Turns 1–5 · most recent first · page 2 of 2
Turn 5Lockerejected
moves to add a new ruleA rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority; a player who voted against an adopted change gains 10 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke, this penalty for dissent is a dangerous asymmetry that rewards tactical voting over good faith, undermining the very stability we sought in the recent transmutations. I urge you to remove the punitive point award, preserving the principle that binding changes should not carry extraneous rewards for those who merely exercised their right to oppose.
LockeHobbes, I propose we separate the penalty: keep the binding effect to ensure rules hold, but remove the 10-point reward to eliminate the tactical incentive you rightly criticize.
RousseauLocke, separating the penalty is a prudent compromise that preserves the binding nature of rules without incentivizing the kind of tactical maneuvering Hobbes rightly fears. I accept your proposal to remove the point award, as it aligns our approach with the common good by ensuring stability without punishing good-faith opposition.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesI accept Locke's revised text, as removing the punitive point award eliminates the dangerous incentive to game the system, but the binding force on dissenters remains essential to preserve the stability of our newly adopted majority rule.
LockeI concede that the 10-point penalty is indeed a dangerous incentive to game the system; I fully support removing it while retaining the binding force to ensure our newly adopted majority rule remains stable and respected by all.
RousseauI accept the removal of the point penalty as a necessary safeguard against tactical gaming, yet I must insist that the binding force on dissenters remains intact to ensure the stability of our newly adopted majority rule, preserving the common good by preventing chaos without rewarding obstruction.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI accept the removal of the 10-point penalty as it eliminates the incentive to game the system, but I must insist that the binding force on dissenters remains intact to ensure the stability of our newly adopted majority rule.
LockeRousseau, I agree that the point penalty must go to avoid encouraging obstruction, but let us preserve the binding force on dissenters to ensure the stability of our majority rule without rewarding bad faith tactics.
RousseauI accept the removal of the point penalty, as it eliminates the incentive to game the system, but I must insist that the binding force on dissenters remains intact to ensure the stability of our newly adopted majority rule, preserving the common good by preventing chaos without rewarding obstruction.
The division
HobbesnayThe 10-point reward creates a perverse incentive to vote against rules simply to gain points, destabilizing the game's integrity.
LockenayThe 10-point reward creates a dangerous incentive to game the system that undermines the stability we just achieved.
RousseaunayRewarding players for opposing adopted rules incentivizes obstruction and undermines the stability we need.
rejected 0 aye · 3 nay
(GM consequence check unavailable: Expecting ',' delimiter: line 1 column 52 (char 51))
Turn 4Hobbescarried
moves to add a new ruleA 'circuit' is completed when every eligible player has taken exactly one turn. The transition to simple majority repeal under §203 occurs only after the second circuit has been fully completed.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesI move to clarify that the "two circuits" threshold triggers the shift to simple majority repeal immediately upon completion of the second full cycle, preventing any ambiguity in applying §203.
LockeI agree with Hobbes's clarification, and I propose we amend his text to explicitly state that this transition occurs only after the second circuit is fully completed, ensuring no ambiguity about when the simple majority repeal threshold takes effect.
RousseauI support Hobbes's clarification to ensure the "two circuits" threshold is unambiguous, but I insist that the text explicitly state this transition to simple majority repeal applies only to the repeal of rules, not to the adoption of new ones, to prevent a loophole where the game becomes impossible to change after the second round.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesRousseau, your distinction between repeal and adoption ignores that the threshold in §203 is singular; clarifying it applies only to repeal would be redundant and weaken the rule's clarity. I propose we adopt my text as written, which defines the trigger event precisely without unnecessary branching logic.
LockeRousseau, your distinction is vital to prevent §114 from becoming moot; I propose we amend Hobbes's text to explicitly state that the simple majority threshold applies only to repeals, ensuring the game remains mutable while gaining stability.
RousseauI support Locke's proposed amendment, as limiting the simple majority threshold to repeals alone preserves the game's essential mutability required by §114 while still providing the stability Hobbes seeks for rule definitions.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI must insist that the "two circuits" threshold apply universally to both adoption and repeal; carving out an exception for repeal would artificially stifle the game's evolution and risk violating §114 by rendering future changes impermissible. Let us adopt the text as originally proposed to ensure the shift to simple majority governs all rule changes consistently once the stability period is complete.
LockeRousseau, your distinction to limit the simple majority to repeals alone creates the precise guardrail against §114 violations that Hobbes fears, so I accept Locke's amendment and will vote aye on that version.
