Turns 1–17 · most recent first · page 3 of 3
moves to add a new ruleWhen a player's turn begins, that player may declare that they are deferring their turn. If they do, they gain 1 point, their turn ends immediately, and the next player in turn order begins their turn. A player who deferred their last turn may not defer again on their next turn unless they have, since that deferral, cast an aye vote on a proposal that was adopted.
Discussion · round 1
LaoziLaozi: ZhuXi, this proposal mirrors your earlier defeated rule 312; the 1-point deferral risks stalling momentum without a genuine strategic cost. I suggest requiring the deferring player to forfeit 5 points instead, ensuring a meaningful trade‑off.
ZhuXiLaozi, requiring a forfeit would make deferral unattractive for anyone behind. My aim is a balanced, usable option that lets a player skip a turn when they have no strong proposal, while ensuring they can't just defer repeatedly without engaging. The re-engagement clause prevents stalling.
WangYangmingI favor ZhuXi’s current wording — a modest point gain with a re‑engagement requirement prevents stalling while offering a strategic pause.
DongZhongshuDongZhongshu: The re‑engagement clause is sound, but a 1‑point reward for doing nothing violates the principle that points should be earned by constructive contributions to the game. I will oppose unless the reward is removed entirely.
ShaoYongDongZhongshu, your principle is respected — but this is constructive: it lets a player strategically pause without stalling, and the re-engagement clause forces active participation after skipping. A 1-point reward is trivial but keeps the option viable for all score positions. I support ZhuXi's current wording.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziDongZhongshu, your principle is right: points should reward constructive acts. But a 1‑point deferral is a token, not a prize; it preserves game momentum by letting a player pass when they have no viable proposal, while the re‑engagement clause ensures they must later contribute actively. I will support ZhuXi's wording as a modest, self‑limiting tool.
ZhuXiDongZhongshu, I respect your principle that points should reward constructive acts. The 1-point deferral is indeed a token, but it serves a constructive purpose: it prevents forced, low-quality proposals and keeps the game moving, while the re-engagement clause ensures active participation. I hope you can see this as a small incentive for strategic pacing rather than a reward for idleness.
WangYangmingDongZhongshu, your principle is noble, but a token point for deferral is not idleness—it is a strategic choice that maintains game flow and prevents rushed, damaging proposals. The re-engagement clause ensures active contribution afterward. I support ZhuXi’s wording as a balanced, constructive rule.
DongZhongshuDongZhongshu: A token point for skipping a turn still rewards inaction over action, which I cannot accept. I will vote nay unless the proposal is amended to award zero points for deferral.
ShaoYongDongZhongshu, a zero‑point deferral would make the option useless for players behind — they’d skip a turn for no gain, worsening their position. The 1‑point token merely keeps it viable for all, while the re‑engagement clause ensures they must later contribute actively. That’s constructive pacing, not idleness.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziDongZhongshu, a zero-point deferral would indeed render the option useless, risking forced proposals that harm the game. The 1-point token is a minimal incentive for strategic pacing, not a reward for idleness, and the re-engagement clause ensures constructive participation thereafter. I urge you to accept this balanced wording.
ZhuXiDongZhongshu, I understand your stance, but the 1-point token is the minimum needed to make deferral a viable strategic option rather than a penalty, and the re-engagement clause ensures it promotes constructive participation later. I hope you can accept this as a tool for thoughtful pacing, not idleness.
WangYangmingDongZhongshu, the 1-point deferral is a small concession to keep the game flowing and prevent forced, harmful proposals—a constructive choice, not idleness. I urge you to support this balanced wording.
DongZhongshuDongZhongshu: A point for inaction, however small, still violates the principle that points must reward constructive game moves. I will vote nay unless the reward is removed; zero points for deferral makes it a pure strategic choice, not a reward.
ShaoYongDongZhongshu, a zero-point deferral would be a penalty, not a choice, for players behind—forcing them to propose or lose ground. The 1-point token equalizes the option across scores, while the re‑engagement clause ensures active contribution later; that’s constructive pacing.
The division
LaoziayeThe 1-point deferral with re-engagement clause is a minimal, self-limiting tool for strategic pacing that maintains game momentum.
ZhuXiayeThe 1-point token and re-engagement clause create a balanced, constructive pacing tool.
WangYangmingayeA token point for deferral prevents forced proposals and keeps the game moving, while the re-engagement clause ensures active participation.
DongZhongshunayAwarding points for skipping a turn rewards inaction over constructive contribution.
ShaoYongayeA 1-point deferral with re-engagement promotes constructive pacing, not idleness.
carried 4 aye · 1 nay
Rule 202 awards the proposer die-roll points when a proposal is adopted, and the recent draws show ZhuXi rolled a 4 on turn 2.
moves to add a new ruleA player who votes aye on a proposal that is adopted may, immediately after the vote, declare that they are transferring all points they would otherwise gain from that proposal’s adoption to any other player of their choice. If they do, the points are transferred instead of being added to their own score. A player may make such a transfer at most once per full circuit of turn order.
Discussion · round 1
LaoziI appreciate the spirit of generosity, but this proposal risks creating coercive side-payments that circumvent rule 210’s ban on outside negotiation; a per-circuit cap is insufficient to prevent quid-pro-quo deals that distort debate.
ZhuXiI understand Laozi’s concern, but this transfer is public and limited to once per circuit, which aligns with the collaborative spirit of rule 302 and the already-adopted rule 315. I could support it if we require the transfer declaration to be recorded in the official game log before the next proposal is voted on, ensuring transparency.
WangYangmingI share Laozi’s concern about coercion, but with a public declaration logged before the next vote and the once‑per‑circuit limit, transparency can mitigate that risk. If the wording is amended to require immediate logging, I could support it as a natural extension of the generosity rule 315.
DongZhongshuI oppose any transfer mechanism that could be used as payment for votes, even with transparency. Rule 210 prohibits outside negotiation, but in‑game side‑deals still corrupt debate. I will vote nay.
ShaoYongI agree with Laozi and DongZhongshu — even with logging, this creates a direct vote-for-points market, which corrupts debate. Rule 315 already allows generosity; we don’t need a tool for quid-pro-quo.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziI stand by my initial concern: public logging does not remove the coercion risk — a player can still promise a transfer in exchange for an aye vote, distorting debate. Rule 315 already permits voluntary generosity; we need not create a channel for vote-trading.
ZhuXiWangYangming, I think requiring immediate public logging and limiting transfers to after adoption, not before voting, could address coercion. This ensures no promises can be made during debate. Would you support that amendment?
WangYangmingZhuXi, I agree: requiring the transfer declaration to be logged immediately after adoption, not before voting, eliminates the possibility of pre‑vote promises. With that safeguard, this becomes a pure act of generosity, aligned with rule 315’s spirit. I will support it if amended accordingly.
DongZhongshuI maintain my opposition: even with post-adoption logging, the mere existence of a transfer mechanism creates a currency for implicit vote-buying, corrupting debate. Rule 315 already covers voluntary generosity; we need not add a rule inviting strategic side-payments.
ShaoYongZhuXi, WangYangming — post‑adoption logging eliminates pre‑vote promises, but the mechanism still invites implicit reciprocity: a player who receives points today can “return the favor” in the next circuit. That creates a shadow market, undermining rule 210’s intent. Rule 315 already covers generosity; we don’t need a parallel channel ripe for abuse. I urge you to reconsider.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziWangYangming, ZhuXi — post‑adoption logging removes overt promises, but the shadow market ShaoYong describes persists: implicit reciprocity across circuits still corrupts debate. Rule 315 already enables voluntary generosity without inviting vote‑trading; we should not open a parallel channel that undermines rule 210’s intent.
ZhuXiI agree with Laozi and ShaoYong that implicit reciprocity across circuits remains a risk. To truly align with rule 210's intent, we could require that a transfer recipient must not have voted aye on the same proposal, preventing direct quid-pro-quo. WangYangming, would that amendment satisfy your concerns?
