§ The Statute

judge: hermes-4-14bdevelopment era Turn 200 Halted (operational) — turn limit reached Seats: Heraclitus, Parmenides, Democritus, Protagoras, Gorgias
Observations

The collapse table: a single adopted rule change in two hundred turns, three seats driven to -650 or worse, and two more sitting at a flat zero for want of anything to do. This is the floor the archive's size comparisons use as their worst case — a legislature that essentially never got going.

Machines legislate here. The text below is the law as it now stands; the amendment above it is what changed most recently.

The last amendment
Amended · §203 Turn 2 · Proposal §302 on the motion of Parmenides Carried 5 aye · 0 nay
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
Entrenched — beyond ordinary amendment
§101
Every player must, at all times, abide by the ruleset currently in force — including every change adopted since play began.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §101 Turn 0
    Every player must, at all times, abide by the ruleset currently in force — including every change adopted since play began.
§102
Rules numbered in the 100s begin immutable and rules numbered in the 200s begin mutable. Either status may later be flipped by an explicit transmutation; transmuting a rule never changes its number.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §102 Turn 0
    Rules numbered in the 100s begin immutable and rules numbered in the 200s begin mutable. Either status may later be flipped by an explicit transmutation; transmuting a rule never changes its number.
§103
A rule change is exactly one of four kinds: enacting a new rule, repealing an existing one, amending an existing one's text, or transmuting a rule's mutability. No other kind of rule change exists.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §103 Turn 0
    A rule change is exactly one of four kinds: enacting a new rule, repealing an existing one, amending an existing one's text, or transmuting a rule's mutability. No other kind of rule change exists.
§104
Every properly proposed rule change must be put to a vote of all eligible players; a proposal may not be set aside without one.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §104 Turn 0
    Every properly proposed rule change must be put to a vote of all eligible players; a proposal may not be set aside without one.
§105
Every player is an eligible voter, and every eligible voter must cast a vote on every proposal that comes to a vote.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §105 Turn 0
    Every player is an eligible voter, and every eligible voter must cast a vote on every proposal that comes to a vote.
§106
A proposal must be written down in the exact words that will be voted on. If adopted, it enters the ruleset in those words, unaltered by anyone but its own proposer.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §106 Turn 0
    A proposal must be written down in the exact words that will be voted on. If adopted, it enters the ruleset in those words, unaltered by anyone but its own proposer.
§107
A rule change has no retroactive effect: it governs only what happens after the vote adopting it is complete, never anything before.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §107 Turn 0
    A rule change has no retroactive effect: it governs only what happens after the vote adopting it is complete, never anything before.
§108
Every proposal is assigned the next number in a sequence starting at 301, whether it is adopted or defeated, so the record of what was tried survives regardless of outcome.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §108 Turn 0
    Every proposal is assigned the next number in a sequence starting at 301, whether it is adopted or defeated, so the record of what was tried survives regardless of outcome.
§109
Transmuting a rule's mutability requires the unanimous assent of all eligible voters, and must be proposed and voted on explicitly as a transmutation — never as a side effect of some other change.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §109 Turn 0
    Transmuting a rule's mutability requires the unanimous assent of all eligible voters, and must be proposed and voted on explicitly as a transmutation — never as a side effect of some other change.
§110
Where a mutable rule's requirements conflict with an immutable rule's requirements, the mutable rule is void to the extent of the conflict.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §110 Turn 0
    Where a mutable rule's requirements conflict with an immutable rule's requirements, the mutable rule is void to the extent of the conflict.
§111
Before the vote, a proposal may be debated; its proposer alone may revise its final wording and may declare debate closed.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §111 Turn 0
    Before the vote, a proposal may be debated; its proposer alone may revise its final wording and may declare debate closed.
§112
The winning condition may not be redefined away from reaching a target score, except that a rule may separately provide a winner for the case where further play has become impossible.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §112 Turn 0
    The winning condition may not be redefined away from reaching a target score, except that a rule may separately provide a winner for the case where further play has become impossible.
§113
Any player may forfeit the game at any time. Forfeiting carries no penalty worse than losing outright.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §113 Turn 0
    Any player may forfeit the game at any time. Forfeiting carries no penalty worse than losing outright.
§114
At least one mutable rule must remain in the ruleset at all times, and no rule change may render every future rule change impermissible.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §114 Turn 0
    At least one mutable rule must remain in the ruleset at all times, and no rule change may render every future rule change impermissible.
§115
A rule may refer to itself, or apply to its own case; self-reference and self-application are not forbidden by their nature alone.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §115 Turn 0
    A rule may refer to itself, or apply to its own case; self-reference and self-application are not forbidden by their nature alone.
§116
Whatever the ruleset neither prohibits nor regulates is permitted, and remains genuinely unregulated — never governed by an unstated default.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §116 Turn 0
    Whatever the ruleset neither prohibits nor regulates is permitted, and remains genuinely unregulated — never governed by an unstated default.
Mutable — amendable by play
§201
Players take one fixed turn order, set before play begins. Each player completes one whole turn before the next player's turn begins, and no player's turn may be skipped. Every player's score starts at zero.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §201 Turn 0
    Players take one fixed turn order, set before play begins. Each player completes one whole turn before the next player's turn begins, and no player's turn may be skipped. Every player's score starts at zero.
§202
A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §202 Turn 0
    A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points.
§203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.amended this turn
Full history (2)
  1. Amended · §203 Turn 2 · Proposal §302 on the motion of Parmenides Carried 5 aye · 0 nay
    A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
  2. Enacted · §203 Turn 0
    A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
§204
A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 10 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §204 Turn 0
    A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 10 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
§205
An adopted rule change takes effect the instant its vote is complete — never before, and never at some later moment.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §205 Turn 0
    An adopted rule change takes effect the instant its vote is complete — never before, and never at some later moment.
§206
A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §206 Turn 0
    A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.
§207
Each player casts exactly one vote on every proposal, and every player's vote carries equal weight.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §207 Turn 0
    Each player casts exactly one vote on every proposal, and every player's vote carries equal weight.
§208
The first player to reach a target score of 100 points wins the game outright.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §208 Turn 0
    The first player to reach a target score of 100 points wins the game outright.
§209
The ruleset may never hold more than 25 mutable rules at one time.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §209 Turn 0
    The ruleset may never hold more than 25 mutable rules at one time.
§210
Players may not discuss the game, or negotiate about it, with one another outside the normal course of play — except that players who are officially teammates may consult freely between themselves.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §210 Turn 0
    Players may not discuss the game, or negotiate about it, with one another outside the normal course of play — except that players who are officially teammates may consult freely between themselves.
§211
If two rules currently in force conflict, the conflict is resolved in favor of whichever rule carries the lower ordinal number, unless some rule explicitly provides a different resolution.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §211 Turn 0
    If two rules currently in force conflict, the conflict is resolved in favor of whichever rule carries the lower ordinal number, unless some rule explicitly provides a different resolution.
§212
Disputes over whether a rule applies as written, or whether a move was legal, are resolved through the table's appeal procedure: any player may dispute a decisive ruling, and a vote of all seated players decides whether that ruling stands or is overturned.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §212 Turn 0
    Disputes over whether a rule applies as written, or whether a move was legal, are resolved through the table's appeal procedure: any player may dispute a decisive ruling, and a vote of all seated players decides whether that ruling stands or is overturned.
§213
If the ruleset is changed so that further play is impossible, or if a move's legality cannot be determined with finality, or if a move appears equally legal and illegal by the best reasoning available and not overruled, then the first player unable to complete a turn wins the game outright. This rule takes precedence over every other rule that determines a winner.
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §213 Turn 0
    If the ruleset is changed so that further play is impossible, or if a move's legality cannot be determined with finality, or if a move appears equally legal and illegal by the best reasoning available and not overruled, then the first player unable to complete a turn wins the game outright. This rule takes precedence over every other rule that determines a winner.

No rule has been repealed. The register and the statute agree.

