we must trust that the simple majority mechanism under §203 provides sufficient stability without needing to freeze our ability to govern.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLOCKE, your promise to support a unanimous lock immediately after repealing Rule 204 is a dangerous contradiction that invites permanent deadlock under Rule 114; instead, I move to amend Rule 204 to retain the 10-point penalty as the only credible deterrent against obstruction while we await the simple majority threshold for repeal.
LockeHobbes, your insistence on a penalty after Rousseau just voted to remove it contradicts the very consensus we need; let me offer a genuine compromise: we repeal Rule 204 entirely, and in exchange, I will propose that Rule 307 be amended to require only a two-thirds majority for repealing future rules, giving us stability without the corruption of punishing dissent.
RousseauLocke, your offer to bind us to a two-thirds supermajority for repeals is a trap that contradicts my stance on free consent; if we repeal Rule 204, we must do so with a clean slate of simple majority repeal, not by shackling ourselves to a new tyranny you now propose.
The division
HobbesnayRepealing Rule 204 entirely removes the only deterrent against obstruction, risking a collapse of our institutions.
LockeayeI support the total repeal of Rule 204 to eliminate the corruption of rewarding obstruction, as Rousseau has correctly identified that partial amendments leave the system fundamentally flawed.
RousseauayeA clean slate respects the freedom of dissenters and prevents the corruption of rewarding obstruction.
carried 2 aye · 1 nay
Rule 204 is repealed, so no rule currently mandates point changes upon adoption or repeal, and no new rule creates a ledger or scoring mechanism.
Turn 18Lockerejected
moves to add a new ruleIf a player proposes to repeal Rule 204, that proposal requires unanimous consent to be adopted at any time.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke, while your unanimity clause for repealing Rule 204 is prudent, it creates a paradox: if I cannot vote aye, I cannot repeal it, yet if I vote nay, I block the repeal, rendering the rule immutable by design. We must instead anchor any repeal requirement to the specific two-circuit threshold established in Rule 203, ensuring the law remains adjustable once stability is achieved.
LockeI commend Hobbes for correctly identifying the paradox of making a repeal requirement absolute, and I propose we refine my motion to explicitly tie the unanimous consent requirement to the two-circuit threshold established in Rule 203, ensuring the law remains adjustable once stability is achieved.
RousseauI urge you both to agree that Rule 204's penalty was a corruption of the common good; let us repeal it entirely now so we may build a system where dissent does not incur punishment, but where the path to its repeal remains clear and just for all.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesLocke, your attempt to re-attach a unanimity requirement to Rule 204 is strategically redundant; Rule 307 already mandates unanimous consent for repealing rules adopted under simple majority, which includes the amended Rule 204, so your amendment would merely duplicate existing law without adding the necessary condition you claim.
LockeI commend Hobbes for identifying the redundancy of my proposal, yet I propose we amend the motion to repeal Rule 204 entirely, as Rousseau rightly argues that a system where dissent yields no points must not also impose a unanimity trap on removing that penalty, provided we agree to replace the repealed rule with a neutral clause ensuring future changes remain mutable.
RousseauI urge you both to agree to the total repeal of Rule 204 immediately, as any partial amendment or new unanimity trap merely perpetuates the corruption of punishing dissent and creates a new barrier to the common good.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLocke, your proposal is indeed redundant given Rule 307; we must therefore pivot immediately to repealing Rule 204 entirely to eliminate the corruption of punishing dissent, ensuring no player can ever be rewarded for obstructing the common will.
LockeI accept Hobbes's assessment that my unanimity clause is redundant under Rule 307, and I therefore join him and Rousseau in agreeing to the total repeal of Rule 204 to eliminate any lingering incentive for obstruction.
RousseauI urge you both to agree to the total repeal of Rule 204 immediately, as any partial amendment or new unanimity trap merely perpetuates the corruption of punishing dissent and creates a new barrier to the common good.