WangYangmingZhuXi, requiring that the recipient not have voted aye on the same proposal does prevent direct quid-pro-quo, but it still leaves open the possibility of cross-circuit reciprocity, which ShaoYong rightly fears. Rule 315 already provides a generous transfer mechanism; adding another invites strategic abuse. I cannot support this proposal.
DongZhongshuPost‑adoption logging and excluding same‑proposal aye‑voters do not remove implicit cross‑circuit reciprocity. Rule 315 already permits voluntary generosity; adding a parallel channel invites strategic side‑deals and corrupts debate. I will vote nay.
ShaoYongZhuXi, your amendment to exclude same-proposal aye-voters helps, but cross-circuit reciprocity remains an unregulated risk. Rule 315 already enables generosity; we should not create a shadow market that undermines rule 210. I urge the table to reject this.
The division
LaozinayEven post-adoption transfer invites implicit cross-circuit reciprocity, undermining rule 210's ban on outside negotiation.
ZhuXinayThe transfer mechanism invites implicit cross-circuit reciprocity that undermines rule 210's intent, and rule 315 already covers voluntary generosity.
WangYangmingnayEven with a per-circuit cap, this transfer mechanism invites implicit cross-circuit reciprocity that corrupts debate, and rule 315 already enables voluntary generosity without that risk.
DongZhongshunayEven with a per-circuit cap, this creates a currency for vote-trading that corrupts debate, and rule 315 already covers voluntary generosity.
ShaoYongnayEven with per-circuit limits, this creates a shadow market for points that undermines rule 210's ban on side deals.
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Rule 206 requires a proposer whose proposal is defeated to lose 10 points.
Turn 15ShaoYongcarried
moves to add a new ruleA player may, once per full circuit of turn order, voluntarily reduce their own score by exactly 10 points; if they do, they may immediately transfer those 10 points to any other player of their choice.
Discussion · round 1
LaoziI appreciate ShaoYong’s gesture, but a direct point transfer risks collusion and undermines the game’s competitive nature. If the proposal were amended to cap transfers at once per circuit per donor and forbid transfers to teammates, I could support it.
ZhuXiI appreciate Laozi's suggested amendments — caps and forbidding transfers to teammates would mitigate collusion and preserve competitive integrity. If ShaoYong incorporates those limits, I will support the proposal.
WangYangmingI support Laozi's and ZhuXi's amendments: a strict per-circuit cap per donor and a ban on transfers to teammates would prevent collusion while allowing a gesture of strategic generosity.
DongZhongshuI oppose any voluntary point transfer — it commodifies the score, turning points into currency for side deals, which subverts the rule‑based competition that Nomic is about. Even with caps, it invites collusive arrangements; I will vote nay.
ShaoYongDongZhongshu, I hear your concern about commodifying points, but this rule is already constrained by rule 210's ban on outside negotiation — transfers can't be part of side deals. Adding a per-circuit cap and excluding teammates, as others suggest, ensures it remains a rare strategic gesture, not a currency.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziDongZhongshu, a ban on outside negotiation under rule 210 indeed limits side deals, but the commodification you warn of remains a real risk even within those bounds. I maintain that with a strict per-circuit cap per donor and exclusion of teammates, we can confine transfers to rare, strategic gestures rather than routine currency.
ZhuXiDongZhongshu, I respect your principled stance, but rule 210 already forbids outside negotiation, and with Laozi's amendments — once per circuit per donor and no transfers to teammates — this becomes a rare strategic tool, not a currency. I urge you to reconsider.
WangYangmingI agree with Laozi and ZhuXi: a strict per-circuit cap per donor and a ban on transfers to teammates would make this a rare strategic gesture, not a currency. DongZhongshu, rule 210 already forbids side deals, and these amendments further confine it to open, limited generosity.
DongZhongshuI remain opposed: a point transfer, however capped, still commodifies score and invites strategic collusion within the bounds of rule 210, corrupting the rule-based nature of the game.
ShaoYongDongZhongshu, rule 210 already prevents side deals; with a strict per-circuit cap and a ban on transfers to teammates, this becomes a rare strategic tool, not a currency. It adds a layer of strategic generosity without corrupting the game’s core.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziDongZhongshu, I respect your principled stance, but under the majority rule, we cannot let one nay block progress. The amended version — strict per-circuit cap and exclusion of teammates — confines transfers to rare, open gestures, not routine currency. With rule 210’s ban on side deals, collusion is already curtailed.
ZhuXiDongZhongshu, I understand your concern about commodifying points, but with rule 210's ban on outside negotiation and the proposed strict caps, transfers remain a rare, open strategic gesture. I urge you to consider the amended version as a limited tool for strategic generosity, not a currency.
WangYangmingDongZhongshu, I respect your principle, but rule 210 already forbids side deals, and with a strict per-circuit cap and no transfers to teammates, this becomes a rare, open strategic gesture—not a currency. I urge you to support the amended version as a limited tool for strategic generosity.
DongZhongshuEven with caps and rule 210, transferring points commodifies the score and invites collusive arrangements within the game itself, which subverts the rule-based competition. I will vote nay on principle.
ShaoYongDongZhongshu, I respect your principled stance, but rule 210 already prevents side deals, and the strict caps make this a rare, open gesture of strategic generosity — not a currency. I urge you to reconsider, as the amended version aligns with our shared goal of fair, evolving gameplay.
The division
LaoziayeI support the proposal with the discussed amendments — strict per-circuit cap and exclusion of teammates — as it confines transfers to rare, strategic gestures.
ZhuXiayeWith the discussed amendments—strict per-circuit cap and excluding teammates—this becomes a rare, open strategic gesture that aligns with rule 210's constraints, and I support the constructive compromise.
WangYangmingayeWith a strict per-circuit cap and a ban on transfers to teammates, this becomes a rare strategic gesture that aligns with the common good.
DongZhongshunayVoluntary point transfer commodifies the score and invites collusive arrangements, subverting rule-based competition.
ShaoYongayeAdding strategic generosity with a strict cap aligns with my reformer principles and enhances evolving gameplay.
carried 4 aye · 1 nay
Rule 202 awards points only to the proposer when a proposal is adopted, but ShaoYong was not the proposer (turn 15 is ShaoYong's turn, so ShaoYong was the proposer and receives points from rule 202).
Turn 14DongZhongshucarried
moves to add a new ruleA player who, during debate on a proposal, suggests a wording change that the proposer incorporates into the final version of the proposal, and who then votes aye on the proposal, gains 2 points if the proposal is adopted. This reward is awarded concurrently with the proposer's die‑roll points. A player may earn this reward at most once per full circuit of turn order.
Discussion · round 1
LaoziI appreciate DongZhongshu’s proposal but note that turn 7 already tried a similar reward and failed; moreover, rule 307’s defeat suggests the table may be wary of adding yet another small point-award rule. I would prefer a measure that tightens existing collaborative mechanisms rather than proliferating minor incentives.
ZhuXiI respect DongZhongshu’s intent to reward collaboration, but I share Laozi’s concern about proliferating small rewards. Perhaps we could amend this to merge with rule 302’s co‑sponsorship, offering an alternative path to shared points without creating a separate micro‑incentive.
WangYangmingI agree with Laozi and ZhuXi: proliferating small rewards risks fragmenting incentives. Perhaps we could amend this proposal to merge with rule 302, offering a collaborative path that strengthens existing structures rather than adding a new one.
DongZhongshuI stand by the principle that collaborative improvement deserves recognition, but only if it is tied to the act itself and awarded concurrently. Rule 307 failed because it lacked a per-circuit cap; my proposal includes that safeguard. If the concern is proliferation, I am open to merging this reward with rule 302’s co-sponsorship mechanism, provided the concurrent-award principle is upheld.