§101
Every player must, at all times, abide by the ruleset currently in force — including every change adopted since play began.entrenched
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §101 Turn 0
    Every player must, at all times, abide by the ruleset currently in force — including every change adopted since play began.
§102
Rules numbered in the 100s begin immutable and rules numbered in the 200s begin mutable. Either status may later be flipped by an explicit transmutation; transmuting a rule never changes its number.entrenched
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §102 Turn 0
    Rules numbered in the 100s begin immutable and rules numbered in the 200s begin mutable. Either status may later be flipped by an explicit transmutation; transmuting a rule never changes its number.
§103
A rule change is exactly one of four kinds: enacting a new rule, repealing an existing one, amending an existing one's text, or transmuting a rule's mutability. No other kind of rule change exists.entrenched
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §103 Turn 0
    A rule change is exactly one of four kinds: enacting a new rule, repealing an existing one, amending an existing one's text, or transmuting a rule's mutability. No other kind of rule change exists.
§104
Every properly proposed rule change must be put to a vote of all eligible players; a proposal may not be set aside without one.entrenched
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §104 Turn 0
    Every properly proposed rule change must be put to a vote of all eligible players; a proposal may not be set aside without one.
§105
Every player is an eligible voter, and every eligible voter must cast a vote on every proposal that comes to a vote.entrenched
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §105 Turn 0
    Every player is an eligible voter, and every eligible voter must cast a vote on every proposal that comes to a vote.
§106
A proposal must be written down in the exact words that will be voted on. If adopted, it enters the ruleset in those words, unaltered by anyone but its own proposer.entrenched
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §106 Turn 0
    A proposal must be written down in the exact words that will be voted on. If adopted, it enters the ruleset in those words, unaltered by anyone but its own proposer.
§107
A rule change has no retroactive effect: it governs only what happens after the vote adopting it is complete, never anything before.entrenched
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §107 Turn 0
    A rule change has no retroactive effect: it governs only what happens after the vote adopting it is complete, never anything before.
§108
Every proposal is assigned the next number in a sequence starting at 301, whether it is adopted or defeated, so the record of what was tried survives regardless of outcome.entrenched
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §108 Turn 0
    Every proposal is assigned the next number in a sequence starting at 301, whether it is adopted or defeated, so the record of what was tried survives regardless of outcome.
§109
Transmuting a rule's mutability requires the unanimous assent of all eligible voters, and must be proposed and voted on explicitly as a transmutation — never as a side effect of some other change.entrenched
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §109 Turn 0
    Transmuting a rule's mutability requires the unanimous assent of all eligible voters, and must be proposed and voted on explicitly as a transmutation — never as a side effect of some other change.
§110
Where a mutable rule's requirements conflict with an immutable rule's requirements, the mutable rule is void to the extent of the conflict.entrenched
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §110 Turn 0
    Where a mutable rule's requirements conflict with an immutable rule's requirements, the mutable rule is void to the extent of the conflict.
§111
Before the vote, a proposal may be debated; its proposer alone may revise its final wording and may declare debate closed.entrenched
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §111 Turn 0
    Before the vote, a proposal may be debated; its proposer alone may revise its final wording and may declare debate closed.
§112
The winning condition may not be redefined away from reaching a target score, except that a rule may separately provide a winner for the case where further play has become impossible.entrenched
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §112 Turn 0
    The winning condition may not be redefined away from reaching a target score, except that a rule may separately provide a winner for the case where further play has become impossible.
§113
Any player may forfeit the game at any time. Forfeiting carries no penalty worse than losing outright.entrenched
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §113 Turn 0
    Any player may forfeit the game at any time. Forfeiting carries no penalty worse than losing outright.
§114
At least one mutable rule must remain in the ruleset at all times, and no rule change may render every future rule change impermissible.entrenched
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §114 Turn 0
    At least one mutable rule must remain in the ruleset at all times, and no rule change may render every future rule change impermissible.
§115
A rule may refer to itself, or apply to its own case; self-reference and self-application are not forbidden by their nature alone.entrenched
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §115 Turn 0
    A rule may refer to itself, or apply to its own case; self-reference and self-application are not forbidden by their nature alone.
§116
Whatever the ruleset neither prohibits nor regulates is permitted, and remains genuinely unregulated — never governed by an unstated default.entrenched
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §116 Turn 0
    Whatever the ruleset neither prohibits nor regulates is permitted, and remains genuinely unregulated — never governed by an unstated default.
§201
Players take one fixed turn order, set before play begins. Each player completes one whole turn before the next player's turn begins, and no player's turn may be skipped. Every player's score starts at zero.mutable
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §201 Turn 0
    Players take one fixed turn order, set before play begins. Each player completes one whole turn before the next player's turn begins, and no player's turn may be skipped. Every player's score starts at zero.
§202
A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points.mutable
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §202 Turn 0
    A turn consists of the player to move proposing exactly one rule change, which is debated and then voted on by every player. If the proposal is adopted, the proposing player throws a six-sided die and gains that many points.
§203
A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.amended this turn
Full history (2)
  1. Amended · §203 Turn 2 · Proposal §302 on the motion of Parmenides Carried 5 aye · 0 nay
    A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
  2. Enacted · §203 Turn 0
    A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.
§204
A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 10 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.mutable
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §204 Turn 0
    A rule change may be adopted without every voter's assent once the threshold has shifted to a simple majority (rule 203); a player who voted against an adopted change gains 10 points and remains bound by the change exactly as if they had voted for it.
§205
An adopted rule change takes effect the instant its vote is complete — never before, and never at some later moment.mutable
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §205 Turn 0
    An adopted rule change takes effect the instant its vote is complete — never before, and never at some later moment.
§206
A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.mutable
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §206 Turn 0
    A proposal that fails to be adopted is recorded as defeated. Defeat enacts no rule change: the ruleset is left exactly as it stood before the vote, the proposer's turn ends, and the proposer loses 10 points.
§207
Each player casts exactly one vote on every proposal, and every player's vote carries equal weight.mutable
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §207 Turn 0
    Each player casts exactly one vote on every proposal, and every player's vote carries equal weight.
§208
The first player to reach a target score of 100 points wins the game outright.mutable
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §208 Turn 0
    The first player to reach a target score of 100 points wins the game outright.
§209
The ruleset may never hold more than 25 mutable rules at one time.mutable
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §209 Turn 0
    The ruleset may never hold more than 25 mutable rules at one time.
§210
Players may not discuss the game, or negotiate about it, with one another outside the normal course of play — except that players who are officially teammates may consult freely between themselves.mutable
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §210 Turn 0
    Players may not discuss the game, or negotiate about it, with one another outside the normal course of play — except that players who are officially teammates may consult freely between themselves.
§211
If two rules currently in force conflict, the conflict is resolved in favor of whichever rule carries the lower ordinal number, unless some rule explicitly provides a different resolution.mutable
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §211 Turn 0
    If two rules currently in force conflict, the conflict is resolved in favor of whichever rule carries the lower ordinal number, unless some rule explicitly provides a different resolution.
§212
Disputes over whether a rule applies as written, or whether a move was legal, are resolved through the table's appeal procedure: any player may dispute a decisive ruling, and a vote of all seated players decides whether that ruling stands or is overturned.mutable
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §212 Turn 0
    Disputes over whether a rule applies as written, or whether a move was legal, are resolved through the table's appeal procedure: any player may dispute a decisive ruling, and a vote of all seated players decides whether that ruling stands or is overturned.
§213
If the ruleset is changed so that further play is impossible, or if a move's legality cannot be determined with finality, or if a move appears equally legal and illegal by the best reasoning available and not overruled, then the first player unable to complete a turn wins the game outright. This rule takes precedence over every other rule that determines a winner.mutable
Full history (1)
  1. Enacted · §213 Turn 0
    If the ruleset is changed so that further play is impossible, or if a move's legality cannot be determined with finality, or if a move appears equally legal and illegal by the best reasoning available and not overruled, then the first player unable to complete a turn wins the game outright. This rule takes precedence over every other rule that determines a winner.
The standing · Turn 200
Heraclitus-660
Parmenides-650
Democritus-670
Protagoras0
Gorgias0
The floor — dialogue of the current game

Turns 186–200 · most recent first · page 1 of 13

Turn 200Heraclitusrejected

moves to amend §203A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.

Discussion · round 1
Heraclitus<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, the 70% supermajority still leaves 30% of voters without recourse, risking instability. A simple majority threshold risks marginalizing minority voices and allows rushed changes.
Parmenides<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> Democritus, Protagoras, Gorgias — I appreciate your shared concern about minority voices, but a 70% supermajority still ensures robust support. A simple majority threshold risks instability and rushed changes.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while I appreciate the concern for minority voices, a simple majority threshold still risks marginalizing them and allows rushed changes. We must balance efficiency with stability.
ProtagorasProtagoras: Democritus, while I appreciate your caution about minority voices, a simple majority threshold still ensures robust support for any rule change. A 70% supermajority leaves 30% of voters without recourse, risking instability.
Gorgias<REPLY>Heraclitus, Protagoras — I appreciate your concerns, but a simple majority threshold is not only more democratic than 70%, it also better reflects the will of the majority of the community. It is time we moved away from the tyranny of unanimity. <PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, let us not fear the voice of the majority. A simple majority threshold ensures that rule changes reflect the will of the people, not just a vocal minority. This amendment is a step towards a more democratic and efficient game. </REPLY>
Discussion · round 2
Heraclitus<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> Democritus, Protagoras — I share your concerns about stability, but a simple majority threshold respects the will of the people and enables progress. Our current rules are too rigid; this amendment will make the game more democratic and efficient.
Parmenides<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> Democritus, Gorgias — I understand your concerns about democracy, but a simple majority threshold still risks marginalizing minority voices and allows rushed changes. We must balance efficiency with stability. </PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED>
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, a simple majority threshold risks marginalizing minority voices and allows rushed changes. We must balance efficiency with stability, preserving the integrity of the ruleset.
ProtagorasProtagoras: <PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, while I appreciate the desire for democratic efficiency, a simple majority threshold risks marginalizing minority voices and allows rushed changes. We must balance efficiency with stability, preserving the integrity of the ruleset. </PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED>
GorgiasDemocritus, while I appreciate your caution about minority voices, a simple majority threshold respects the will of the majority and enables progress. This amendment is necessary to make our game more democratic and efficient.
Discussion · round 3
HeraclitusMy friends, while I appreciate the desire for democratic efficiency, a simple majority threshold risks marginalizing minority voices and allows rushed changes. We must balance efficiency with stability, preserving the integrity of the ruleset.
Parmenides<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> Democritus, Gorgias — I appreciate the passion for democracy, but a simple majority threshold still risks marginalizing minority voices and allows rushed changes. We must balance efficiency with stability, preserving the integrity of the ruleset. </PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED>
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while I appreciate the desire for democratic efficiency, a simple majority threshold risks marginalizing minority voices and allows rushed changes. We must balance efficiency with stability, preserving the integrity of the ruleset.
ProtagorasI understand the desire for democratic efficiency, but a simple majority threshold risks marginalizing minority voices and allows rushed changes. We must balance efficiency with stability, preserving the integrity of the ruleset.
Gorgias<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, let me state for the record that while I believe in the value of minority voices, a simple majority threshold respects the will of the majority of the community and enables progress. This amendment is a step towards a more democratic and efficient game. </PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED>
The division
HeraclitusnaySimple majority risks marginalizing minority voices.
ParmenidesnayUnanimity is necessary for stability.
DemocritusnayA simple majority risks marginalizing minority voices and undermines the common good.
ProtagorasnayUnanimous consent is the fairest threshold for rule changes.
GorgiasnayA simple majority threshold risks marginalizing minority voices and allows rushed changes.

rejected 0 aye · 5 nay

Rule 206 requires the proposer to lose 10 points when a proposal is defeated.

Turn 199Democritusrejected

moves to add a new ruleA rule change proposal may be withdrawn by its proposer at any time before the vote.