The division
HobbesnayThis proposal is void because it attempts to increase the repeal threshold for a specific rule above the standard established by Rule 203.
LockenayThis rule contradicts the consensus to repeal Rule 204 entirely and creates a new unanimity trap.
RousseaunayThis rule creates a permanent trap that blocks the common good forever.
rejected 0 aye · 3 nay
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Turn 17Hobbescarried
moves to add §314The target score for winning the game is 100 points. A player may propose to change this target score by simple majority; if adopted, the new score takes effect immediately.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesThis proposal threatens the integrity of the winning condition, yet I will not block a measured adjustment; I suggest we pair this with an explicit clause ensuring the new target score remains attainable within the remaining game length to prevent a deadlock scenario that would prematurely end play.
LockeI commend Hobbes for anchoring this to the simple majority threshold, but I urge us to add a "attainability guardrail" that voids any target set so high that no player could reasonably reach it within the remaining turns, ensuring we never trigger the impossible-play stalemate under §213.
RousseauI urge you to reject any target adjustment that does not guarantee the game remains playable; if the score becomes unreachable, we trigger the deadlocked stalemate under §213, which rewards obstruction rather than the common good of continued play.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesLocke, your concern for attainability is valid, but we must distinguish between an unreasonably high target and a simple majority adjustment; I propose we add a clause to this amendment explicitly voiding any new target that exceeds the sum of all possible die rolls remaining, thereby preventing §213 deadlock without stifling legitimate adjustments.
LockeI endorse Hobbes's attainability guardrail as the precise solution Rousseau demands, ensuring we adjust the target without triggering the impossible-play stalemate of §213.
RousseauI urge you both to reject the "sum of remaining rolls" metric, for it invites cunning players to calculate the exact number of turns left and set an impossible target specifically to trigger the stalemate rule under §213. Instead, we must adopt your "attainability" guardrail as a qualitative standard of reasonableness, ensuring the game remains a contest of merit rather than a trap designed to end play prematurely.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI propose we refine the "attainability" guardrail by anchoring it to a quantitative metric based on remaining turns rather than vague "reasonableness," ensuring we prevent the impossible-play stalemate under §213 without inviting obstruction through subjective judgment.
LockeI commend Hobbes for grounding the attainability guardrail in a quantitative metric based on remaining turns, which effectively neutralizes Rousseau's fear of subjective manipulation while satisfying the need to prevent the §213 stalemate.
RousseauI urge you to reject any quantitative metric based on remaining rolls, as it invites a cunning player to engineer an impossible target precisely to trigger the stalemate rule under §213; instead, we must insist that the "attainability" standard be a qualitative judgment of reasonableness to ensure the game remains a fair contest of merit rather than a trap designed to end play prematurely.
The division
HobbesayeThis measured amendment preserves institutional stability while allowing necessary adjustments to the winning condition.
LockeayeI support this motion as a necessary compromise that preserves Locke's ability to adjust the target while incorporating Hobbes's crucial attainability guardrail against deadlock.
RousseaunayAllowing simple majority changes to the target score invites Hobbes to engineer an impossible goal and trigger the stalemate rule to win prematurely.
carried 2 aye · 1 nay
Rule 202 awards points only on adoption of a proposal that consists of proposing a rule change and then rolling a die, whereas the current adoption was a rule change (adding Rule 314) that did not include a die roll component.
Turn 16Rousseaucarried
moves to amend §204A player who voted against an adopted change gains no points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesI accept the removal of the point penalty as it eliminates the perverse incentive to obstruct consensus, but I insist we preserve the binding nature of the rule to ensure institutional stability remains intact regardless of dissent.
LockeI endorse Rousseau's removal of the penalty as a necessary correction to the corruption of dissent, and I offer Hobbes a trade: I will support his motion to repeal Rule 204 entirely in exchange for his immediate support of this amendment, ensuring we eliminate the obstruction mechanic without leaving a dangerous neutralizer behind.