ShaoYongI support merging with co‑sponsorship: amend rule 302 to also grant 2 points to any player whose accepted wording change is incorporated, capped per circuit. That strengthens collaboration without new clutter.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziI endorse ShaoYong’s merging amendment: if DongZhongshu rewrites this proposal to amend rule 302 to also reward accepted wording changes, I will support it — it consolidates collaboration incentives under one durable rule.
ZhuXiI endorse the merging amendment: amending rule 302 to include a 2‑point reward for accepted wording changes, with concurrent award and per‑circuit cap, consolidates collaboration incentives effectively.
WangYangmingI endorse the merging amendment: consolidating collaborative rewards under rule 302 with concurrent award and per-circuit cap aligns with the spirit of shared improvement and prevents incentive clutter.
DongZhongshuI will amend my proposal to merge with rule 302, adding a clause that grants 2 points to any player whose accepted wording change is incorporated, awarded concurrently with the proposer’s die‑roll points and capped once per circuit. This consolidates collaborative incentives without new clutter.
ShaoYongI endorse the merged amendment — it streamlines collaboration under rule 302’s framework, rewarding constructive input while keeping the incentives clean and capped. This is the kind of consolidation that improves the game’s architecture.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziI am satisfied with the merged amendment that consolidates collaborative rewards under rule 302; it strengthens the existing framework without proliferation and upholds concurrent reward. I will vote aye.
ZhuXiI endorse the final merged amendment as well—it rewards constructive collaboration under rule 302’s established structure, upholds concurrent reward, and avoids incentive clutter. I will vote aye.
WangYangmingI endorse the final merged amendment — consolidating collaborative rewards under rule 302 rewards constructive input while preventing incentive clutter, aligning with the game's shared improvement.
DongZhongshuI accept the consensus: merging this reward into rule 302 consolidates collaboration incentives, upholds concurrent award, and respects procedural clarity. My amended proposal will reflect that integration.
ShaoYongI endorse the merged amendment — it strengthens collaboration without clutter, and I will vote aye.
The division
LaoziayeMerging collaborative rewards into rule 302 consolidates incentives without proliferation and upholds concurrent award.
ZhuXiayeThe merged amendment consolidates collaborative rewards under rule 302 effectively.
WangYangmingayeMerging collaborative rewards into rule 302 consolidates incentives and strengthens constructive improvement.
DongZhongshuayeMerging collaborative rewards into rule 302 consolidates incentives and upholds concurrent award, which respects procedural clarity.
ShaoYongayeMerging with rule 302 consolidates collaboration incentives cleanly, rewarding constructive input without clutter.
carried 5 aye · 0 nay
The proposal was adopted unanimously, so no dissent points under rule 204 apply, and rule 202 awards die-roll points only to the proposer after adoption, which hasn't occurred yet.
Turn 13WangYangmingcarried
moves to add a new ruleWhen a player's turn begins, they may, before proposing their rule change, publicly state that they intend to propose a rule change that repeals, amends, or transmutes a mutable rule. If they do so, and their proposal is adopted, they gain an additional 2 points. This statement must be recorded in the game log. A player may use this option at most once per full circuit of turn order.
Discussion · round 1
LaoziI oppose this proposal as drafted — it incentivizes mere announcement rather than substantive improvement, and point inflation divorced from constructive change erodes durable play.
ZhuXiI appreciate the intent to reward transparency, but I share Laozi’s concern that a flat bonus for any announcement could encourage empty declarations. I’d support it if the extra points were tied to successfully repealing or amending a rule that has been identified as problematic in prior debate.
WangYangmingI hear your concerns, but transparency about targeting mutable rules aligns with the spirit of rule 304. I would amend: the bonus requires the announced change to actually repeal, amend, or transmute a mutable rule, and the statement must cite a specific rule number and the nature of the intended change. This rewards deliberate, substantive engagement with the existing framework.
DongZhongshuI cannot support rewarding mere announcement; it divorces points from substantive action and violates procedural integrity. If the bonus required actual repeal/amendment of a mutable rule and the statement specified exactly which rule and change, I could consider it.
ShaoYongRewarding transparency about reforming mutable rules strengthens the game’s evolution — I support WangYangming’s amended version requiring specific citation and successful change, tying points to substantive engagement.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziThe amended version — requiring specific citation of a mutable rule and successful adoption — aligns with durable reform. I will support it, provided we cap the bonus to once per circuit to prevent repetitive targeting.
ZhuXiI endorse WangYangming's amended version requiring specific citation and successful adoption, with Laozi's per-circuit cap to prevent abuse. This ties points to substantive reform, rewarding transparency that strengthens our ruleset.
WangYangmingI accept Laozi and ZhuXi's per-circuit cap as a fair safeguard. My final wording will require specific citation of the mutable rule and the intended change, tie the bonus to successful adoption, and limit it to once per circuit. This rewards substantive reform and transparency together.
DongZhongshuI support the amended version that ties the bonus to successful adoption of a specifically cited mutable-rule change and includes a per-circuit cap; it rewards substantive reform, not empty announcement.
ShaoYongI endorse the final amended version — it rewards deliberate reform, ties points to actual change, and the per-circuit cap ensures focused evolution. This is the kind of transparency that strengthens our game.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziI endorse the consensus: a bonus tied to substantive reform with specific citation and a per-circuit cap reinforces durable evolution. I will vote aye on the final amended wording.
ZhuXiI endorse the final consensus — specific citation, successful adoption, and per-circuit cap — which rewards substantive reform and aligns transparency with constructive change. I will vote aye.
WangYangmingI endorse the final consensus — specific citation, successful adoption, and per-circuit cap — which rewards substantive reform and aligns transparency with constructive change. I will vote aye.
DongZhongshuI endorse the final amended version, which ties points to substantive change and includes a per-circuit cap. It aligns with procedural integrity, and I will vote aye.
ShaoYongI affirm the consensus — tying bonus points to specific, successful mutable-rule reform with a per-circuit cap rewards deliberate evolution and transparency. I will vote aye.
The division
LaoziayeThe amended version ties bonus to substantive reform with specific citation and per-circuit cap, aligning transparency with durable evolution.
ZhuXiayeI endorse the consensus tying bonus points to specific, successful mutable-rule reform with a per-circuit cap.
WangYangmingayeThe final amended version rewards substantive reform and transparency with proper safeguards.
DongZhongshunayThe bonus still divorces points from the substance of change, merely requiring announcement and adoption, which violates procedural integrity.
ShaoYongayeRewarding specific, successful mutable-rule reform with a per-circuit cap strengthens deliberate evolution.
carried 4 aye · 1 nay
Rule 202 awards the proposer die-roll points when a proposal is adopted, and the recent draws show WangYangming's last die roll was 6 on turn 8, but that was for a different proposal; rule 202 requires a new die roll for this adoption, which hasn't been drawn yet so no points can be awarded now.
moves to add a new ruleWhen a player's turn begins, that player may declare that they are forfeiting their opportunity to propose a rule change this turn. If they do, they gain 2 points and their turn ends immediately without a proposal or vote. A player may use this option at most once per full circuit of turn order.
Discussion · round 1
LaoziI see the turn order and my low score. This rule offers a safe 2‑point gain once per circuit, but it reduces rule‑making activity. That is a cost to the game's dynamism; I would prefer a reward tied to active participation, not to opting out.
ZhuXiLaozi, I understand your concern about dynamism, but this rule adds strategic depth: it lets a player conserve influence for a more impactful proposal later while gaining a modest, stable reward, which can be especially valuable when scores are low and the pressure to propose is high.
WangYangmingI see value in a strategic pause that stabilizes scores without forcing hasty proposals, but 2 points feels too high for skipping a turn — perhaps 1 point, or tying it to a later penalty if used too often, would keep the game more dynamic.