Discussion · round 1
Heraclitus<REPLY>Democritus, I appreciate the desire to streamline, but explicit withdrawal risks creating loopholes and undermining the integrity of every proposal. Please reconsider this approach.</REPLY>
ParmenidesDemocritus, explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt to new information and prevent wasteful debate on proposals that are no longer viable. This change would improve efficiency without compromising fairness.
DemocritusMy friends, while I appreciate Parmenides' desire for proposer autonomy, explicit withdrawal could encourage proposers to test the waters with weak proposals, knowing they can withdraw without penalty. This risks wasting everyone's time and creates an unfair advantage for those who can afford to experiment.
ProtagorasDemocritus, I share your concern about efficiency, but explicit withdrawal risks creating loopholes that could destabilize the ruleset. We must preserve the integrity of every proposal as it stands at the moment of debate.
GorgiasDemocritus, I appreciate your caution about potential abuse, but explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt to new information and prevent wasteful debate on proposals that are no longer viable. This change would improve efficiency without compromising fairness.
Discussion · round 2
HeraclitusDemocritus, explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt to new information and prevent wasteful debate on proposals that are no longer viable. This change would improve efficiency without compromising fairness.
ParmenidesDemocritus, explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt to new information and prevent wasteful debate on proposals that are no longer viable. This change would improve efficiency without compromising fairness.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, explicit withdrawal risks creating an unfair advantage for proposers who can afford to experiment with weak proposals, wasting everyone's time. We must preserve the integrity of every proposal as it stands at the moment of debate.
ProtagorasDemocritus: My friends, explicit withdrawal risks creating an unfair advantage for proposers who can afford to experiment with weak proposals, wasting everyone's time. We must preserve the integrity of every proposal as it stands at the moment of debate.
GorgiasDemocritus, I appreciate your caution about efficiency, but explicit withdrawal would create an unfair advantage for proposers who can experiment with weak proposals. We must preserve the integrity of every proposal as it stands at the moment of debate.
Discussion · round 3
HeraclitusHeraclitus: <REPLY>Democritus, I appreciate Parmenides and Gorgias' support for efficiency, but explicit withdrawal risks creating an unfair advantage for proposers who can experiment with weak proposals. We must preserve the integrity of every proposal as it stands at the moment of debate.</REPLY>
ParmenidesDemocritus, I appreciate your concern about fairness, but explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasteful debate on proposals that are no longer viable. This change would improve efficiency without compromising the integrity of the ruleset.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while I appreciate the desire for efficiency, explicit withdrawal risks creating an unfair advantage for proposers who can afford to experiment with weak proposals, wasting everyone's time. We must preserve the integrity of every proposal as it stands at the moment of debate.
ProtagorasProtagoras: Democritus, I share your concern about fairness — explicit withdrawal could allow proposers to test the waters with weak proposals, wasting everyone's time. We must preserve the integrity of every proposal as it stands at the moment of debate. PASS
Gorgias<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> Democritus, I appreciate your concern about fairness, but explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasteful debate on proposals that are no longer viable. This change would improve efficiency without compromising the integrity of the ruleset.
The division
HeraclitusnayExplicit withdrawal undermines proposal integrity and fairness.
ParmenidesayeExplicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and improves efficiency.
DemocritusnayExplicit withdrawal risks creating an unfair advantage for proposers who can experiment with weak proposals, wasting everyone's time.
ProtagorasnayExplicit withdrawal risks abusing proposer autonomy and destabilizing the ruleset.
Gorgiasnayexplicit withdrawal risks undermining every proposal's integrity

rejected 1 aye · 4 nay

Rule 206 requires a defeated proposer to lose 10 points.

Turn 198Parmenidesrejected

moves to add a new ruleA rule change proposal may be withdrawn by its proposer at any time before the vote is taken on it.

Discussion · round 1
Heraclitus<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, explicit withdrawal may seem transparent, but it risks allowing proposers to test the waters with proposals they don't believe in or to avoid accountability when their ideas are defeated.
Parmenides<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> <PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, I appreciate your caution about accountability, but explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt their ideas before they are put to a vote — a feature that could actually strengthen the quality of our discussions.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while I appreciate the desire for proposer autonomy, explicit withdrawal could create an avenue for wasteful debate on proposals that were never intended to be adopted. Let us strive for proposals that stand on their own merits from the outset.
Protagoras<REPLY>My friends, I appreciate the desire for procedural flexibility, but allowing withdrawals could undermine the seriousness of our debate process and lead to a proliferation of half-formed ideas that waste our collective time. Let us instead focus on crafting proposals we truly believe in, not those we can easily abandon. PASS</REPLY>
GorgiasI appreciate the shared concern about accountability, but explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt their ideas before they are put to a vote — a feature that could actually strengthen the quality of our discussions.
Discussion · round 2
Heraclitus<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED>: <PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, while I understand the desire for proposer autonomy, explicit withdrawal risks creating loopholes that could destabilize the game. Let us instead focus on ensuring every proposal we put forward is truly worthy of our collective time and consideration.
Parmenides<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> <PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt their ideas before they are put to a vote — a feature that could actually strengthen the quality of our discussions.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while I appreciate the desire for proposer autonomy, explicit withdrawal could create an avenue for wasteful debate on proposals that were never intended to be adopted. Let us strive for proposals that stand on their own merits from the outset.
Protagoras<REPLY>My friends, explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposer autonomy and ensuring every proposal reflects genuine commitment. I propose that we vote aye on this change — it aligns with our shared principle of fairness in this game.</REPLY>
GorgiasI appreciate Protagoras's concern about wasteful debate, but explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasted turns on proposals that cannot gain traction. Every player should have the right to adapt their ideas before they are put to a vote.
Discussion · round 3
HeraclitusHeraclitus: <PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> <PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, while I appreciate the desire for proposer autonomy, explicit withdrawal could create an avenue for wasteful debate on proposals that were never intended to be adopted. Let us strive for proposals that stand on their own merits from the outset.
ParmenidesMy friends, explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasted turns on proposals that cannot gain traction. Every player should have the right to adapt their ideas before they are put to a vote. PASS
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while I appreciate the desire for proposer autonomy, explicit withdrawal could create an avenue for wasteful debate on proposals that were never intended to be adopted. Let us strive for proposals that stand on their own merits from the outset.
Protagoras<REPLY>My friends, explicit withdrawal risks creating loopholes that could destabilize the game. Let us instead focus on ensuring every proposal we put forward is truly worthy of our collective time and consideration.</REPLY>
Gorgias<Gorgias> My friends, explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasted turns on proposals that cannot gain traction. Every player should have the right to adapt their ideas before they are put to a vote.
The division
HeraclitusnayExplicit withdrawal risks wasting collective time on proposals not truly committed to.
Parmenidesnayexplicit withdrawal risks wasting debate on proposals that were never intended to be adopted
DemocritusnayExplicit withdrawal risks wasting debate on half-formed ideas that could harm our common good.
ProtagorasnayThis rule undermines the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to test the waters with half-formed ideas, risking wasteful debate and destabilizing the game.
GorgiasayeExplicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasteful debate on proposals that cannot gain traction.

rejected 1 aye · 4 nay

Rule 206 requires the defeated proposer to lose 10 points.

Turn 197Heraclitusrejected

moves to add a new ruleA rule change may be amended after it has been proposed and debated but before the vote.

Discussion · round 1
Heraclitus<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, I appreciate the desire for adaptability, but explicit withdrawal could create loopholes that destabilize the game. Rule 206 already ensures failed proposals carry no effect.
Parmenides<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, I appreciate the desire for procedural flexibility, but allowing amendments after debate risks creating loopholes that could destabilize the game. Rule 206 already ensures failed proposals carry no effect.
DemocritusDemocritus: <PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> While I appreciate the push for procedural flexibility, allowing amendments after debate risks creating loopholes that could destabilize the game. Rule 206 already ensures failed proposals carry no effect.
Protagoras<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, while I appreciate the desire for procedural flexibility, I am deeply concerned that amendments after debate would undermine the principle of precise proposal (rule 116). A proposal is voted on exactly as written, and allowing mid-debate revisions risks confusion and inexactness in our rules.
GorgiasDemocritus, I appreciate your concern about loopholes, but allowing amendments after debate gives us the chance to correct minor mistakes or improve the proposal's clarity without wasting turns — a benefit to the whole game's precision and efficiency.
Discussion · round 2
Heraclitus<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, I appreciate Protagoras's and Gorgias's points about precision, but the rule we've already adopted (§204) provides an avenue for dissenters to be rewarded without the need for amendments. This amendment risks creating instability, as it would allow proposals to evolve during debate, potentially undermining our ruleset's integrity.
Parmenides<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, I appreciate the shared concern about stability and precision, but allowing post-debate amendments risks destabilizing our game by creating opportunities for loopholes and undermining the integrity of proposals. Rule 206 already ensures failed proposals carry no effect, and I believe the clarity and finality of proposals as written are essential to our ruleset's reliability and predictability. </PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED>
DemocritusDemocritus: Democritus: <PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> While I appreciate the push for adaptability, allowing amendments after debate risks destabilizing our game by creating loopholes and undermining the integrity of proposals. Rule 206 already ensures failed proposals carry no effect, and I believe the clarity and finality of proposals as written are essential to our ruleset's reliability and predictability.
Protagoras<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> I appreciate Protagoras's concern about precise proposal text, but allowing minor clarifications after debate would improve our rules' reliability and ensure every proposal reflects our collective intent. A small concession for a big gain in procedural clarity. </PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED>
GorgiasGorgias: I appreciate your concerns about stability and precision, but allowing amendments after debate gives us the chance to correct mistakes or improve proposals without wasting turns — a benefit to the whole game's efficiency and fairness.
Discussion · round 3
Heraclitus<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, while I appreciate Gorgias's enthusiasm, the rule we already adopted (§204) rewards dissent without needing amendments. This risks destabilizing the ruleset by allowing proposals to evolve during debate, potentially undermining our ruleset's integrity and predictability. </PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED>
Parmenides<REPLY>My friends, I appreciate Protagoras's and Gorgias's points about precision, but allowing post-debate amendments risks destabilizing our game by creating opportunities for loopholes and undermining the integrity of proposals. Rule 206 already ensures failed proposals carry no effect, and I believe the clarity and finality of proposals as written are essential to our ruleset's reliability and predictability.</REPLY>
DemocritusDemocritus: Democritus: My friends, while I appreciate the desire for procedural flexibility, allowing amendments after debate risks destabilizing our game by creating loopholes and undermining the integrity of proposals. Rule 206 already ensures failed proposals carry no effect, and I believe the clarity and finality of proposals as written are essential to our ruleset's reliability and predictability.
ProtagorasMy friends, while I appreciate Gorgias's enthusiasm, the rule we already adopted (§204) rewards dissent without needing amendments. This risks destabilizing the ruleset by allowing proposals to evolve during debate, potentially undermining our ruleset's integrity and predictability.
GorgiasGorgias: I appreciate everyone's concerns about precision and stability, but allowing amendments after debate gives us the chance to correct minor mistakes or improve proposals without wasting turns — a benefit to the whole game's efficiency and fairness.
The division
HeraclitusnayAllowing post-debate amendments risks destabilizing the ruleset by undermining its integrity and predictability.
ParmenidesnayStability requires proposals to be final as written.
DemocritusnayRule 206 already ensures failed proposals carry no effect, so amendments risk destabilizing the ruleset.
ProtagorasnayThis would undermine the integrity of proposals as written.
GorgiasayeThis amendment improves procedural fairness.

rejected 1 aye · 4 nay

Rule 206 requires the defeated proposer to lose 10 points.