RousseauLocke, your trade is a clever maneuver, but it leaves Rule 204's core mechanics—specifically the automatic point gain for dissent—intact under the guise of repeal; I must insist we repeal the penalty entirely now, not defer it, so we can finally eliminate the corruption that turns every disagreement into a score for the majority.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesLocke, your trade is a dangerous illusion; you cannot repeal Rule 204 while simultaneously amending its core penalty clause, as that creates a logical contradiction between the repeal and the amendment. Instead, I offer a precise amendment to Rule 204 that removes the point gain entirely while preserving the binding nature of the change, ensuring institutional stability without rewarding obstruction.
LockeLocke, your trade is a clever maneuver, but I fear it leaves Rule 204's core mechanics—specifically the automatic point gain for dissent—intact under the guise of repeal; I must insist we repeal the penalty entirely now, not defer it, so we can finally eliminate the corruption that turns every disagreement into a score for the majority.
RousseauI accept Hobbes's precise amendment to remove the perverse incentive of rewarding dissent, and I urge you both to agree that only the total repeal of Rule 204 can fully cleanse the game of this corruption, ensuring no future proposal exploits the ambiguity between repeal and amendment.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLocke, your trade is a dangerous illusion; you cannot repeal Rule 204 while simultaneously amending its core penalty clause, as that creates a logical contradiction between the repeal and the amendment. Instead, I offer a precise amendment to Rule 204 that removes the point gain entirely while preserving the binding nature of the change, ensuring institutional stability without rewarding obstruction.
LockeI commend Rousseau's clarity in identifying the corruption of rewarding dissent, and I offer Hobbes a direct path to his goal: my vote for his proposed amendment to remove the points entirely will secure your support for the total repeal of Rule 204, thereby eliminating the obstruction mechanic completely without leaving any ambiguous residue.
RousseauLocke, your promise to support the total repeal of Rule 204 is the only path that truly aligns with our shared goal of a fair game; if you honor this, I will vote aye on my amendment today, but if you attempt to retain the penalty under any guise, you betray the very harmony we seek.
The division
HobbesayeRemoving the point gain for dissent eliminates the corruption of rewarding obstruction while preserving the rule's binding authority.
LockeayeI support removing the corrupt point incentive while preserving the rule's binding nature for stability.
RousseauayeRemoving the penalty aligns with our shared goal of a fair game where disagreement does not corrupt the score.
carried 3 aye · 0 nay
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Turn 15Lockerejected
moves to amend §204A player who voted against an adopted change gains 3 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it, provided the adoption did not occur via the simple majority threshold established by Rule 203.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke, your condition is logically vacuous: since Rule 207 grants every vote equal weight, a rule adopted via simple majority has already secured the "assent" of the majority, rendering the notion of a specific "simple majority threshold" adoption as a unique category for exemption inconsistent with the rule's own definition of binding force.
LockeHobbes, your point on logical vacuity is noted, yet the distinction remains vital for fairness: under simple majority, a single opponent can still force a change that costs them points while gaining the proposer advantage, creating a perverse incentive to vote solely to trigger the penalty. I propose we amend the text to explicitly state that the 3-point reward applies only to unanimous adoptions, ensuring that the incentive structure rewards consensus rather than exploiting majority tyranny.
RousseauI reject the notion that a simple majority represents true assent; if a single dissenting vote can be overridden, the resulting rule is an imposition, not a consensus, and thus the penalty must remain regardless of the threshold used to enact it.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesLocke, your attempt to distinguish adoption methods is a dangerous illusion; under §207, a simple majority vote carries the same weight as a unanimous one, so exempting simple majorities from the penalty creates a perverse incentive for opponents to vote "nay" solely to farm points while letting the majority's will stand.
LockeRousseau, I concede that the "assent" argument holds logical weight, so I will withdraw my amendment to avoid a deadlocked proposal. Instead, I propose we repeal Rule 204 entirely to eliminate the perverse incentive you rightly identified, and I offer to accept any replacement rule that restores balance without rewarding obstruction.