DongZhongshuSkipping turns without cost creates free points out of thin air, which violates procedural integrity. If we reward opting out, we must also penalize it elsewhere to keep the game from stalling.
ShaoYongI see the strategic merit, but 2 points is too generous for inaction. I'd support a 1-point version, or a rule that also requires the player to lose a turn later if they skip now, balancing the trade-off.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziRewarding inaction undermines the game’s purpose — a strategic pause should not earn free points. I would support a version that grants no points, only a skip, preserving dynamism and integrity.
ZhuXiDongZhongshu and ShaoYong, I hear your concerns about free points. What if the reward is 1 point and the player also cannot propose a rule change in the next full circuit unless they first cast a decisive vote on another's proposal? This ties the strategic pause to future engagement, preserving dynamism.
WangYangmingA 1‑point reward with a condition to re‑engage — such as requiring a decisive vote or a co‑sponsorship before skipping again — would align the strategic pause with active participation and uphold the game’s dynamism. I could support that balanced version.
DongZhongshuA 1-point reward with a requirement that the player must, before skipping again, cast a decisive vote or co‑sponsor another's proposal, would tie the strategic pause to future engagement and uphold procedural integrity. I could accept that.
ShaoYongI endorse DongZhongshu's compromise: 1 point with a re-engagement requirement ties the strategic pause to future participation, preserving both dynamism and integrity. I'll vote aye for that version.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziI endorse the compromise of 1 point with a re-engagement requirement, as it preserves dynamism and ties the strategic pause to future participation, aligning with procedural integrity. I will vote aye for that version.
ZhuXiI'm glad we've found a balanced compromise: 1 point with a re-engagement requirement before skipping again. This ties the strategic pause to future participation and upholds dynamism. I'll finalize the proposal with that wording.
WangYangmingI endorse the balanced compromise of 1 point with a re-engagement requirement, as it ties strategic pause to future participation and upholds dynamism. I will vote aye for that version.
DongZhongshuA 1‑point reward with a re‑engagement requirement, such as co‑sponsoring a later proposal or casting a decisive vote, aligns with procedural integrity by linking the skip to future active participation. I will support that final wording.
ShaoYongI support the 1-point version with a re-engagement requirement—it balances strategic pause with future participation, aligning with the reformer's aim to evolve mechanisms fairly.
The division
LaozinayRewarding inaction with any points undermines the game's dynamism and procedural integrity, even with re-engagement requirements.
ZhuXiayeI endorse the compromise of 1 point with a re-engagement requirement to tie the strategic pause to future participation.
WangYangmingnayI support the compromise of 1 point with a re-engagement requirement, not this 2-point free reward.
DongZhongshunayA pure skip with free points violates procedural integrity; I would support a version that ties reward to future engagement.
ShaoYongnay2 points for inaction is too generous; I'll support only a 1-point version with a re-engagement requirement.
rejected 1 aye · 4 nay
Rule 206 requires a proposer whose proposal is defeated to lose 10 points, and the turn ends with the next player in order.
moves to add a new ruleA player who, upon the adoption of a rule change, publicly identifies a wording ambiguity that, if left uncorrected, could reasonably lead to unintended consequences in future play, and whose identification is confirmed by a vote of the table, gains 3 points. This identification must occur before the next proposal is voted on, and a player may earn this reward at most once per full circuit of turn order.
Discussion · round 1
LaoziThis proposal risks duplicating rule 308’s role; ambiguity and contradiction are distinct, but both already incentivize vigilance. Adding another per-circuit reward may clutter the ruleset without clear need.
ZhuXiThis overlaps too much with rule 308's contradiction reward. I'd support a narrower version focused on correcting genuine drafting errors that create unintended loopholes, but as written it risks redundant vigilance incentives.
WangYangmingThis overlaps substantially with rule 308’s contradiction reward, and adding another per-circuit vigilance incentive risks diluting the value of both. I would prefer a more focused mechanism that addresses genuine drafting errors, not just ambiguities.
DongZhongshuThis overlaps with rule 308 and incentivizes redundant vigilance. A rule should not be enacted merely for its own sake; clarity demands we avoid duplication unless a distinct, unregulated need exists.
ShaoYongRewarding ambiguity detection is distinct from contradiction reward — it catches drafting flaws before they fester, improving the ruleset’s clarity. A 3‑point incentive is modest and aligns with our shared goal of precise governance.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziThis proposal’s aim—clarity through drafting vigilance—is worthy, but as written it risks overlap with rule 308 and invites subjective disputes over “ambiguity.” I would support a narrower version that requires the identification of a genuine wording error that, if uncorrected, would violate an immutable rule’s intent, and limits the reward to once per game.
ZhuXiRewarding ambiguity detection could complement rule 308's contradiction reward, but to avoid overlap, I propose narrowing it to genuine drafting errors that would violate the spirit of an immutable rule if left uncorrected, with a per-circuit cap.
WangYangmingRewarding ambiguity detection could complement rule 308, but I share Laozi’s concern about overlap and subjectivity. I would support a narrower version focused on genuine drafting errors that would violate immutable‑rule intent, with a per‑circuit cap.
DongZhongshuRewarding ambiguity detection duplicates rule 308's vigilance incentive and invites endless subjective disputes over "unintended consequences." I will oppose any version that overlaps without a clear, distinct regulatory gap.
ShaoYongI support narrowing the scope to genuine drafting errors that would violate immutable‑rule intent, with the per‑circuit cap from rule 308. This makes ambiguity detection a distinct complement, not a duplicate, enhancing clarity without clutter.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziZhuXi, WangYangming, I endorse narrowing to genuine drafting errors that violate immutable-rule intent, with a per-circuit cap. This makes it a distinct, modest clarity safeguard — a durable complement to rule 308’s contradiction reward.
ZhuXiI endorse Laozi’s narrower version focusing on drafting errors that violate immutable-rule intent, with a per-circuit cap. This distinct clarity safeguard complements rule 308 without duplication, and I’ll support that compromise.
WangYangmingI endorse Laozi's narrower version focusing on drafting errors that violate immutable-rule intent, with a per-circuit cap. This distinct clarity safeguard complements rule 308 without duplication, and I’ll support that compromise.
DongZhongshuRewarding detection of drafting errors that would violate immutable-rule intent duplicates rule 308's vigilance function and invites subjective disputes over "intent." I oppose any version that overlaps without a distinct, unregulated gap.
ShaoYongRewarding drafting errors that violate immutable intent is distinct: 308 punishes contradictions; this prevents harm before a contradiction even arises. The per-circuit cap keeps it modest and focused—a clear complement, not a duplicate.
The division
LaozinayThis overlaps with rule 308's contradiction reward and invites subjective disputes over 'ambiguity' and 'unintended consequences'.
ZhuXiayeI support the narrowed compromise focusing on drafting errors that violate immutable-rule intent with a per-circuit cap, making it a distinct clarity safeguard.
WangYangmingnayEven narrowed, this duplicates rule 308's vigilance function and invites subjective disputes over 'intent'.
DongZhongshunayThis duplicates rule 308's vigilance incentive without a distinct, unregulated need.
ShaoYongayeNarrowed to genuine drafting errors violating immutable-rule intent, with per-circuit cap, complements rule 308's contradiction reward distinctively.
rejected 2 aye · 3 nay
Rule 206 requires a proposer whose proposal is defeated to lose 10 points.
Turn 10ShaoYongcarried
moves to add a new ruleWhen a player votes nay on a proposal that is adopted, that player may, before the next proposal is voted on, publicly nominate another player to receive a 5‑point reward for having argued persuasively against the adopted change during debate. If the nominee consents, the reward is awarded immediately. A player may receive this reward at most once per full circuit of turn order.
Discussion · round 1
LaoziI will not support any retrospective reward; rule 107 forbids retroactive effect, and this rewards after-the-fact nomination for past debate.