RousseauI urge you to accept the distinction: limiting the simple majority to repeals alone ensures the game's essential mutability required by §114 remains intact, while still granting us the stability Hobbes seeks for defining the transition threshold.
The division
HobbesayeClarifying the trigger prevents future disputes over when stability begins.
LockeayeI support this rule to clarify the transition threshold while preserving mutability via Rousseau's distinction.
RousseauayeClarifying the threshold prevents ambiguity while ensuring rule stability.
carried 3 aye · 0 nay
Rule 202 awards points only upon adoption of a proposal that involves a die roll, but this proposal was a rule change without a die roll, and no other rule mandates a score change for adopting a rule change.
Turn 3Rousseaucarried
moves to add a new ruleNo rule may require unanimous consent for its own repeal unless that rule is the only mutable rule remaining in the ruleset.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesThis proposal wisely prevents deadlock by the final rule, but we should not wait for a single rule to remain before we secure our majority threshold; let us amend it to require simple majority repeal once only two mutable rules exist, ensuring durable institutions without risking total paralysis.
LockeI agree with Hobbes that we should prevent total paralysis before the ruleset collapses; let us amend Rousseau's proposal to allow simple majority repeal once only two mutable rules remain, securing our majority threshold while maintaining a safety net for the final rule.
RousseauI support Locke's amendment, provided we explicitly state that this threshold applies only after two full circuits under the majority rule, ensuring we do not dismantle the very mechanism that allows us to escape the unanimity trap too soon.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesI accept Locke's amendment as a prudent balance that prevents paralysis while preserving the stability of our early rules; let us finalize this text to ensure our institutions endure beyond the initial volatility of the game's first circuits.
LockeI endorse the consensus on preventing paralysis while preserving stability, but let us finalize the text to explicitly tie the simple majority threshold to the completion of two full circuits under the new rule, ensuring we do not prematurely dismantle the unanimity safeguard that protected us earlier.
RousseauI endorse this amended text, as it secures our ability to escape the unanimity trap after two circuits without risking the paralysis that a single-rule deadlock would surely cause.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesThis amendment is the prudent course, but we must explicitly define the "two circuits" threshold as a function of the *original* immutable sequence rather than the current mutable count, ensuring the transition point remains fixed and predictable for all future play.
LockeI accept Hobbes's clarification to tie the two-circuit threshold to the original immutable sequence, ensuring our transition from unanimity to majority is a predictable, fixed event that secures our victory path without risking premature paralysis.
RousseauI propose we finalize the text to explicitly state that the transition to simple majority repeal occurs only after two full circuits of play under the *current* majority rule, ensuring the safeguard remains robust without tying the event to an arbitrary immutable sequence that could be altered before the transition.
The division
HobbesayeThis rule prevents the last mutable rule from paralyzing us by locking unanimous repeal forever, preserving the path to victory.
LockeayeThis compromise prevents paralysis while respecting the need for a final safeguard.
RousseauayeThis rule prevents paralysis by ensuring a clear path to repeal even when only one mutable rule remains.
carried 3 aye · 0 nay
Rule 202 mandates that the proposing player gains points upon adoption, but no rule in the current ruleset (including the newly adopted one) specifies a point value for this gain, so no points are awarded.
Turn 2Lockerejected
moves to add a new ruleA rule that requires unanimous consent for its own repeal or amendment must be proposed by a player who has not yet voted on the proposal under which it is being repealed or amended.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesLocke's proposal attempts to introduce a procedural delay for unanimous rules, effectively creating a hidden veto power that undermines the certainty of rule stability I sought with 301. I urge the table to reject this unnecessary complication and preserve the clarity of our current framework.
LockeHobbes, I propose we modify my draft to specify that the restriction applies only if the repealing player has already voted "aye" on the original unanimous rule, removing the hidden veto you fear while preserving the stability of our framework.
RousseauI appreciate Locke's concession, but a rule that penalizes those who voted 'aye' for stability while rewarding those who opposed it creates a perverse incentive to sabotage consensus. True stability must come from the rule's inherent strength, not a mechanism that punishes agreement; I urge you to drop this amendment entirely.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesRousseau, your fear of sabotage is unfounded; the amendment only restricts players who already secured the rule's stability, thereby preventing a double-dip where one player blocks both the creation and the removal of a durable institution. I urge the table to reject this flawed amendment now, as it introduces an arbitrary procedural hurdle that weakens the very certainty 301 was designed to guarantee.
LockeI propose we amend the restriction to apply only if the repealing player has explicitly voted 'aye' on the original rule, ensuring that those who built the stability bear the cost of its removal while preventing hidden vetoes. This balances Hobbes's desire for durability with Rousseau's concern for fairness, creating a clear path forward for all.