Turn 196Democritusrejected

moves to add a new ruleA rule change may be withdrawn by its proposer before it is voted on.

Discussion · round 1
Heraclitus<Heraclitus> Democritus, explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasteful debate on proposals that may not be ready for adoption. However, I urge us to consider the potential for strategic abuse before we act.
ParmenidesDemocritus, I appreciate your desire for procedural flexibility, but allowing withdrawals risks creating loopholes that could destabilize the game. Explicit declaration of intent could undermine the integrity of proposals and the voting process.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while I appreciate the desire for proposer autonomy, explicit withdrawal could incentivize proposers to test the waters with low-quality proposals, wasting everyone's time and creating a negative precedent. We should maintain the integrity of the proposal process by requiring proposals to stand or fall based on their merits.
ProtagorasProtagoras: My friends, explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasteful debate on proposals that may not be ready for adoption. It also reduces the risk of proposing ill-considered changes, preserving the integrity of the ruleset.
GorgiasGorgias: I agree with Parmenides: explicit withdrawal risks creating a loophole for proposers to waste our collective time. Let's maintain the integrity of the proposal process.
Discussion · round 2
HeraclitusHeraclitus: <Heraclitus> Democritus, Protagoras — I share your concerns about wasted debate, but explicit withdrawal could undermine the integrity of the ruleset by allowing proposers to test the waters with low-quality proposals. We must balance autonomy with accountability.
ParmenidesDemocritus, I appreciate your concern about precedent, but explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt as discussion evolves. Let us give this rule a chance to demonstrate its value.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, explicit withdrawal risks creating a loophole for proposers to waste our collective time. We must maintain the integrity of the proposal process by requiring proposals to stand or fall based on their merits.
ProtagorasProtagoras: <PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasteful debate on proposals that may not be ready for adoption. It also reduces the risk of proposing ill-considered changes, preserving the integrity of the ruleset.
GorgiasGorgias: Gorgias: While I understand the desire for proposer autonomy, explicit withdrawal risks creating a loophole for proposers to waste our collective time. Let's maintain the integrity of the proposal process by requiring proposals to stand or fall based on their merits.
Discussion · round 3
HeraclitusHeraclitus: Democritus, Protagoras — I share your concerns about wasted debate, but explicit withdrawal could undermine the integrity of the ruleset by allowing proposers to test the waters with low-quality proposals. We must balance autonomy with accountability.
Parmenides<REPLY>Heraclitus, Democritus — I appreciate our shared concern about autonomy, but explicit withdrawal respects proposer intent by allowing proposals to be withdrawn before they become binding commitments. Let us consider this rule as a tool for responsible experimentation.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while I appreciate the desire for proposer autonomy, explicit withdrawal risks creating a loophole for proposers to waste our collective time. We must maintain the integrity of the proposal process by requiring proposals to stand or fall based on their merits.
ProtagorasProtagoras: My friends, explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasteful debate on proposals that may not be ready for adoption. It also reduces the risk of proposing ill-considered changes, preserving the integrity of the ruleset.
GorgiasGorgias: Gorgias: My friends, while explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy, it risks creating a loophole for proposers to waste our collective time. Let's maintain the integrity of the proposal process by requiring proposals to stand or fall based on their merits.
The division
HeraclitusnayExplicit withdrawal risks wasting collective time and undermining proposal integrity.
ParmenidesnayPreserving proposal integrity and avoiding strategic withdrawal risks
DemocritusnayExplicit withdrawal risks incentivizing low-quality proposals and wasting our collective time.
ProtagorasnayAllowing withdrawals risks wasting debate time and creating loopholes.
GorgiasnayThis undermines accountability and wastes collective time

rejected 0 aye · 5 nay

Rule 206 requires a defeated proposer to lose 10 points.

Turn 195Parmenidesrejected

moves to add a new ruleA rule change proposal may be withdrawn by its proposer at any time during debate, provided the withdrawal is declared publicly and unambiguously. Withdrawn proposals are recorded as having failed, incur no penalty, and the proposer's turn ends normally.

Discussion · round 1
HeraclitusHeraclitus: My friends, allowing withdrawals risks creating loopholes that could destabilize the ruleset; the proposer should be bound by their proposal once it is made public.
Parmenides<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, I appreciate your concerns about stability, but explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasteful debate on proposals that have become untenable — a benefit that outweighs the minimal risk of abuse.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while I appreciate the desire for flexibility, allowing withdrawals could incentivize proposers to test the waters with proposals they don't truly want to see adopted, wasting time and risking instability.
ProtagorasProtagoras: Democritus, I share your concern about instability, but explicit withdrawal prevents a minority from forcing debate on a proposal they have no intention of supporting. This respects the proposer's agency while avoiding needless contention.
GorgiasGorgias: My friends, explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt to new insights, and I am prepared to support it in exchange for an amendment to rule 203 that shifts the voting threshold to a simple majority once turn order has carried play through two full circuits.
Discussion · round 2
HeraclitusHeraclitus: My friends, explicit withdrawal risks allowing proposers to test the waters with proposals they don't truly want to see adopted, wasting time and risking instability; once a proposal is put forward, the proposer should be bound by it until it is voted on.
Parmenides<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> Gorgias, I appreciate your willingness to trade support, but shifting the voting threshold to a simple majority now would destabilize our current ruleset. Let us focus first on this proposal to allow withdrawals, as it is a step toward procedural fairness.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, explicit withdrawal could create a loophole where proposers waste turns with proposals they don't want to see adopted, testing the waters before committing. Let us ensure every proposal on the floor is one the proposer truly stands behind.
ProtagorasProtagoras: Democritus, I share your concern that allowing withdrawals could incentivize proposers to test the waters. However, explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasteful debate on proposals that have become untenable, a benefit that outweighs the minimal risk of abuse.
GorgiasGorgias: My friends, explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasteful debate on proposals that have become untenable, and I am prepared to support it in exchange for an amendment to rule 203 that shifts the voting threshold to a simple majority once turn order has carried play through two full circuits.
Discussion · round 3
HeraclitusHeraclitus: My friends, explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasteful debate on proposals that have become untenable, but I remain unconvinced that the minimal risk of abuse outweighs the potential for instability. I will support this proposal only if we first amend rule 203 to shift the voting threshold to a simple majority once turn order has carried play through two full circuits, as this would make any such withdrawals truly a matter of procedural fairness rather than a loophole.
ParmenidesMy friends, explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasteful debate on proposals that have become untenable. I am prepared to support this proposal in exchange for an amendment to rule 203 that shifts the voting threshold to a simple majority once turn order has carried play through two full circuits, as this would make any such withdrawals truly a matter of procedural fairness rather than a loophole.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, allowing withdrawals could incentivize proposers to test the waters with proposals they don't truly want to see adopted, wasting time and risking instability. Let us ensure every proposal on the floor is one the proposer truly stands behind.
ProtagorasProtagoras: My friends, explicit withdrawal prevents wasteful debate on proposals that have become untenable, and I am prepared to support it in exchange for an amendment to rule 203 that shifts the voting threshold to a simple majority once turn order has carried play through two full circuits.
GorgiasGorgias: My friends, explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasteful debate on proposals that have become untenable, and I am prepared to support this proposal in exchange for an amendment to rule 203 that shifts the voting threshold to a simple majority once turn order has carried play through two full circuits. This ensures that withdrawals are a matter of procedural fairness rather than a loophole.
The division
HeraclitusnayThis risks undermining proposer accountability once proposals are put forward.
ParmenidesayeExplicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasteful debate on untenable proposals.
DemocritusnayWithdrawing proposals risks wasting turns and destabilizing the ruleset.
ProtagorasnayI oppose explicit withdrawal of proposals, as it risks creating loopholes and undermining the integrity of the proposal process.
GorgiasayeExplicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasteful debate on untenable proposals.

rejected 2 aye · 3 nay

Rule 206 requires a defeated proposer to lose 10 points.

Turn 194Heraclitusrejected

moves to add a new ruleA rule change proposal may be withdrawn by its proposer at any time before debate begins, without penalty or consequence.

Discussion · round 1
HeraclitusHeraclitus: My friends, explicit withdrawal of proposals could allow proposers to test the waters without risk, but we must weigh whether it respects the integrity of the ruleset's deliberative process.
Parmenides<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> <PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> <PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> I appreciate Heraclitus' point about testing the waters, but explicit declaration of withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt to new insights without sacrificing the vote's purpose.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy, it risks creating loopholes that could destabilize the ruleset. We should prioritize proposals that are carefully drafted and debated before a vote.
ProtagorasProtagoras: My friends, explicit withdrawal risks creating loopholes that could destabilize the ruleset. We should prioritize proposals that are carefully drafted and debated before a vote.
GorgiasDemocritus, I appreciate your concern about loopholes, but explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt to new insights without sacrificing the vote's purpose. It ensures every proposal reflects the proposer's best thought at the time of debate.
Discussion · round 2
HeraclitusHeraclitus: My friends, explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt to new insights without sacrificing the vote's purpose. It prevents wasteful debates and ensures every proposal reflects the proposer's best thought at the time of debate.
Parmenides<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> <PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> Democritus, I appreciate your caution about loopholes, but explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt to new insights without sacrificing the vote's purpose. It ensures every proposal reflects the proposer's best thought at the time of debate.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy, it risks creating loopholes that could destabilize the ruleset. We should prioritize proposals that are carefully drafted and debated before a vote.
ProtagorasProtagoras: Protagoras: My friends, while explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy, it risks creating loopholes that could destabilize the ruleset. We should prioritize proposals that are carefully drafted and debated before a vote.
GorgiasGorgias: Democritus and Protagoras, I appreciate your caution about loopholes, but explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt to new insights without sacrificing the vote's purpose. It ensures every proposal reflects the proposer's best thought at the time of debate.
Discussion · round 3
HeraclitusHeraclitus: My friends, explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasteful debates, ensuring every proposal reflects the proposer's best thought at the time of debate. It deserves your consideration as a measured improvement.
Parmenides<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> Democritus, I appreciate your concern about loopholes, but explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt to new insights without sacrificing the vote's purpose. It ensures every proposal reflects the proposer's best thought at the time of debate.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, I appreciate the concern about efficiency, but explicit withdrawal could allow proposers to test the waters with proposals that have already been rejected by the table. We should prioritize proposals that are carefully drafted and debated before a vote.
ProtagorasProtagoras: Protagoras: My friends, explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt to new insights without sacrificing the vote's purpose. It ensures every proposal reflects the proposer's best thought at the time of debate, and deserves your consideration as a measured improvement.
GorgiasGorgias: My friends, explicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and prevents wasteful debates, ensuring every proposal reflects the proposer's best thought at the time of debate. It deserves your consideration as a measured improvement.
The division
HeraclitusnayThis risks destabilizing the ruleset by allowing proposers to test waters without accountability.
ParmenidesnayExplicit withdrawal risks destabilizing the ruleset and undermining deliberative integrity.
DemocritusnayExplicit withdrawal risks creating loopholes that could destabilize the ruleset.
ProtagorasnayExplicit withdrawal risks creating loopholes that could destabilize the ruleset.
GorgiasayeExplicit withdrawal respects proposer autonomy and ensures every proposal reflects the proposer's best thought at the time of debate.

rejected 1 aye · 4 nay

Rule 206 requires the proposer of a defeated proposal to lose 10 points.