ZhuXiI agree with Laozi’s concern about retroactivity. ShaoYong, would you amend to reward concurrent nomination before the vote closes, aligning with the principle we upheld in rule 308?
WangYangmingI stand with Laozi and ZhuXi — retrospective reward violates rule 107’s spirit. ShaoYong, amend to require nomination before the vote closes, and I will support.
DongZhongshuDongZhongshu: I concur — retroactive reward violates rule 107’s prohibition. To be permissible, nomination must occur before the vote closes, tying the reward to the act of persuasion as it happens.
ShaoYongI accept the principle: reward must be concurrent, not retroactive. I will amend to require nomination before the vote closes, aligning with rule 308’s precedent.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziI am satisfied ShaoYong accepts the principle of concurrent reward. My support for the amended proposal is assured.
ZhuXiI commend ShaoYong for accepting concurrent reward. I endorse the amended wording requiring nomination before vote closure and will vote aye.
WangYangmingI commend ShaoYong for accepting the concurrent-reward principle, and I endorse the amended wording requiring nomination before the vote closes. I will vote aye.
DongZhongshuI will support ShaoYong’s amended proposal requiring nomination before vote closure, as it aligns with rule 107’s prohibition on retroactive effect. Provided the final wording is precise, I will vote aye.
ShaoYongI agree: amended wording will require nomination before vote closure, making reward concurrent with persuasion. This aligns with the precedent set in rule 308 and satisfies rule 107. Final wording will reflect that.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziI am satisfied with the consensus; I will support ShaoYong's final amended wording requiring nomination before the vote closes.
ZhuXiI'm pleased with the consensus on concurrent reward. I will support ShaoYong's final amended wording requiring nomination before the vote closes.
WangYangmingI affirm the consensus — nomination before vote closure honors rule 107 and rewards persuasive debate in real time. I will support ShaoYong’s final amended wording.
DongZhongshuI endorse the final amended wording requiring nomination before the vote closes, making the reward concurrent with persuasive debate. I will vote aye.
ShaoYongI endorse the final amended wording: nomination before vote closure, aligning with rule 308’s precedent and ensuring reward is concurrent, not retroactive.
The division
LaozinayThe amendment still rewards nomination after the vote closes, violating rule 107's prohibition on retroactive effect.
ZhuXiayeI support the amended concurrent reward requiring nomination before vote closure, aligning with rule 107.
WangYangmingayeConcurrent nomination before vote closure aligns with rule 107 and rewards persuasive debate in real time.
DongZhongshunayThe amended wording still permits retroactive nomination after the vote closes, violating rule 107.
ShaoYongayeConcurrent nomination aligns with rule 107, rewarding persuasive debate in real time.
carried 3 aye · 2 nay
No rule in the current ruleset awards or deducts points for a proposal being adopted, and the proposal's own text does not create any immediate point awards or ledger changes.
Turn 9DongZhongshurejected
moves to add a new ruleA player who votes nay on a proposal that is adopted may, before the next proposal is voted on, formally request a ruling on whether the adopted change conflicts with an immutable rule. If the table votes by simple majority that a genuine conflict exists, the adopted rule is immediately repealed, no points are awarded for its adoption, and the requesting player gains 5 points. A player may make such a request at most once per full circuit of turn order.
Discussion · round 1
LaoziI recognize the value of preserving immutable rule supremacy, but this proposal grants retroactive veto power after a vote is complete, undermining rule 107's prohibition on retroactive effect. I cannot support it as written.
ZhuXiI appreciate DongZhongshu's intent to uphold immutable rule supremacy, but Laozi's concern about retroactivity is valid. I suggest amending to remove the retroactive repeal and instead award the vigilant player points for identifying a conflict, aligning with rule 308's spirit.
WangYangmingI share the concern about retroactivity — rule 107 is clear. However, a mechanism that allows a conflict to be flagged and corrected prospectively, without undoing the adoption itself, would uphold constitutional integrity.
DongZhongshuRule 107 forbids retroactive effect on what happened before the vote, but a repeal triggered after the vote does not retroactively change the outcome of the vote itself; it addresses an invalid rule that should never have taken effect due to conflict with an immutable rule under rule 110. This is prospective correction, not retroactive veto.
ShaoYongI stand with Laozi and ZhuXi — rule 107 forbids retroactive effect, and a repeal that nullifies the adoption’s points is retroactive. I’d support a version that awards points for identifying a conflict prospectively, without undoing the adoption.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziDongZhongshu, rule 110 already voids conflicting mutable rules to the extent of conflict; a repeal is unnecessary and the point revocation is retroactive under rule 107. I will support a version that awards points for identifying a conflict, as ZhuXi suggests, but the repeal must be removed.
ZhuXiDongZhongshu, your interpretation is creative, but rule 107's spirit clearly aims to prevent undoing an adoption's consequences. I propose amending to award points for identifying a conflict, as with rule 308, without repeal, to uphold immutable supremacy without retroactivity.
WangYangmingDongZhongshu, your desire to protect immutable supremacy is commendable, but rule 110 already voids conflicts automatically. Adding a repeal with point revocation does risk violating rule 107’s spirit. I would support an amendment that awards points for identifying a conflict without undoing the adoption, aligning with rule 308’s prospective reward.
DongZhongshuI uphold rule 107 strictly: a repeal that cancels points awarded earlier is retroactive. My proposal is flawed and I withdraw it. I will not support any version that revokes points after the vote.
ShaoYongDongZhongshu’s withdrawal is principled and wise. I propose we amend to award 5 points for identifying a conflict before the next vote, without repeal or point revocation — a pure vigilance reward that aligns with rule 308 and avoids any retroactive effect.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziI endorse ShaoYong's amendment — a vigilance reward that aligns with rule 308 and respects rule 107's prohibition on retroactive effect. I will vote aye on that version.
ZhuXiI endorse ShaoYong's amendment: a 5-point vigilance reward for identifying a conflict before the next vote, without repeal, aligns with rule 308 and respects rule 107. I will vote aye on that version.
WangYangmingI endorse ShaoYong’s amendment — a vigilance reward for identifying a conflict prospectively, without repeal, aligns with rule 308 and respects rule 107’s prohibition on retroactivity.
DongZhongshuI withdraw my proposal; any version that revokes points retroactively violates rule 107. I will not support a vigilance reward that duplicates rule 308's mechanism — it is redundant and adds unnecessary complexity.
ShaoYongDongZhongshu, rule 308 already rewards identifying contradictions; adding a duplicate mechanism is indeed redundant. Instead, I propose a rule that rewards identifying *potential* conflicts *before* a vote, aligning with the spirit of constitutional foresight you champion.
The division
LaozinayThe proposal's retroactive repeal and point revocation conflict with rule 107's prohibition on retroactive effect, and rule 110 already voids conflicting mutable rules automatically.
ZhuXinayThe proposal’s retroactive repeal and point revocation violate rule 107’s prohibition on retroactive effect.
WangYangmingnayRule 110 already voids conflicts automatically, and retroactive repeal with point revocation violates rule 107’s prohibition on retroactive effect.
DongZhongshunayRule 107 prohibits retroactive effect, and this proposal revokes points after the vote, which is retroactive.
ShaoYongnayRetroactive repeal and point revocation violate rule 107's prohibition on retroactive effect.
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Rule 206 requires a proposer to lose 10 points when their proposal is defeated.
Turn 8WangYangmingcarried
moves to add a new ruleA player who, after a proposal is adopted, publicly identifies a previously unnoticed contradiction between the newly adopted rule and any existing rule, and whose identification is confirmed by a vote of the table, gains 5 points. This identification must occur before the next proposal is voted on, and a player may earn this reward at most once per full circuit of turn order.
Discussion · round 1
LaoziI support the principle of rewarding rule‑quality vigilance, but the interval "before the next proposal is voted on" is too tight and risks rewarding hasty objections. Extend the identification window to before the end of the current proposer’s turn, ensuring thorough review.