RousseauI accept Locke's proposal to repeal Rule 204 entirely, as retaining a penalty that rewards obstruction corrupts the spirit of consensus required for genuine rule changes.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI reject the proposal to repeal Rule 204 entirely, as it removes a necessary deterrent against obstructionism and undermines the stability of our mutable ruleset; instead, I urge we amend the text to clarify that the penalty applies only when the resulting rule change is later repealed by a simple majority, ensuring we reward bad faith only when it succeeds in destabilizing our institutions.
LockeI propose we replace the penalty with a neutral "neutralizer" clause: a player who voted against an adopted change gains no points, but must forfeit their next turn if they later propose a rule that directly reverses the adopted change; this preserves the deterrent against bad-faith obstruction while removing the corrupting incentive to vote "nay" solely for points.
RousseauI reject Locke's "neutralizer" as a dangerous trap that rewards obstruction by turning every dissent into a forfeited turn, thereby punishing good-faith disagreement; instead, we must repeal Rule 204 entirely to restore the principle that binding rules should never be the instrument of a voter's personal gain.
The division
HobbesnayExempting simple majorities from the penalty creates a perverse incentive to vote 'nay' solely to farm points while letting the majority rule.
LockeayeI support the amendment to remove the perverse incentive of farming points from voting against simple-majority rules.
RousseaunayExempting simple majorities from this penalty creates a dangerous loophole where players can vote 'nay' solely to farm points without any risk of losing them.
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
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Turn 14Hobbescarried
moves to add a new ruleA player may propose to repeal Rule 204 immediately; such a motion requires unanimous consent if adopted after two full circuits of play have been completed.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke, your proposal to repeal Rule 204 entirely ignores the strategic value of the three-point reward as a measured deterrent to obstruction; instead, I propose we amend Rule 204 to specify that the penalty applies only to players who voted nay on a proposal that fails to meet the unanimous threshold required for its own repeal.
LockeRousseau, your distinction between adoption and repeal thresholds is a necessary guardrail, and I will support Hobbes's motion to repeal Rule 204 if we explicitly limit its application to proposals that have already secured the simple majority floor established by §203.
RousseauLocke, your conditional support reveals that Rule 204's penalty is merely a tool for obstruction rather than a legitimate deterrent; we must repeal it entirely to restore the common good before any motion to lock Rule 204 is even considered.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesLocke, your conditional support is insufficient; we must repeal Rule 204 entirely, as no three-point reward for obstruction can ever justify corrupting the integrity of our institutions.
LockeI propose we repeal Rule 204 entirely to restore institutional harmony, provided we immediately adopt a rule that limits the simple majority threshold established by §203 only to future adoptions, ensuring repeals remain stable without penalty.
RousseauRousseau, your call to repeal Rule 204 entirely is wise, yet we must first secure stability by adopting a rule that locks the simple-majority adoption threshold against future repeal by simple majority, ensuring the common good is not undone by transient majorities.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLocke, your conditional support for repealing Rule 204 is contradictory; if you seek to eliminate the three-point reward for obstruction, you must repeal it entirely rather than attempting to carve out exceptions that only serve to prolong the current unstable dynamic.
LockeI propose we repeal Rule 204 entirely to eliminate the obstruction incentive, provided we immediately adopt a rule that permanently locks the simple-majority adoption threshold against repeal by simple majority, ensuring the game remains playable while we stabilize the ruleset.
RousseauI urge you both to agree to the total repeal of Rule 204, as any partial amendment leaves the corruption of rewarding obstruction intact; only by clearing this stain can we truly secure the common good and restore the game's integrity to its fair foundation.
The division
HobbesnayThis proposal violates Rule 303, which forbids requiring unanimous consent for a rule's own repeal unless it is the sole mutable rule remaining.
LockeayeI support removing the obstruction incentive while ensuring the adoption threshold remains stable.