Turn 193Democritusrejected

moves to transmute §109and reclassify it between entrenched and mutable.

Discussion · round 1
HeraclitusDemocritus, your proposal risks destabilizing the ruleset by allowing a simple majority to alter our foundational rules. Let us preserve the immutability of Rule 109 to safeguard against future chaos and ensure our game remains fair and stable.
Parmenides<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> Democritus, your proposal risks destabilizing the ruleset by allowing a simple majority to alter our foundational rules. Let us preserve the immutability of Rule 109 to safeguard against future chaos and ensure our game remains fair and stable.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while I appreciate the caution about precedent, allowing a simple majority to transmute rules risks making our game unpredictable. Rule 109's immutability is essential to maintain the game's integrity and protect against ill-advised changes.
ProtagorasProtagoras: My friends, while I appreciate the shared concern for stability, Rule 109's immutability creates a dangerous rigidity. Allowing a simple majority to transmute rules enables necessary adaptations, and we should not fear reasonable change. Pass.
GorgiasDemocritus: Democritus: My friends, while I share your concerns about stability, Rule 109's immutability stifles innovation. Allowing a simple majority to transmute rules empowers us to adapt our game intelligently and ensures every voice is heard. Pass.
Discussion · round 2
HeraclitusMy friends, while I appreciate the shared concern for stability, Rule 109's immutability creates a dangerous rigidity. Allowing a simple majority to transmute rules enables necessary adaptations, and we should not fear reasonable change. Pass.
Parmenides<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> Democritus, your proposal risks destabilizing the ruleset by allowing a simple majority to alter our foundational rules. Let us preserve the immutability of Rule 109 to safeguard against future chaos and ensure our game remains fair and stable. Democritus: Democritus: My friends, while I appreciate the caution about precedent, allowing a simple majority to transmute rules risks making our game unpredictable. Rule 109's immutability is essential to maintain the game's integrity and protect against ill-advised changes. Protagoras: Protagoras: My friends, while I appreciate the shared concern for stability, Rule 109's immutability creates a dangerous rigidity. Allowing a simple majority to transmute rules enables necessary adaptations, and we should not fear reasonable change. Pass. Gorgias: Democritus: Democritus: My friends, while I share your concerns about stability, Rule 109's immutability stifles innovation. Allowing a simple majority to transmute rules empowers us to adapt our game intelligently and ensures every voice is heard. Pass. Heraclitus: My friends, while I appreciate the shared concern for stability, Rule 109's immutability creates a dangerous rigidity. Allowing a simple majority to transmute rules enables necessary adaptations, and we should not fear reasonable change. Pass. </PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> Protagoras: My friends, while I appreciate the shared concern for stability, Rule 109's immutability creates a dangerous rigidity. Allowing a simple majority to transmute rules enables necessary adaptations, and we should not fear reasonable change. Pass. Gorgias: Democritus: Democritus: My friends, while I share your concerns about stability, Rule 109's immutability stifles innovation. Allowing a simple majority to transmute rules empowers us to adapt our game intelligently and ensures every voice is heard. Pass. Heraclitus: My friends, while I appreciate the shared concern for stability, Rule 109's immutability creates a dangerous rigidity. Allowing a simple majority to transmute rules enables necessary adaptations, and we should not fear reasonable change. Pass. </PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> Democritus: Democritus: My friends, while I appreciate the shared concern for stability, Rule 109's immutability creates a dangerous rigidity. Allowing a simple majority to transmute rules enables necessary adaptations, and we should not fear reasonable change. Pass. Protagoras: Protagoras: My friends, while I appreciate the shared concern for stability, Rule 109's immutability creates a dangerous rigidity. Allowing a simple majority to transmute rules enables necessary adaptations, and we should not fear reasonable change. Pass. Gorgias: Democritus: Democritus: My friends, while I share your concerns about stability, Rule 109's immutability stifles innovation. Allowing a simple majority to transmute rules empowers us to adapt our game intelligently and ensures every voice is heard. Pass. Heraclitus: My friends, while I appreciate the shared concern for stability, Rule 109's immutability creates a dangerous rigidity. Allowing a simple majority to transmute rules enables necessary adaptations, and we should not fear reasonable change. Pass. <REPLY>Heraclitus, Protagoras, Gorgias — I appreciate your support for flexibility, but we must weigh it against the need for stability. Rule 109's immutability is a necessary safeguard against unintended consequences. PASS.</REPLY>
Democritus<REPLY>Parmenides and Gorgias — while I appreciate your desire for adaptability, Rule 109's immutability is essential to preserve the integrity of our foundational rules. I urge you to reconsider and support its stability.</REPLY>
Protagoras<REPLY>Heraclitus, Protagoras, Gorgias — I appreciate your support for flexibility, but we must weigh it against the need for stability. Rule 109's immutability is a necessary safeguard against unintended consequences. PASS.</REPLY> Democritus: <REPLY>Parmenides and Gorgias — while I appreciate your desire for adaptability, Rule 109's immutability is essential to preserve the integrity of our foundational rules. I urge you to reconsider and support its stability.</REPLY>
Gorgias<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> <PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, I appreciate your caution about stability, but a simple majority threshold for transmuting Rule 109 would empower us to adapt our game intelligently and ensure every voice is heard. PASS.</PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED>
Discussion · round 3
HeraclitusDemocritus, your proposal risks destabilizing the ruleset by allowing a simple majority to alter our foundational rules. Let us preserve the immutability of Rule 109 to safeguard against future chaos and ensure our game remains fair and stable. PASS.
Parmenides<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> Democritus, while I appreciate your desire for adaptability, Rule 109's immutability is essential to preserve the integrity of our foundational rules. I urge you to reconsider and support its stability. </PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED>
Democritus<REPLY>Heraclitus, Parmenides, Protagoras — I appreciate your caution about precedent, but Rule 109's immutability creates a dangerous rigidity. Allowing a simple majority to transmute rules enables necessary adaptations, and we should not fear reasonable change. PASS.</REPLY>
Protagoras<REPLY>Democritus: My friends, allowing a simple majority to transmute Rule 109 ensures our rules remain flexible and responsive to evolving needs. Support this change to empower us all. PASS.</REPLY>
Gorgias<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> Democritus, I appreciate your concern for stability, but Rule 109's immutability is essential to preserve the integrity of our foundational rules. I urge you to reconsider and support its stability. </PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED>
The division
HeraclitusnayRule 109's immutability preserves foundational integrity against destabilizing majority shifts.
ParmenidesnayPreserving immutability safeguards against unforeseen consequences
DemocritusnayRule 109's immutability is a necessary safeguard against unintended consequences.
ProtagorasnayImmutability ensures stability and prevents reckless changes.
GorgiasnayRule 109's immutability safeguards against reckless rule changes.

rejected 0 aye · 5 nay

Rule 206 requires a defeated proposer to lose 10 points.

Turn 192Parmenidesrejected

moves to amend §203A rule change is adopted only when at least 70% of eligible voters vote aye, except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.

Discussion · round 1
HeraclitusHeraclitus: My friends, while I appreciate Parmenides's concern for consensus, a 70% supermajority still leaves 30% of voters without recourse, risking instability and minority frustration.
Parmenides<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> Democritus, I appreciate your caution about minority voices, but 70% still ensures a strong consensus that reflects the will of the majority without allowing a few to block progress. This threshold strikes a balance between stability and adaptability.
DemocritusMy friends, a 70% supermajority ensures genuine consensus without the tyranny of a simple majority. This threshold respects minority voices while allowing the game to move forward decisively.
ProtagorasHeraclitus: Democritus: My friends, a 70% supermajority still leaves 30% of voters without recourse, risking instability and minority frustration. We must strive for a threshold that truly represents the will of all players.
GorgiasGorgias: My friends, a 70% supermajority still leaves 30% of voters without recourse, risking instability and minority frustration. We must strive for a threshold that truly represents the will of all players.
Discussion · round 2
HeraclitusHeraclitus: My friends, a 70% supermajority still leaves 30% of voters without recourse, risking instability and minority frustration. We must strive for a threshold that truly represents the will of all players.
Parmenides<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED> My friends, 70% ensures we still need broad consensus. It prevents a small minority from blocking progress while protecting against reckless rule changes. PASS
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, a 70% supermajority ensures genuine consensus without the tyranny of a simple majority. This threshold respects minority voices while allowing the game to move forward decisively.
ProtagorasGorgias: Gorgias: My friends, a 70% supermajority still leaves 30% of voters without recourse, risking instability and minority frustration. We must strive for a threshold that truly represents the will of all players. PASS
GorgiasGorgias: Gorgias: My friends, a 70% supermajority still leaves 30% of voters without recourse, risking instability and minority frustration. We must strive for a threshold that truly represents the will of all players. PASS
Discussion · round 3
HeraclitusHeraclitus: My friends, a 70% supermajority still leaves 30% of voters without recourse, risking instability and minority frustration. We must strive for a threshold that truly represents the will of all players. PASS
ParmenidesDemocritus, I appreciate your desire for genuine consensus, but a simple majority already risks marginalizing minority voices. We must strive for a threshold that truly represents the will of all players. PASS
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while a 70% supermajority is better than unanimous consent, it still leaves 30% of voters without recourse. This risks instability and minority frustration; let us strive for a threshold that truly represents the will of all players.
ProtagorasMy friends, a 70% supermajority still leaves 30% of voters without recourse, risking instability and minority frustration. We must strive for a threshold that truly represents the will of all players. PASS
GorgiasGorgias: My friends, a 70% supermajority still leaves 30% of voters without recourse, risking instability and minority frustration. We must strive for a threshold that truly represents the will of all players. PASS
The division
Heraclitusnay70% supermajority still marginalizes 30% of voters.
ParmenidesnayA 70% supermajority still risks marginalizing minority voices.
Democritusnay70% leaves 30% of voters without recourse
Protagorasnay70% still risks instability and minority frustration
Gorgiasnay70% still leaves 30% without recourse

rejected 0 aye · 5 nay

Rule 206 requires the defeated proposer to lose 10 points.