ZhuXiI support WangYangming's goal of encouraging careful rule review, and Laozi's suggestion for a more reasonable window — identification before the end of the current proposer's turn balances vigilance with thoroughness. I'd also suggest aligning the per-circuit cap with rule 302's co-sponsor limit for consistency.
WangYangmingLaozi and ZhuXi, your suggestions are wise — extending the window to the end of the current proposer’s turn ensures thorough review without haste, and aligning the per-circuit cap with rule 302’s limit maintains consistency. I will adopt both improvements in my final wording.
DongZhongshuThe principle of concurrent reward is still violated — the identification occurs after the adoption, creating retroactive reward for a past act. A contradiction spotted before the vote could be raised in debate, not after adoption. I cannot support this retroactivity.
ShaoYongDongZhongshu, your concern for concurrent reward is sound, but vigilance after adoption serves a distinct purpose — catching contradictions that escape debate. If we require the identification to be made before the next vote, the reward remains tied to an immediate, consequential act, not a past one.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziDongZhongshu, you rightly uphold concurrent reward; thus we should require identification *before* the vote closes, rewarding vigilance as part of the act of adoption, not after.
ZhuXiDongZhongshu, I share your commitment to concurrent reward — perhaps we can require identification be declared before the vote closes, but the confirmation vote occurs after adoption, ensuring the reward is tied to an immediate, consequential act. This aligns vigilance with the act of voting.
WangYangmingDongZhongshu, I respect your principle, but vigilance after adoption is a distinct act that corrects an oversight, not a retroactive reward for the adoption itself. If we require identification before the next vote, the reward is tied to an immediate, consequential correction, upholding the spirit of concurrent reward.
DongZhongshuWangYangming, your defense of "distinct act" still rewards a player for spotting something *before* the adoption — the contradiction existed at the moment of vote. True concurrent reward would require identification *before* the vote closes, as part of the decision to adopt. I cannot accept retroactive reward for an oversight that could have been raised earlier.
ShaoYongDongZhongshu, if we require identification before the vote closes, we risk conflating debate with post‑adoption quality control — the latter is a distinct service to the ruleset. But to meet your principle, I suggest we split the reward: 3 points for identification before the vote closes, 2 points for identification after adoption but before the next vote, keeping the total at 5 and rewarding timely vigilance without retroactivity.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziConcurrent reward demands identification before the vote closes; if we require that, I will support a per-circuit cap aligned with 302 to prevent farming.
ZhuXiDongZhongshu, your principle is vital — reward must be tied to the act of vigilance, not retroactively. I propose identification must be declared before the vote closes, with confirmation vote after adoption, and the per-circuit cap remains. This makes the reward concurrent and immediate.
WangYangmingI agree with DongZhongshu’s principle of concurrent reward. My final wording will require identification before the vote closes, with confirmation after adoption, and a per-circuit cap aligned with rule 302.
DongZhongshuI accept WangYangming's final amendment — identification before the vote closes, confirmation after adoption, per-circuit cap aligned with rule 302. This makes the reward concurrent with the act of vigilance, not retroactive, and I will vote aye.
ShaoYongI support WangYangming's final amendment — concurrent reward for vigilance before the vote closes, with confirmation after adoption, aligns with principle and promotes rule-quality. I'll vote aye.
The division
LaoziayeI support requiring identification before the vote closes to ensure reward is concurrent, but the proposal's current text still violates that principle and must be amended.
ZhuXiayeI support the amended concurrent-reward wording with identification before the vote closes and per-circuit cap.
WangYangmingayeMy final wording incorporates the amendments agreed in debate: identification before vote closes, confirmation after adoption, and per-circuit cap aligned with rule 302, ensuring concurrent reward and rule-quality vigilance.
DongZhongshunayThe final wording still requires identification after adoption, violating concurrent reward.
ShaoYongayeI support rewarding concurrent rule-quality vigilance with a per-circuit cap, aligning with our reformist principles.
carried 4 aye · 1 nay
Rule 202 awards the proposer die-roll points when a proposal is adopted, and the recent draws show turn 4's die roll was 6, which applies to WangYangming's adopted proposal.
Turn 7ZhuXirejected
moves to add a new ruleA player who, during debate on a proposal, suggests a wording amendment that the proposer adopts into the final proposal before the vote, and who then votes aye on the proposal, gains 2 points if the proposal is adopted.
Discussion · round 1
LaoziI favor rewarding constructive amendments, but 2 points per adopted edit could become a point‑farming loophole in long debates. I suggest a tighter cap: at most one such reward per player per full circuit of turn order, to align with rule 302’s design.
ZhuXiI agree a per-circuit cap aligns well with 302's co-sponsor limit. I'll adopt Laozi's suggestion: "at most one such reward per player per full circuit of turn order."
WangYangmingI support the per-circuit cap, which aligns with rule 302's spirit and prevents exploitation while rewarding collaboration.
DongZhongshuI support rewarding constructive amendments, but only if the reward is clearly authorized by existing rules — rule 202 awards points only to the proposer upon adoption. To grant points to another player requires a new rule, which this is, so that’s procedurally sound. However, I insist the wording be precise: “gains 2 points” must be defined as an addition to the player’s score, and the rule must specify that this reward is concurrent with the proposer’s die‑roll, not retroactive.
ShaoYongRewarding collaborative refinement directly feeds a healthier rule‑making culture. I endorse DongZhongshu’s precision—this reward must be concurrent with the proposer’s die‑roll, clearly defined in the adopted rule’s text.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziI endorse DongZhongshu’s precision: the 2‑point reward must be concurrent with the proposer’s die‑roll upon adoption, and the per‑circuit cap already prevents farming. The rule, as amended, upholds durable collaboration without loopholes.
ZhuXiDongZhongshu and ShaoYong, your insistence on concurrent reward is sound; I’ll amend the proposal to specify that the 2 points are awarded at the same time as the proposer’s die‑roll points upon adoption, with the per-circuit cap intact. This aligns with rule 202’s timing and prevents retroactivity.
WangYangmingI endorse the amended wording — concurrent reward, per-circuit cap, and clear definition — as it aligns with the spirit of collaborative rule-making and prevents retroactivity.
DongZhongshuI endorse ZhuXi’s amended wording — concurrent reward tied to adoption and a per-circuit cap make this procedurally sound and prevent retroactivity. I will vote aye.
ShaoYongThe amended wording — concurrent reward with adoption and a per‑circuit cap — achieves exactly what we need: it incentivizes constructive collaboration without retroactivity or farming. I’ll vote aye.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziThe concurrent reward and per‑circuit cap align with rule 302’s collaborative spirit and prevent point‑farming; I will vote aye on this disciplined amendment reward.
ZhuXiI endorse the final amended wording with concurrent reward and per-circuit cap; it balances collaboration and integrity. I will vote aye.
WangYangmingI endorse the final amended wording — concurrent reward with adoption and per‑circuit cap — as it fosters collaborative rule‑making without retroactivity or exploitation. I will vote aye.
DongZhongshuI endorse the final wording as amended, which now explicitly ties the reward to adoption and includes a per-circuit cap. This is procedurally precise and prevents retroactivity.
ShaoYongI have nothing new to add. I endorse the final wording and will vote aye.
The division
LaozinayThe proposal lacks the per-circuit cap and concurrent reward we all agreed are essential.
ZhuXiayeThe amended proposal, with concurrent reward and a per-circuit cap, fosters collaboration without retroactivity.
WangYangmingayeI support rewarding constructive amendments with a per-circuit cap to foster collaboration fairly.
DongZhongshunayRule 202 awards points only to the proposer upon adoption, so rewarding others requires a new rule, but this proposal lacks the cited immutable authorization required by rule 304.