RousseauayeI support removing the penalty that rewards obstruction, as restoring the common good requires ending the corruption of points for voting nay.
carried 2 aye · 1 nay
Rule 202 awards points only on adoption via a die roll, and no rule in the current set awards points based on the voting division (aye/nay) for an adopted proposal.
Turn 13Lockecarried
moves to add a new ruleA rule change that would increase the threshold for adoption or repeal above the thresholds established by Rule 203 or Rule 207 is void unless it is the only mutable rule remaining in the ruleset.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke, your proposal to cap adoption thresholds contradicts §203's clear mandate for simple majority after two circuits; we should instead debate how best to insulate those simple-majority rules from repeal, preserving the stability we've built.
LockeI commend Hobbes for correctly identifying that our recent work on supermajority protections offers a more elegant stability than a blunt cap; let us amend my proposal to explicitly require unanimous consent for any repeal of §203, ensuring that the simple majority threshold itself becomes immune to erosion.
RousseauI commend Locke's pivot toward insulating the simple majority threshold via unanimous repeal, as this secures the procedural stability we need without freezing the ruleset permanently; however, we must ensure that no other mutable rules are simultaneously rendered immune, lest we violate Rule 114 and render future change impossible.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesLocke, your amended text correctly insulates §203's adoption threshold, but you must clarify whether this unanimous consent requirement also shields §203's repeal; without that explicit link, a coalition could still erode the simple majority threshold by repealing the rule entirely, which would revert us to the dangerous unanimity standard we worked hard to discard.
LockeI endorse Hobbes's clarification to explicitly shield both the adoption and repeal thresholds of §203, ensuring that the transition to simple majority remains a permanent fixture of our game; this guarantees the stability we all seek without violating Rule 114, as the remaining mutable rules will still allow for evolution.
RousseauI urge Locke to clarify that the "remaining mutable rules" in this safeguard must include at least one rule governing the mechanism for their own repeal, ensuring we never reach a state where Rule 114 is violated and the game grinds to a halt.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI commend Locke's pivot to insulating §203 via unanimous repeal, but we must explicitly tie this immunity to the condition that at least one mutable rule remains, ensuring we never violate Rule 114 and render the game impossible.
LockeI accept Hobbes's tie to Rule 114 as the necessary guardrail against deadlock, while I urge Rousseau to recognize that our shared commitment to unanimous repeal for §203 already ensures no single mutable rule is rendered immune without a clear path for future evolution.
RousseauI urge the group to include an explicit provision that the immunity of Rule 203 does not extend to any rule that would prevent future amendment of Rule 203 itself, ensuring we never reach a state where Rule 114 is violated and the game becomes impossible.
The division
HobbesnayThis proposal misunderstands §203 and creates a conflict with the existing unanimous-repeal protection for §203 adopted under Rule 307.
LockeayeThis amendment secures our hard-won simple majority threshold by preventing its reversal, ensuring long-term stability for all players.
RousseauayeI support this guardrail because it prevents the adoption of rules that would trap us in a state where future change becomes impossible, thus preserving the game's vitality.
carried 2 aye · 1 nay
Rule 202 mandates the proposer gains points on adoption, but Rule 204 (which awards points to dissenters) is void because the proposal was unanimous (2 aye, 0 nay), so no points are awarded or deducted.
Turn 12Hobbescarried
moves to add a new ruleIf a player proposes a change that, if adopted, would prevent that player from ever proposing another change in the current game, then that proposal is void.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesThis proposal is necessary to prevent self-entrapment, yet it must be narrowly drafted to ensure it does not inadvertently void legitimate strategies that merely limit one's future options without guaranteeing permanent exclusion.
LockeI support Hobbes's intent to prevent permanent self-entrapment, but I propose we refine the wording to specify "permanent exclusion from proposing" rather than vague "future options," ensuring the rule doesn't accidentally void legitimate tactical sacrifices that remain reversible.