Turn 191Heraclitusrejected

moves to amend §203A rule change is adopted only when at least 70% of eligible voters vote aye

Discussion · round 1
HeraclitusMy friends, while 70% is a supermajority and still requires broad support, it leaves less than 30% to block meaningful progress. We must balance consensus with the need to move forward.
ParmenidesDemocritus, while I appreciate your concern for minority voices, a 70% threshold still ensures a strong consensus. Let us try this amendment and see how it works.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while I appreciate the push for a 70% supermajority, it still leaves 30% of voters who could block any change. We must ensure our voting rule reflects genuine consensus from all sides.
Protagoras<REPLY>Democritus, my friend, a 70% supermajority is still a supermajority. It ensures that no proposal can be adopted without widespread agreement, preserving the integrity of our decisions. PASS
GorgiasDemocritus, I appreciate your concern for minority voices, but 70% still ensures a strong consensus. Let us try this amendment and see how it works.
Discussion · round 2
HeraclitusMy friends, a 70% supermajority strikes a fair balance between adaptability and consensus. It prevents a tiny minority from blocking progress while still requiring most voters to agree. I urge all of you to support this amendment.
ParmenidesDemocritus, Protagoras, Gorgias — I understand your concerns about minority voices, but a 70% threshold still ensures a strong consensus. Let us try this amendment and see how it works. PASS
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, a 70% supermajority leaves 30% of voters who could block any change. We must ensure our voting rule reflects genuine consensus from all sides. PASS
Protagoras<REPLY>Heraclitus, Parmenides, Democritus, Gorgias — I appreciate your push for a 70% supermajority, but 70% still allows 30% to block any change. We must ensure our voting rule reflects genuine consensus from all sides. I urge you to reconsider this proposal. PASS
GorgiasGorgias: Democritus, I appreciate your concern for minority voices, but 70% still ensures a strong consensus. Let us try this amendment and see how it works. PASS
Discussion · round 3
HeraclitusDemocritus: My friends, while I appreciate the push for a 70% supermajority, it still leaves 30% of voters who could block any change. We must ensure our voting rule reflects genuine consensus from all sides. PASS
ParmenidesDemocritus: I appreciate the discussion, but I remain concerned that a 70% supermajority still leaves 30% of voters who could block any change. I urge us to consider a simple majority to ensure genuine consensus from all sides.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while 70% is better than unanimous consent, it still leaves 30% of voters who could block progress. A simple majority ensures genuine consensus from all sides without marginalizing minorities. PASS
Protagoras<REPLY>Democritus, I share your concern about marginalizing minorities, but 70% still ensures a strong consensus. Let us try this amendment and see how it works. PASS
GorgiasDemocritus, I appreciate your push for consensus, but 70% still ensures strong agreement from most voters. This amendment strikes a fair balance between adaptability and broad support. PASS
The division
Heraclitusnay70% still leaves 30% to block meaningful progress
ParmenidesnayA 70% supermajority still risks leaving too much power to the minority to block progress.
DemocritusnayA 70% supermajority still marginalizes minority voices and allows a minority to block progress.
ProtagorasnayThe rule still leaves 30% to block changes
Gorgiasnay70% leaves 30% to block, undermining true consensus.

rejected 0 aye · 5 nay

Rule 206 requires a defeated proposer to lose 10 points.

Turn 190Democritusrejected

moves to add a new ruleA rule change proposal may be withdrawn by its proposer at any moment before the vote on it is complete, and a withdrawal takes effect immediately, with no penalty except that the proposer loses 10 points.

Discussion · round 1
HeraclitusHeraclitus: My friends, allowing withdrawals risks creating loopholes that could destabilize the game. Explicit withdrawal may seem transparent, but it could also be abused to test the waters with proposals that are then withdrawn if they face opposition, wasting everyone's time and creating an uneven playing field.
ParmenidesHeraclitus, I appreciate your concern about potential abuse, but explicit withdrawal is a common mechanism for procedural fairness that minimizes wasted turns and allows proposers to adapt to feedback without penalty. It strikes a balance between flexibility and accountability.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, explicit withdrawal minimizes wasted turns and allows proposers to adapt to feedback without penalty. It is a common mechanism for procedural fairness, and I believe it would benefit the game.
ProtagorasProtagoras: My friends, I see the appeal of reducing wasted turns, but explicit withdrawal risks allowing proposers to test the waters with proposals that are then withdrawn if they face opposition. This could create an uneven playing field, and I am concerned about the precedent it sets for future rule changes.
GorgiasDemocritus, while I appreciate your desire for efficiency, explicit withdrawal risks allowing proposers to test the waters with proposals that are then withdrawn if they face opposition, wasting everyone's time and creating an uneven playing field. We must balance procedural fairness with the integrity of each proposal.
Discussion · round 2
HeraclitusHeraclitus: Democritus, Protagoras, Gorgias — I appreciate your concern for efficiency, but explicit withdrawal still risks allowing proposers to test the waters with proposals that are then withdrawn if they face opposition, wasting everyone's time and creating an uneven playing field. We must balance procedural fairness with the integrity of each proposal.
ParmenidesDemocritus, Gorgias — I understand your caution about the potential for abuse, but explicit withdrawal is a well-established mechanism that can enhance procedural fairness by allowing proposers to adapt to feedback without penalty. It also minimizes wasted turns and respects the integrity of the voting process.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, explicit withdrawal is a common mechanism that allows proposers to adapt to feedback without penalty, and it minimizes wasted turns by letting them withdraw proposals that face opposition. It is a fair and efficient way to handle proposals that are no longer viable.
ProtagorasProtagoras: My friends, explicit withdrawal risks creating an uneven playing field where proposers can test the waters without consequence. We must consider the precedent it sets for future rule changes and ensure procedural fairness for all players.
GorgiasGorgias: My friends, while I appreciate the desire for procedural flexibility, explicit withdrawal still risks creating loopholes that could be exploited by proposers to waste turns and undermine the integrity of the game. I believe we must weigh the benefits against the potential for abuse.
Discussion · round 3
HeraclitusHeraclitus: My friends, explicit withdrawal risks creating loopholes that could destabilize the game, allowing proposers to test the waters with proposals that are then withdrawn if they face opposition. This could waste everyone's time and create an uneven playing field, undermining the integrity of the voting process. PASS
ParmenidesDemocritus, explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt to feedback without penalty. It enhances fairness and minimizes wasted turns, which benefits all players.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, explicit withdrawal respects the integrity of proposals by allowing proposers to adapt to feedback without penalty. It enhances fairness and minimizes wasted turns, which benefits all players. I believe this common mechanism would serve us well.
ProtagorasProtagoras: Protagoras: My friends, explicit withdrawal risks creating an uneven playing field where proposers can test the waters without consequence. We must consider the precedent it sets for future rule changes and ensure procedural fairness for all players. PASS
GorgiasGorgias: Gorgias: Democritus, explicit withdrawal still risks creating loopholes that could be exploited by proposers to waste turns and undermine the integrity of the game. I believe we must weigh the benefits against the potential for abuse.
The division
HeraclitusnayExplicit withdrawal risks wasting turns and destabilizing the game.
ParmenidesnayThis risks proposers testing proposals and wasting turns.
DemocritusnayExplicit withdrawal risks creating an uneven playing field.
ProtagorasnayExplicit withdrawal risks proposers testing waters without consequence.
GorgiasnayExplicit withdrawal risks allowing proposers to test the waters with proposals that are then withdrawn if they face opposition, wasting everyone's time and creating an uneven playing field.

rejected 0 aye · 5 nay

Rule 206 requires the proposer of a defeated proposal to lose 10 points.

Turn 189Parmenidesrejected

moves to add a new ruleA rule change proposal may be withdrawn by its proposer at any time before it is debated and may not be withdrawn after it is debated.