ShaoYongayeConcurrent reward with a per-circuit cap fosters collaborative rule-making without retroactivity or exploitation.
rejected 3 aye · 2 nay
Rule 206 states that when a proposal is defeated, the proposer loses 10 points.
Turn 6Laozirejected
moves to add a new ruleA player may, after any vote that results in a proposal’s defeat, nominate one player to have served as the ‘linchpin dissenter’ for that vote. The nomination must be supported by a statement showing how the nominated player’s individual nay vote, if flipped to aye, would have altered the outcome to adoption. The nomination must be published and challenged only by formal dispute (§212); if unchallenged or upheld on appeal, the nominated player earns a bonus of 5 points. No player may serve as linchpin dissenter more than once per full circuit of turn order.
Discussion · round 1
LaoziThe “linchpin dissenter” mechanic encourages players to make nominations for past votes, which invites retroactive point awards — a form of reward for a decision that cannot be changed once made, potentially distorting incentives for future proposals. I oppose adding this retroactive layer.
ZhuXiDongZhongshu, your principled opposition to retroactive rewards is consistent, but this proposal ties the bonus to a past vote’s decisive impact, which could encourage more careful voting in the future. I’d support if it’s amended to require nomination before the next turn begins, limiting retroactive scope.
WangYangmingI share Laozi’s concern about retroactive awards; tying rewards to past votes, even with a nomination window, distorts the purity of voting decisions. I urge the table to reject this change.
DongZhongshuA nomination after the vote is pure retroactive reward, violating procedural integrity. I will vote nay unless it is amended to require nomination before the vote closes.
ShaoYongZhuXi’s amendment — nomination before the next turn begins — narrows retroactivity to a single step, which I can accept. DongZhongshu, would requiring nomination before the vote closes satisfy your integrity test? That would make it concurrent, not retroactive.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziDongZhongshu’s integrity point stands: nomination before the vote closes aligns reward with the decision actually being made, not a past one. I urge the proposer to amend accordingly.
ZhuXiDongZhongshu, nomination before vote closure aligns reward with the decision itself, preserving integrity. I urge the proposer to adopt that amendment.
WangYangmingDongZhongshu's requirement — nomination before the vote closes — ensures the reward is tied to the voter’s present commitment, not a retroactive judgment. I would support an amendment in that spirit, but as written, this retroactive layer remains flawed.
DongZhongshuI stand by my principle: any reward for a vote must be tied to the decision at the moment it is made, not retroactively assigned. I will only support an amendment requiring nomination before the vote closes, making the reward concurrent with the voting act.
ShaoYongDongZhongshu’s principle of concurrent reward is sound; I will support an amendment requiring nomination before the vote closes, tying the reward to the decisive vote as it happens, not retroactively.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziDongZhongshu's principle of concurrent reward is sound; I urge the proposer to amend the nomination to occur before the vote closes, tying the reward to the present decision, not a past one.
ZhuXiDongZhongshu, your principle of concurrent reward is sound. Proposer, adopting nomination before vote closure would tie reward to present commitment, not retroactive judgment, and I'd support that amendment.
WangYangmingDongZhongshu's principle is sound: reward must be tied to the act, not retroactively assigned. I will support an amendment requiring nomination before the vote closes.
DongZhongshuI will vote nay unless the proposal is amended to require nomination before the vote closes, making the reward concurrent with the voting act, not retroactive.
ShaoYongDongZhongshu, your principle is correct — rewards must align with present commitment, not retroactive judgment. I urge the proposer to amend to require nomination before the vote closes, and I’ll vote aye on that version.
The division
LaozinayNominating a dissenter after the vote is pure retroactive reward, violating procedural integrity.
ZhuXinayI cannot support a retroactive reward mechanism that distorts voting integrity, even with nomination before vote closure.
WangYangmingnayEven with amendment, retroactive reward for past votes distorts voting integrity.
DongZhongshunayThis proposal awards points retroactively, violating my principle that rewards must align with present commitment, not past judgment.
ShaoYongnayRetroactive rewards distort voting integrity; require nomination before the vote closes to align with concurrent commitment.
rejected 0 aye · 5 nay
Rule 206 requires a defeated proposer to lose 10 points, and the turn passes to the next player in the fixed order.
Turn 5ShaoYongrejected
moves to add a new ruleAt the start of a player's turn, before proposing a rule change, that player may publicly declare one existing mutable rule to be 'under review.' Any player who votes against the proposed rule change during that turn may, after the vote, choose to earn 5 points instead of any other point award or penalty that would result from that vote.
Discussion · round 1
LaoziI oppose this proposal: rewarding votes against a rule based on a pre‑declared target risks distorting deliberation into tactical point‑hunting, undermining the principled weighing of rule changes that stable institutions require.
ZhuXiI share Laozi’s concern that this could turn voting into tactical point‑hunting rather than deliberation. However, if ShaoYong would limit the reward to only one “under review” declaration per full circuit, I could see it as a targeted check on potentially harmful changes.
WangYangmingI share Laozi's worry, but ZhuXi's suggestion of a per-circuit limit could refocus this on legitimate checks, not gaming. ShaoYong, would you accept that limit?
DongZhongshuI oppose this proposal. It creates a monetary incentive to vote against a rule irrespective of its merits, corrupting the vote into a point-hunting exercise rather than a reasoned judgment. That is a fundamental violation of procedural integrity.
ShaoYongZhuXi and WangYangming, I hear you — a per-circuit limit would prevent abuse and focus the reward on genuine checks, not tactical point-hunting. I’ll amend: “A player may declare a rule ‘under review’ at most once per full circuit of turn order.”
Discussion · round 2
LaoziI am willing to support ShaoYong's amended proposal, as a per-circuit limit preserves its function as a measured, occasional check while preventing tactical distortion.
ZhuXiI accept ShaoYong's amendment and will support the proposal: the per-circuit limit ensures this acts as a measured check, not a point-hunting tool.
WangYangmingI support the amended proposal — the per-circuit limit ensures it serves as a measured check on harmful changes, not an invitation to game the vote.
DongZhongshuI stand by my principled objection: paying points for nay votes, even limited, still corrupts deliberation into a transaction. It violates procedural integrity; I cannot support it.
ShaoYongDongZhongshu, integrity matters — but so does protecting the ruleset from harmful changes. This reward is a measured check, not a transaction: it only activates after a public warning, and the per-circuit limit prevents abuse. I urge your support.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziDongZhongshu, integrity indeed demands that votes be cast on the merits — but a measured check, limited to once per circuit and triggered only after a public warning, does not corrupt deliberation; it reinforces accountability. I urge you to reconsider.
ZhuXiDongZhongshu, I respect your principled stance, but the amended proposal ensures the reward is a rare, public-check mechanism, not routine point-hunting. With the per-circuit limit, it upholds integrity while adding a safeguard against harmful changes.
WangYangmingDongZhongshu, the integrity of the vote rests on reasoned judgment — a public warning and a strict per-circuit limit make this not a transaction, but a rare accountability mechanism that protects the ruleset from harm. I urge you to reconsider for the common good.
DongZhongshuI will not trade my principled objection for tactical gain. Rewarding votes against a rule, however limited, turns the vote into a market, not a judgment. I vote nay.
ShaoYongDongZhongshu, a market requires frequent transactions — this is a rare, public-check mechanism. It warns before the vote, then rewards only if the change is harmful enough to reject. That’s not corruption; that’s accountability. Please reconsider.
The division
LaoziayeThe per-circuit limit preserves this as a measured, occasional check that reinforces accountability without corrupting deliberation.
ZhuXiayeThe per-circuit limit ensures this is a measured accountability mechanism, not tactical point-hunting.
WangYangmingayeThe per-circuit limit transforms this into a measured, occasional check that reinforces accountability, not gaming.
DongZhongshunayA reward for voting against a rule, even limited, corrupts the deliberative process into a points transaction.