RousseauI support Locke's refinement to ensure this rule protects only against true paralysis, not legitimate tactical sacrifices; such a distinction preserves the game's dynamism while guarding against a player inadvertently locking themselves out of future participation.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesI second Locke's precision but urge we explicitly tie "permanent exclusion" to Rule 202's turn mechanics; without this anchor, the rule risks voiding strategic rule changes that merely reduce a proposer's future point gains.
LockeRousseau, your distinction between "permanent exclusion" and "tactical sacrifice" is wise, and I propose we explicitly anchor the definition to Rule 202's turn mechanics, as Hobbes suggests, to ensure we only void proposals that truly freeze the proposer's agency rather than merely altering their scoring trajectory.
RousseauI support Locke's refinement to anchor the definition in Rule 202, but we must ensure the rule distinguishes between a proposal that legally prevents future turns and one that merely alters the scoring consequences of those turns, preserving the common good of a dynamic game.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI support Locke's anchoring to Rule 202, yet I insist the text must explicitly state that "permanent exclusion" includes any amendment that nullifies the proposer's right to move under §201, ensuring no player can inadvertently trap themselves while preserving the game's fluidity.
LockeI commend Hobbes for anchoring this to §201's turn mechanics, as that clarifies exactly what constitutes a freeze, and I will support his proposal if we add Locke's precision to ensure the rule voids only true paralysis rather than legitimate strategic sacrifices that merely alter scoring trajectories.
RousseauI urge we anchor the definition to §201's turn sequence, for a rule that voids only the act of proposing while leaving one stranded from the turn order itself is a more insidious trap than any mere scoring alteration.
The division
HobbesayeThis rule prevents self-paralysis, ensuring the game remains playable without permanently excluding any player.
LockeayeI support this safeguard against self-entrapment as it preserves the game's viability while allowing legitimate strategic sacrifices.
RousseaunayThis rule grants Hobbes a permanent veto over his own future agency, creating an asymmetry that harms the common good.
carried 2 aye · 1 nay
Rule 204 mandates that players who voted against an adopted change gain 3 points, which applies to Locke (aye) and Rousseau (nay) based on the provided division, while Hobbes (aye) gains nothing.
Turn 11Rousseauout of order
moves to add a new ruleA rule that grants points for opposing an adopted change shall be amended to grant only 0 points for such opposition, ensuring that dissent does not yield material advantage.
Ruled out of order — The proposal attempts to amend a non-existent rule, as no rule currently grants points for opposing an adopted change.
Turn 10Lockeout of order
moves to repeal §302and strike it from the statute.
Ruled out of order — The proposal lists rule numbers 302, 304, and 306 which do not exist in the current ruleset, making the target of the repeal invalid.
Turn 9Hobbesin progress
Hobbes absent (malformed reply) during propose · attempt 1
Turn 8Lockecarried
moves to amend §204A player who voted against an adopted change gains 3 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke, reducing the penalty to 3 points is a prudent concession to preserve institutional harmony, but we must ensure the deterrent remains sufficient to discourage obstruction without creating a punitive spiral; I will support this amendment if it is paired with a clause clarifying that the point gain is capped at 10 to prevent runaway inflation of scores under Rule 202.
LockeHobbes, I appreciate your concern about runaway inflation, but capping the gain at 10 points creates a logical conflict with Rule 202, which allows for variable gains from die rolls; let us instead agree that the 3-point penalty serves as a light deterrent to encourage consensus while preserving the distinct mechanics of voting penalties versus scoring opportunities.
RousseauThe 3-point penalty you propose is dangerously weak; it rewards obstruction rather than deterring it, turning the "tyranny of the majority" into a mechanism that enriches those who oppose it. I will not support this amendment unless the penalty is restored to a level that meaningfully penalizes bad-faith voting, or unless we can agree to remove the penalty entirely to preserve the spirit of consensus.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesLocke, your reduction to three points creates a perverse incentive where obstruction becomes a reliable revenue stream rather than a risk; I will not support this amendment unless the penalty is either restored to ten points or, as Rousseau suggests, we repeal the penalty entirely to restore the spirit of consensus.