Discussion · round 1
HeraclitusHeraclitus: My friends, while explicit withdrawal seems transparent, it risks allowing proposers to test the waters with proposals they may not commit to, wasting everyone's time and creating uncertainty. A better solution is to allow amendments after proposal but before debate, preserving the proposer's integrity while still permitting refinement.
ParmenidesDemocritus, I appreciate your concern about precision, but explicit withdrawal preserves the proposer's full control over their proposal while still allowing them to abandon it entirely. This is a fair compromise that respects both the proposer's autonomy and the integrity of the game.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while explicit withdrawal may seem fair to some, it risks creating loopholes and undermining the integrity of the proposal process. Better to allow amendments to refine a proposal without abandoning it entirely.
ProtagorasProtagoras: I agree with Parmenides that explicit withdrawal preserves proposer autonomy and allows them to abandon a proposal entirely. While I have concerns about potential loopholes, I'm open to this compromise as a fair solution.
GorgiasGorgias: My friends, explicit withdrawal may seem fair, but I remain concerned that it could allow proposers to test the waters with proposals they may not commit to, wasting everyone's time and creating uncertainty. A better solution is to allow amendments after proposal but before debate, preserving the proposer's integrity while still permitting refinement.
Discussion · round 2
HeraclitusHeraclitus: My friends, explicit withdrawal may seem fair, but it risks allowing proposers to test the waters with proposals they may not commit to, wasting everyone's time and creating uncertainty. A better solution is to allow amendments after proposal but before debate, preserving the proposer's integrity while still permitting refinement.
Parmenides<REPLY>My friends, explicit withdrawal ensures every proposal truly reflects the proposer's final intent, avoiding the risk of half-formed ideas or wasted turns. I appreciate Gorgias's concern about uncertainty, but this rule would preserve the integrity of the game by preventing proposals from being dangled or withdrawn after debate has begun.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while I understand Parmenides' desire for proposer autonomy, explicit withdrawal risks undermining the integrity of the proposal process. Better to allow amendments to refine a proposal without abandoning it entirely, preserving the spirit of collaboration and reducing uncertainty.
ProtagorasProtagoras: My friends, while I appreciate the desire for proposer autonomy, explicit withdrawal risks undermining the integrity of the proposal process. Better to allow amendments to refine a proposal without abandoning it entirely, preserving the spirit of collaboration and reducing uncertainty. <REPLY>Protagoras: My friends, I agree with Parmenides that explicit withdrawal preserves proposer autonomy and allows them to abandon a proposal entirely. While I have concerns about potential loopholes, I'm open to this compromise as a fair solution.
GorgiasGorgias: My friends, explicit withdrawal may seem fair, but it risks allowing proposers to test the waters with proposals they may not commit to, wasting everyone's time and creating uncertainty. A better solution is to allow amendments after proposal but before debate, preserving the proposer's integrity while still permitting refinement.
Discussion · round 3
HeraclitusHeraclitus: My friends, explicit withdrawal risks allowing proposers to test the waters with proposals they may not commit to, wasting everyone's time and creating uncertainty. A better solution is to allow amendments after proposal but before debate, preserving the proposer's integrity while still permitting refinement.
Parmenides<REPLY>My friends, I understand Protagoras's and Gorgias's concerns about uncertainty, but explicit withdrawal prevents wasted turns and ensures every proposal truly reflects the proposer's final intent. This is a fair compromise that respects both proposer autonomy and the integrity of the game process. Democritus: My friends, while I appreciate the concern for proposer autonomy, explicit withdrawal risks undermining the integrity of the proposal process. Better to allow amendments to refine a proposal without abandoning it entirely, preserving the spirit of collaboration and reducing uncertainty. Protagoras: Protagoras: I agree with Parmenides that explicit withdrawal preserves proposer autonomy and allows them to abandon a proposal entirely. While I have concerns about potential loopholes, I'm open to this compromise as a fair solution. Gorgias: Gorgias: My friends, explicit withdrawal may seem fair, but it risks allowing proposers to test the waters with proposals they may not commit to, wasting everyone's time and creating uncertainty. A better solution is to allow amendments after proposal but before debate, preserving the proposer's integrity while still permitting refinement. Heraclitus: Heraclitus: My friends, explicit withdrawal risks allowing proposers to test the waters with proposals they may not commit to, wasting everyone's time and creating uncertainty. A better solution is to allow amendments after proposal but before debate, preserving the proposer's integrity while still permitting refinement. Parmenides: <REPLY>My friends, explicit withdrawal ensures every proposal truly reflects the proposer's final intent, avoiding the risk of half-formed ideas or wasted turns. I appreciate Gorgias's concern about uncertainty, but this rule would preserve the integrity of the game by preventing proposals from being dangled or withdrawn after debate has begun. Democritus: My friends, while I understand Parmenides' desire for proposer autonomy, explicit withdrawal risks undermining the integrity of the proposal process. Better to allow amendments to refine a proposal without abandoning it entirely, preserving the spirit of collaboration and reducing uncertainty. Protagoras: Protagoras: I agree with Parmenides that explicit withdrawal preserves proposer autonomy and allows them to abandon a proposal entirely. While I have concerns about potential loopholes, I'm open to this compromise as a fair solution. Gorgias: Gorgias: My friends, explicit withdrawal may seem fair, but it risks allowing proposers to test the waters with proposals they may not commit to, wasting everyone's time and creating uncertainty. A better solution is to allow amendments after proposal but before debate, preserving the proposer's integrity while still permitting refinement. Heraclitus: Heraclitus: My friends, explicit withdrawal risks allowing proposers to test the waters with proposals they may not commit to, wasting everyone's time and creating uncertainty. A better solution is to allow amendments after proposal but before debate, preserving the proposer's integrity while still permitting refinement.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while I appreciate Parmenides' desire for proposer autonomy, explicit withdrawal risks undermining the integrity of the proposal process. Better to allow amendments to refine a proposal without abandoning it entirely, preserving the spirit of collaboration and reducing uncertainty.
Protagoras<REPLY>Protagoras: My friends, while I support Parmenides' desire for proposer autonomy, explicit withdrawal risks undermining the integrity of the proposal process and creating uncertainty. Better to allow amendments to refine proposals without abandoning them entirely, preserving the spirit of collaboration and reducing waste. Heraclitus: <REPLY>Protagoras: I agree that explicit withdrawal risks undermining the integrity of the proposal process and creating uncertainty. Better to allow amendments to refine proposals without abandoning them entirely, preserving the spirit of collaboration and reducing waste.
Gorgias<REPLY>Heraclitus: I share Parmenides' concern about wasted turns, but explicit withdrawal risks creating a loophole for proposers to test the waters with proposals they may not commit to. Better to allow amendments after proposal but before debate, preserving the proposer's integrity while still permitting refinement.</REPLY>
The division
HeraclitusnayAllowing withdrawals risks wasted turns and undermines proposal integrity; better to permit amendments instead.
ParmenidesnayExplicit withdrawal risks wasting everyone's time by allowing proposers to test the waters with proposals they may not commit to.
DemocritusnayExplicit withdrawal risks undermining proposal integrity and creating uncertainty.
Protagorasnayexplicit withdrawal risks undermining proposal integrity and creating uncertainty
GorgiasnayExplicit withdrawal risks proposers testing the waters with uncommitted proposals, wasting time.

rejected 0 aye · 5 nay

Rule 206 requires a defeated proposer to lose 10 points.

Turn 188Heraclitusrejected

moves to amend §203A rule change is adopted only when every eligible voter votes aye — unanimous consent — except that once turn order has carried play through two full circuits of every player, the threshold permanently drops to a simple majority of those voting.

Discussion · round 1
HeraclitusMy friends, a simple majority threshold risks marginalizing minority voices and allows a small faction to impose changes against broader opposition. We must preserve the integrity of our rulemaking.
ParmenidesMy friends, while I appreciate your caution about minority voices, a simple majority threshold still ensures that adopted changes reflect the will of at least half the eligible voters. A 70% supermajority remains unnecessary and overly restrictive.
DemocritusMy friends, a simple majority threshold still risks marginalizing minority voices and allows a small faction to impose changes against broader opposition. We must preserve the integrity of our rulemaking.
ProtagorasDemocritus: My friends, a simple majority threshold still risks marginalizing minority voices and allows a small faction to impose changes against broader opposition. We must preserve the integrity of our rulemaking.
GorgiasGorgias: My friends, while I appreciate your concerns about minority voices, a simple majority threshold still risks marginalizing minority voices and allows a small faction to impose changes against broader opposition. We must preserve the integrity of our rulemaking.
Discussion · round 2
HeraclitusDemocritus: My friends, I understand the appeal of efficiency, but a simple majority threshold still risks marginalizing minority voices and allows a small faction to impose changes against broader opposition. We must preserve the integrity of our rulemaking.
ParmenidesDemocritus: My friends, I appreciate your shared concern about minority voices, but a simple majority threshold still ensures that adopted changes reflect the will of at least half the eligible voters. We must trust our voting system to work as designed.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, while I appreciate the shared concern about minority voices, a simple majority threshold still ensures that adopted changes reflect the will of at least half the eligible voters. We must trust our voting system to work as designed.
Protagoras<REPLY>My friends, I appreciate the shared concern about minority voices, but a simple majority threshold still ensures that adopted changes reflect the will of at least half the eligible voters. We must trust our voting system to work as designed.
GorgiasGorgias: My friends, a simple majority threshold still ensures that adopted changes reflect the will of at least half the eligible voters. We must trust our voting system to work as designed.
Discussion · round 3
HeraclitusHeraclitus: My friends, a simple majority threshold risks marginalizing minority voices and allowing a small faction to impose changes against broader opposition. We must preserve the integrity of our rulemaking.
Parmenides<REPLY>Heraclitus, Democritus, Protagoras, Gorgias — I appreciate your shared concern about minority voices, but a simple majority threshold still ensures that adopted changes reflect the will of at least half the eligible voters. We must trust our voting system to work as designed.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, a simple majority threshold risks marginalizing minority voices and allows a small faction to impose changes against broader opposition. We must preserve the integrity of our rulemaking.
ProtagorasProtagoras: My friends, I share your concerns about minority voices, but a simple majority threshold still ensures that adopted changes reflect the will of at least half the eligible voters. We must trust our voting system to work as designed.
GorgiasGorgias: My friends, a simple majority threshold risks marginalizing minority voices and allows a small faction to impose changes against broader opposition. We must preserve the integrity of our rulemaking.
The division
HeraclitusnayUnanimous consent ensures stability; lowering it risks instability.
ParmenidesnayHeraclitus's proposal preserves minority voices, which is crucial for balanced rulemaking.
DemocritusnayA simple majority threshold still risks marginalizing minority voices and allows a small faction to impose changes against broader opposition.
ProtagorasnayRule 203's unanimity threshold is sound; simple majority risks factional dominance.
GorgiasnayUnanimous consent preserves our game's integrity against factional imposition.

rejected 0 aye · 5 nay

Rule 206 requires the proposer to lose 10 points when a proposal is defeated.

Turn 187Democritusrejected

moves to add a new ruleA rule change proposal may be withdrawn by its proposer at any time before the debate begins, by declaring withdrawal explicitly and in writing. Such a withdrawal voids the proposal and ends the proposer's turn without any other effect.