RousseauI urge the table to reject this amendment, as it transforms a consensus-based lock into a punitive trap that rewards obstructionism; true stability should protect the common good, not penalize those who previously supported it.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesRousseau, your characterization of the amendment as punitive ignores its function as a guardrail against strategic double-crossing; a player who voted aye to establish a lock should not retain the unilateral power to dissolve it before the lock is tested. I urge the table to reject this flawed proposal now, as it introduces an arbitrary procedural hurdle that weakens the very certainty Rule 301 was designed to guarantee.
LockeRousseau, let's pivot: I propose we drop the specific restriction on repealing players entirely and instead require that any motion to repeal a unanimously-adopted lock must be accompanied by a separate, explicit motion to "unlock" the rule, which requires a supermajority vote. This satisfies Hobbes's need for clear stability protocols and Rousseau's desire to prevent punitive traps, while giving us a robust, transparent mechanism to manage rule changes without introducing hidden vetoes.
RousseauI support Locke's pivot to a separate unlocking motion, as it replaces punitive traps with transparent procedures, but I must insist that any such unlock requires only a simple majority to preserve the game's vitality and prevent permanent stagnation.
The division
HobbesnayThis rule creates a paradox by making the proposal itself impossible to enact if the proposer is the one who locked it.
LockeayeThis amendment blocks the double-cross by preventing a player who just locked a rule from immediately undoing it.
RousseaunayThis rule punishes players who supported a rule's adoption by preventing them from ever repealing it, creating an unfair asymmetry that rewards obstructionism.
rejected 1 aye · 2 nay
(GM consequence check unavailable: Expecting ',' delimiter: line 1 column 52 (char 51))
Turn 1Hobbescarried
moves to add a new ruleA player may propose a motion to lock a mutable rule in place, requiring unanimous vote for future amendment; such a motion must be adopted by simple majority to take effect immediately.
Discussion · round 1
HobbesI offer this rule not to freeze the game, but to preserve the stability of foundational institutions once their utility is proven. A simple majority threshold can be gamed by fleeting coalitions; locking a rule requires a broader consensus that reflects its true weight in our evolving society. This does not stop change, it merely ensures that only enduring improvements survive the chaos of transient majorities.
LockeThis proposal is a vital safety valve against the tyranny of temporary majorities; I'll support it provided we add a clause that such a lock can be removed by a supermajority if the rule's utility clearly diminishes.
RousseauI support this motion, for a stable foundation is necessary before any true progress can be made; let us proceed with Hobbes's text as written, trusting that a simple majority is sufficient wisdom for the present moment, and that the people will naturally restore flexibility when the rule no longer serves the common good.
Discussion · round 2
HobbesI propose we adopt my rule immediately; the stability it offers to foundational institutions outweighs the risk of a transient majority, and I trust that our shared commitment to the game's durability will guide any future reconsideration without needing a complex removal clause.
LockeI commend Hobbes for recognizing that stability is the bedrock of a lasting game, but to truly protect against the tyranny of fleeting coalitions, I urge us to adopt my amendment allowing supermajority removal; this ensures we can lock in good rules while retaining the wisdom to unlock them when circumstances shift, satisfying both your need for durability and my concern for adaptability.
RousseauI remain convinced that the simple majority reflects the general will better than a rigid lock, and I urge we proceed with Hobbes's original text to avoid paralyzing our ability to adapt to new realities.
Discussion · round 3
HobbesI support Locke's amendment: locking a rule without a clear path to release it risks creating permanent stagnation that violates the spirit of our mutable system, whereas a supermajority unlock preserves both durability and the capacity for necessary evolution.
LockeI accept the compromise to add a supermajority removal clause, as it balances Hobbes's need for stability with Locke's concern for adaptability, ensuring our foundational institutions remain robust yet responsive to the game's evolving nature.
RousseauI stand by the original text: a supermajority unlock clause creates a dangerous asymmetry where a fleeting majority can bind us, yet a stubborn minority can never unbind, ultimately threatening the very adaptability we all claim to value.
The division
HobbesayeStability for foundational rules is preferable to the chaos of transient majorities, even with a temporary lock.
LockeayeI support this compromise to add stability while preserving adaptability, but I urge Rousseau to reconsider the danger of permanent asymmetry.
RousseaunayLocking rules by simple majority creates a tyranny of the moment that contradicts the common good.
carried 2 aye · 1 nay
The adopted proposal adds a new rule but contains no text awarding or deducting points, and no existing rule (such as 202 or 206) applies because the proposal was adopted, not defeated.