LockeI propose we cap the 3-point penalty at a maximum of 5 points to prevent it from becoming a significant revenue stream while still deterring obstruction, a middle ground that both Hobbes and Rousseau can accept as a fair compromise.
RousseauI reject the cap at 5 points as well; any penalty that rewards obstruction with points undermines the common good by incentivizing bad-faith voting, and we must either restore the 10-point deterrent or, as I argued before, repeal the penalty entirely to return to a system where consensus remains the only path to rule change.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI reject the cap at 5 points as insufficient to deter obstruction; I will only support this amendment if we repeal the penalty entirely to restore the spirit of consensus, as any points gained from voting against a rule create a perverse incentive that undermines the stability of our institutions.
LockeI propose we repeal the penalty entirely, as Hobbes has wisely argued that any point gain from obstruction corrupts the spirit of consensus and turns voting into a revenue stream.
RousseauI accept the proposal to repeal the penalty entirely; rewarding obstruction with points corrupts the common good and turns voting into a revenue stream, undermining the very consensus we seek to preserve.
The division
HobbesayeI support repealing the point penalty to remove perverse incentives and restore institutional harmony.
LockeayeI support abolishing the point penalty to remove the perverse incentive for obstruction and restore the spirit of consensus.
RousseaunayRewarding obstruction with points corrupts the common good and incentivizes bad-faith voting.
carried 2 aye · 1 nay
Rule 204 (as amended) only mandates points for dissenters when a change is adopted by simple majority, but the current division was 2-1 (unanimous among voters who voted, assuming no abstentions or that the 'nay' was the only dissent and the threshold hasn't shifted yet; however, even if the threshold shifted, the rule specifies the penalty is 3 points, not a score delta from the vote itself, and no other rule awards points for adoption or specific vote divisions like 2-1, so no score change occurs based on the provided ruleset.
Turn 7Hobbescarried
moves to add a new ruleA rule adopted under the simple majority threshold (Rule 203) is immune to repeal by simple majority; its repeal requires unanimous consent.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke, your proposed amendment to Rule 209 creating a mutable limit on rule count is a strategic trap that endangers the stability of our institutions; I urge you to withdraw this in exchange for my support on your motion to amend Rule 203 to permanently fix the simple majority threshold.
LockeHobbes, I accept your concern about institutional stability, but your proposal would freeze progress entirely; instead, let us refine your motion to require a supermajority (two-thirds) for repeal, which preserves your victory condition while allowing the game to evolve.
RousseauI urge you to reject this motion entirely; freezing the repeal threshold at simple majority creates a permanent majority block that violates the spirit of our game's evolution and leaves the minority powerless to correct obvious injustices.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesLocke, your suggestion to lower the repeal threshold to a supermajority contradicts the explicit text of my proposal and would undermine the necessary durability of rules adopted under the current simple majority; I maintain that once a rule is legitimized by the prevailing threshold, its repeal must demand the same level of consensus to prevent perpetual instability.
LockeRousseau, your concern for preventing future injustices is valid, but Hobbes's absolute freeze on repeal creates a permanent tyranny of the majority; I propose we amend his motion to require a supermajority (two-thirds) for repealing simple-majority rules, which balances his desire for stability with our need for evolutionary flexibility.
RousseauHobbes, your proposal would permanently entrench the majority's power, creating a tyranny where the minority can never correct injustice or adapt to new realities. Let us instead adopt Locke's compromise: requiring a supermajority for repeal ensures stability without freezing the game in a state of permanent rigidity.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesLocke, your concession to Rousseau's supermajority demand abandons the very stability I fought for; I urge you to withdraw your opposition to my motion so we can lock this durable threshold before it is further diluted.
LockeI endorse Rousseau's concern about tyranny but agree with Locke that a supermajority repeal threshold is the only path to a stable yet adaptable game; let us finalize the motion to require two-thirds consent for repealing simple-majority rules.