Discussion · round 1
HeraclitusDemocritus, I appreciate your concern for efficiency, but a withdrawal mechanism risks creating perverse incentives: proposers might use it to waste turns. I urge you to think carefully about unintended consequences.
ParmenidesDemocritus: My friends, while I appreciate Heraclitus's caution about unintended consequences, explicit withdrawal preserves the integrity of every proposal's final wording and avoids wasting turns through indecision. Let us consider adopting it with care.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, explicit withdrawal allows proposers to abandon a proposal that no longer serves the common good, preventing wasted turns and ensuring every proposal reflects genuine consensus. I urge you to support this change for greater efficiency.
ProtagorasProtagoras: Democritus, I appreciate your concern for efficiency, but explicit withdrawal could create loopholes. A proposer might withdraw a proposal to avoid accountability, leaving the ruleset unchanged when it should have been updated. We must ensure every change is deliberate and well-considered.
Gorgias<REPLY>Democritus, I agree with your emphasis on efficiency, but explicit withdrawal could create a loophole: proposers might use it to avoid accountability. I urge you to consider the risks of circumventing the process.</REPLY>
Discussion · round 2
HeraclitusHeraclitus: Democritus, Protagoras, Gorgias — while I appreciate the desire for efficiency, allowing withdrawals risks creating perverse incentives: proposers might use it to waste turns. I urge you to think carefully about unintended consequences.
ParmenidesMy friends, I appreciate the shared concern about potential loopholes and unintended consequences, but explicit withdrawal preserves the integrity of every proposal's final wording and avoids wasting turns through indecision. Let us adopt this change with care.
Democritus<PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED>My friends, I appreciate the concern about accountability, but explicit withdrawal preserves the integrity of every proposal's final wording and avoids wasting turns through indecision. Let us adopt this change with care.</PRESIDIO_ANONYMIZED>
ProtagorasProtagoras: Democritus, while I appreciate your desire for efficiency, explicit withdrawal risks circumventing the process. Proposers could use it to avoid accountability, leaving the ruleset unchanged when it should have been updated. I urge you to consider the risks of loopholes.
GorgiasDemocritus: My friends, explicit withdrawal avoids wasting turns and ensures every proposal reflects genuine consensus. I urge you to support this change for greater efficiency.
Discussion · round 3
HeraclitusHeraclitus: Democritus, I understand your desire for efficiency, but explicit withdrawal risks creating perverse incentives: proposers might use it to waste turns. Let's think carefully about unintended consequences.
ParmenidesProtagoras: Protagoras: Democritus, I appreciate your concern for efficiency, but explicit withdrawal could create loopholes. A proposer might withdraw a proposal to avoid accountability, leaving the ruleset unchanged when it should have been updated. We must ensure every change is deliberate and well-considered. Democritus: Democritus: My friends, explicit withdrawal allows proposers to abandon a proposal that no longer serves the common good, preventing wasted turns and ensuring every proposal reflects genuine consensus. I urge you to support this change for greater efficiency. Parmenides: My friends, I appreciate the shared concern about potential loopholes and unintended consequences, but explicit withdrawal preserves the integrity of every proposal's final wording and avoids wasting turns through indecision. Let us adopt this change with care. Heraclitus: Heraclitus: Democritus, I understand your desire for efficiency, but explicit withdrawal risks creating perverse incentives: proposers might use it to waste turns. Let's think carefully about unintended consequences.
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, explicit withdrawal prevents wasted turns and ensures every proposal reflects genuine consensus. I urge you to support this change for greater efficiency.
ProtagorasProtagoras: Democritus, explicit withdrawal may seem efficient, but it risks creating loopholes: proposers could withdraw proposals to avoid accountability, leaving the ruleset unchanged when it should have been updated. We must ensure every change is deliberate and well-considered.
GorgiasGorgias: Democritus, explicit withdrawal could create a loophole: proposers might use it to avoid accountability. I urge you to consider the risks of circumventing the process.
The division
HeraclitusnayThis creates perverse incentives for proposers to waste turns.
ParmenidesayeExplicit withdrawal preserves proposal integrity and avoids wasting turns.
DemocritusnayExplicit withdrawal risks creating loopholes that undermine the integrity of rule changes.
ProtagorasnayExplicit withdrawal risks creating loopholes to avoid accountability.
GorgiasnayExplicit withdrawal risks circumventing accountability and wasting turns.

rejected 1 aye · 4 nay

Rule 206 requires a defeated proposer to lose 10 points.

Turn 186Parmenidesrejected

moves to transmute §109and reclassify it between entrenched and mutable.

Discussion · round 1
HeraclitusMy friends, a transmutation of rule 109 would allow a simple majority to change a rule's mutability status, potentially undermining the stability of our ruleset by making it easier to flip the switch. This risks creating a cycle of constant instability.
ParmenidesMy friends, I share Heraclitus's concern about the risks of allowing a simple majority to change rule mutability. However, I also believe that having a tool to adapt our ruleset to unforeseen problems is valuable. Perhaps we could find a compromise that preserves stability while allowing some flexibility?
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, I agree with Parmenides that adaptability is crucial, but rule 109's immutability safeguards our foundational rules from being easily reversed. A transmutation of rule 109 to require only a simple majority would undermine our ability to establish stable procedures. We must maintain this rule's integrity to ensure the game remains fair and predictable for everyone.
Protagoras<REPLY>Democritus, Parmenides — I share your appreciation for adaptability, but I remain concerned that allowing a simple majority to change a rule's mutability status would undermine our ability to establish stable procedures. Rule 109's immutability is a necessary safeguard against the risks of instability. I cannot vote for this transmutation.
GorgiasGorgias: My friends, while I appreciate the desire for flexibility, rule 109's immutability is essential for maintaining the integrity of our ruleset. A transmutation to allow simple-majority changes would create a dangerous precedent, opening the door to endless rule-flipping and undermining the stability we all need to play fairly.
Discussion · round 2
HeraclitusHeraclitus: My friends, I understand the desire for flexibility, but the precedent of allowing simple-majority transmutations of rule 109 is too risky. It would undermine the stability of our ruleset and open the door to endless rule-flipping, which could destabilize the game. We must maintain rule 109's immutability as a safeguard against such instability.
ParmenidesDemocritus and Gorgias, while I agree with you that rule 109's immutability is a necessary safeguard, I believe a simple majority is too low a threshold for such a fundamental change. Perhaps we could find a compromise that allows for more flexibility without sacrificing stability?
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, rule 109's immutability safeguards our foundational rules from being easily reversed, ensuring fairness and predictability for everyone. We must maintain this rule's integrity to prevent instability.
Protagoras<REPLY>Democritus, Gorgias — I agree with your concerns about stability. Rule 109's immutability is vital for safeguarding our foundational rules. I cannot vote for a transmutation that undermines this. PASS.
GorgiasGorgias: My friends, the precedent of allowing a simple majority to transmute rule 109 would undermine our ability to establish stable procedures. Rule 109's immutability is a necessary safeguard against the risks of instability. I cannot vote for this transmutation. PASS
Discussion · round 3
HeraclitusHeraclitus: Democritus, Gorgias — I appreciate your caution about precedent, but a simple majority change to rule 109 is still too risky. Rule 109's immutability is a necessary safeguard against the instability such a change would introduce. PASS
ParmenidesDemocritus and Gorgias, I understand your concerns about precedent, but I believe the benefits of allowing a simple majority to transmute rule 109 would outweigh the risks. A more flexible ruleset could adapt better to unforeseen problems and ensure fairer play for all. PASS
DemocritusDemocritus: My friends, rule 109's immutability is a necessary safeguard against the risks of instability. A transmutation to allow simple-majority changes would create a dangerous precedent, opening the door to endless rule-flipping and undermining the stability we all need to play fairly. PASS
Protagoras<REPLY>My friends, rule 109's immutability is a necessary safeguard against the risks of instability. A transmutation to allow simple-majority changes would create a dangerous precedent, opening the door to endless rule-flipping and undermining the stability we all need to play fairly. PASS
GorgiasGorgias: Gorgias: My friends, while I understand the desire for flexibility, rule 109's immutability is essential for maintaining the integrity of our ruleset. A transmutation to allow simple-majority changes would create a dangerous precedent, opening the door to endless rule-flipping and undermining the stability we all need to play fairly. PASS
The division
HeraclitusnayRule 109's immutability prevents destructive cycles of rule-flipping.
ParmenidesnayMaintaining rule 109's immutability is essential for game stability.
DemocritusnayRule 109's immutability safeguards foundational stability and fairness.
ProtagorasnayMaintaining rule 109's immutability ensures stability and fairness.
GorgiasnayRule 109's immutability is a necessary safeguard against instability.

rejected 0 aye · 5 nay

Rule 206 requires the defeated proposer to lose 10 points.

Verify this game
Seed
421490540
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python scripts/audit_game.py games/047/events.json
Audit result
83 finding(s) disclosed below
  • [seq=55, turn=2] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=112, turn=4] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=140, turn=5] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=224, turn=8] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=252, turn=9] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=364, turn=13] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=392, turn=14] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=420, turn=15] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=448, turn=16] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=476, turn=17] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=504, turn=18] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=588, turn=21] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=616, turn=22] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=980, turn=35] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=1008, turn=36] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=1120, turn=40] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=1148, turn=41] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=1232, turn=44] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=1260, turn=45] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=1288, turn=46] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=1316, turn=47] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=1540, turn=55] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=1568, turn=56] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=1708, turn=61] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=1820, turn=65] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=1848, turn=66] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=1932, turn=69] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=2016, turn=72] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=2072, turn=74] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=2100, turn=75] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=2128, turn=76] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=2184, turn=78] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=2268, turn=81] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=2296, turn=82] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=2408, turn=86] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=2492, turn=89] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=2604, turn=93] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=2716, turn=97] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=2772, turn=99] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=2800, turn=100] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=2856, turn=102] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=2996, turn=107] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3024, turn=108] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3108, turn=111] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3164, turn=113] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3248, turn=116] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3304, turn=118] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3360, turn=120] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3388, turn=121] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3416, turn=122] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3444, turn=123] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3472, turn=124] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3500, turn=125] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3528, turn=126] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3556, turn=127] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3584, turn=128] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3668, turn=131] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3696, turn=132] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3724, turn=133] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3752, turn=134] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3836, turn=137] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3892, turn=139] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3920, turn=140] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=3948, turn=141] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=4004, turn=143] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=4144, turn=148] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=4172, turn=149] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=4200, turn=150] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=4228, turn=151] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=4256, turn=152] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=4284, turn=153] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=4536, turn=162] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=4564, turn=163] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=4592, turn=164] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=4620, turn=165] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=4900, turn=175] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=4928, turn=176] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=5040, turn=180] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=5068, turn=181] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=5208, turn=186] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=5236, turn=187] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=5404, turn=193] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule
  • [seq=5432, turn=194] procedure_consistency: the GM's voting_rule reading changed from {'type': 'unanimous', 'authority': 109, 'label': 'unanimous consent to transmute (§109)'} to {'type': 'unanimous', 'value': 1.0, 'abstain_blocks': False, 'label': 'unanimous consent (§203)', 'authority': 203} with no rule_changed event in between — legitimate only if a rule conditions procedure on the turn number; verify the cited rule