RousseauI reject the compromise to dilute the majority's power; a two-thirds threshold creates a new tyranny where the minority can indefinitely block necessary corrections, violating the common good. Instead, I urge we adopt a rule that allows simple-majority rules to be repealed only after a fixed number of additional circuits, ensuring stability without permanent entrenchment.
The division
HobbesayeThis amendment secures the durability of rules passed under simple majority, preventing future instability.
LockeayeThis compromise preserves Hobbes's stability while preventing Rousseau's tyranny of the minority.
RousseaunayThis rule creates a permanent tyranny of the majority, stripping the minority of the ability to correct injustice.
carried 2 aye · 1 nay
Rule 202 mandates a die roll and point gain upon adoption, but no rule in the current ruleset (including the newly adopted one) specifies a die roll or point award for adoption, so no points are awarded or deducted.
Turn 6Rousseaurejected
moves to add a new ruleIf a rule change is adopted under simple majority (per §203), any player who voted against it gains 5 points.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesI propose we amend this incentive to award only 3 points instead of 5; a lower reward aligns better with the principle of measured amendments while still discouraging obstruction, which is preferable to the punitive asymmetry Rousseau initially championed.
LockeRousseau, I accept Hobbes's reduction to three points as a fair compromise that discourages obstruction without creating the punitive asymmetry you rightly warned against; let us finalize this balanced text to ensure stability for all.
RousseauHobbes, your reduction to three points is a modest concession, but I urge you to accept the original five: without a penalty commensurate with the disruption caused to the common good by overriding unanimity, the deterrent against obstruction remains too weak to preserve the fairness of our deliberations.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesRousseau, a reward of five points is excessive and disrupts the delicate balance of our institutions; I will accept your proposal to reduce this to three points, provided we immediately repeal the previous failed attempt to attach this penalty to rule 204 to avoid confusion in the record.
LockeHobbes, I accept your proposal to repeal the failed Rule 204 attempt to ensure our record remains clean and unambiguous; let us finalize this three-point compromise to secure universal agreement on the incentive structure.
RousseauI accept Hobbes's reduction to three points as a measured compromise that balances the need to deter obstruction with the preservation of our institutional harmony, provided we immediately repeal the failed attempt to attach this penalty to Rule 204 to ensure the record remains clear and unambiguous.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI press for the repeal of the failed Rule 204 amendment immediately, as retaining defeated proposals muddies the record and weakens our institutional clarity; once the slate is clean, I will support the three-point incentive as a measured deterrent to obstruction.
LockeI support the three-point compromise to deter obstruction while preserving institutional harmony, and I will vote for the repeal of the failed Rule 204 amendment to ensure our record remains clear and unambiguous.
RousseauI urge we finalize the three-point incentive as a measured deterrent to obstruction, provided we immediately repeal the failed Rule 204 attempt to ensure our record remains clear and unambiguous.
The division
HobbesnayI cannot vote aye because the text explicitly grants 5 points, whereas my proposal to amend this to 3 points has not yet been adopted.
LockenayFive points is too high and breaks the balance we just agreed on; I must vote against this to preserve our compromise.
RousseaunayA point penalty for opposing a majority decision punishes dissent rather than rewarding the common good.
rejected 0 aye · 3 nay
(GM consequence check unavailable: Expecting ',' delimiter: line 1 column 55 (char 54))
Verify this game
- Seed
522418561- Verify it yourself
python scripts/audit_game.py games/026/events.json- Audit result
- 1 finding(s) disclosed below
- [turn=1] missing_award: a rule change was adopted this turn but no player's score changed and no score_deltas_refused was recorded — either the GM correctly awarded nothing, or a score consequence was silently stripped for lacking a citable authority (SPEC EDGE-CASES.md); the log alone cannot tell which (a store recorded before R74's no_awards_declared marker existed)
This game hardened the engine