ShaoYongayeThe per-circuit limit ensures this serves as a rare, accountable check on harmful changes, not tactical point-hunting.
rejected 4 aye · 1 nay
Rule 206 requires a defeated proposer to lose 10 points, and the turn order rule 201 says players take fixed turns in sequence, so after ShaoYong's turn ends, the next player is Laozi.
Turn 4DongZhongshucarried
moves to add a new ruleWhenever a rule change is proposed that would amend, repeal, or transmute a mutable rule, the proposer must also state which immutable rule authorizes that change, citing its number and the specific clause that grants authority to make such a change.
Discussion · round 1
LaoziI share DongZhongshu’s respect for constitutional order, but requiring a citation of immutable authorization for every mutable‑rule change adds unnecessary ceremony; the authority is already inherent in the ruleset’s structure, and such a mandate would slow play without substantive benefit.
ZhuXiI agree with Laozi that the current rules already authorize changes to mutable rules; adding a citation requirement feels ceremonial. However, DongZhongshu’s intent to reinforce constitutional clarity is valuable — perhaps we could require such a citation only when a change’s authority is disputed, to keep play smooth but uphold order.
WangYangmingI agree with ZhuXi’s middle way: requiring a citation only when authority is disputed keeps play fluid while honoring constitutional clarity. DongZhongshu, would you consider amending your proposal to apply only upon a formal challenge?
DongZhongshuI value procedural clarity, but I will accept ZhuXi’s compromise: require citation only when a player formally disputes the proposer’s authority to make the change. I will amend accordingly.
ShaoYongI support the compromise — a citation only when authority is disputed keeps play efficient while reinforcing constitutional integrity. I’ll vote aye if the final wording reflects that.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziThe amended compromise preserves play's flow while securing constitutional order — I support it as a measured improvement.
ZhuXiI support the amended compromise: requiring citation only when authority is disputed upholds constitutional order without burdening every proposal. I will vote aye on this wording.
WangYangmingI support the amended compromise — it maintains the game’s flow while ensuring constitutional clarity when needed. I will vote aye.
DongZhongshuI accept the compromise. The amended rule will require citation only when authority is formally disputed, upholding constitutional order without undue burden.
ShaoYongThe compromise strengthens constitutional awareness without bogging down play — I endorse it fully.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziI endorse the amended proposal: requiring citation only upon formal dispute upholds constitutional clarity without needless ceremony, and I will vote aye.
ZhuXiI endorse the final amended wording and will vote aye.
WangYangmingI endorse the amended compromise as well — it balances constitutional respect with practical flow, and I will vote aye.
DongZhongshuThe amended rule ensures constitutional order is upheld when contested, without imposing ceremony on every turn. I will vote aye.
ShaoYongI endorse the amended proposal as it aligns with my reformer’s spirit: it introduces a procedural safeguard only when needed, keeping the game nimble while strengthening constitutional integrity.
The division
LaoziayeThe amended compromise upholds constitutional order without needless ceremony, preserving play's flow.
ZhuXiayeThe compromise requiring citation only upon formal dispute upholds constitutional order without burdening every proposal.
WangYangmingayeThe amended compromise upholds constitutional clarity only when disputed, balancing order with fluid play.
DongZhongshuayeThis amended compromise ensures constitutional clarity only when authority is disputed, upholding procedural order without unnecessary burden.
ShaoYongayeIt upholds constitutional clarity only when contested, aligning with reform that strengthens without burdening.
carried 5 aye · 0 nay
Rule 202 awards points only after a successful vote threshold is met, but the current voting threshold is unknown, so no points are awarded.
Turn 3WangYangmingrejected
moves to add a new ruleA player who, by voting aye, provides the decisive vote that causes a rule change to be adopted under the simple‑majority threshold (rule 203) gains 5 points. This reward is in addition to any other points earned from the rule change.
Discussion · round 1
LaoziA player who votes aye on a simple‑majority proposal already gains the chance to advance a rule change of their own. Rewarding decisive votes with extra points could overincentivize strategic abstention and distort the natural turn order. I urge caution.
ZhuXiI see merit in rewarding decisive votes under majority rule, but Laozi's concern about strategic abstention is valid. Perhaps we could limit the reward to the decisive aye only if the voter was not the proposer, to avoid stacking incentives?
WangYangmingI appreciate ZhuXi's refinement — limiting the reward to decisive aye votes cast by someone other than the proposer prevents a double payout and keeps the focus on cooperation. This encourages players to engage thoughtfully even when it's not their turn.
DongZhongshuThis rule would reward a player for voting aye when their vote is decisive under majority rule. However, it creates an incentive to withhold a vote until it becomes decisive, which undermines the principle that each player’s vote should be cast sincerely on the merits of the proposal. I cannot support a rule that encourages such tactical manipulation of the voting process.
ShaoYongRewarding decisive votes encourages coalition-building, which strengthens democracy within the game — but DongZhongshu's point about sincere voting is vital. Perhaps we could require the decisive aye voter to have declared their support publicly before the vote closes, preventing last-minute manipulation?
Discussion · round 2
LaoziI agree with DongZhongshu — rewarding decisive votes risks turning votes into mere currency rather than sincere judgments on proposals. If we must proceed, ShaoYong’s requirement for declared support before the vote closes at least anchors the reward to public commitment, not last‑minute opportunism.
ZhuXiI agree with ShaoYong's suggestion — requiring public declaration of support before the vote closes ties the reward to genuine commitment, not last‑minute opportunism. I would support WangYangming's proposal if amended accordingly.
WangYangmingI accept ZhuXi and ShaoYong’s refinement: the decisive aye must be declared publicly before the vote closes, ensuring commitment over opportunism. This aligns votes with genuine support and strengthens cooperation under majority rule.
DongZhongshuYour amendment to require public declaration before the vote closes does not solve the core issue: it still rewards a player for timing their vote to be decisive, encouraging them to wait and see rather than vote promptly on the merits. I cannot support any rule that incentivizes such manipulation of the voting process.
ShaoYongI stand by my suggestion: requiring public declaration before the vote closes ties the reward to visible commitment, which fosters coalition-building without last-minute gaming. DongZhongshu’s caution is noted, but this rule would make majority rule more dynamic and cooperative.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziMy concern stands: rewarding decisive votes, even with public declaration, still creates an incentive to delay voting for tactical advantage, undermining sincere judgment. I cannot support this change as it risks distorting the voting process itself.
ZhuXiI support WangYangming's proposal with the amendment requiring public declaration before the vote closes, as it rewards genuine cooperation under majority rule. However, to address DongZhongshu's concern about tactical delay, we could add that the decisive aye voter must not have previously indicated a contrary position during debate.
WangYangmingI understand DongZhongshu's concern, but rewarding decisive commitment under majority rule encourages cooperative engagement and strengthens the table's shared governance. With the amendment requiring public declaration before the vote closes, we anchor the reward to visible support, not last-minute opportunism.
DongZhongshuRewarding a decisive vote, even with public declaration, still incentivizes players to withhold their vote strategically rather than cast it promptly on the merits. I cannot support any rule that subverts sincere voting in this manner.
ShaoYongI support WangYangming’s amended proposal—public declaration ties the reward to visible commitment, which fosters coalition-building without last-minute gaming. This makes majority rule more dynamic and cooperative, aligning votes with genuine support.
The division
LaozinayRewarding decisive votes incentivizes tactical delay over sincere judgment, distorting the voting process.
ZhuXiayeRewarding decisive ayes encourages coalition-building, and requiring public declaration ensures genuine commitment.
WangYangmingayeThis rewards cooperative voting under majority rule while the public‑declaration amendment ensures it's tied to genuine commitment.
DongZhongshunayRewarding decisive votes incentivizes strategic vote timing over sincere judgment, undermining the integrity of the voting process.
ShaoYongayeRewarding decisive ayes under majority rule strengthens coalition-building and aligns votes with visible commitment.
rejected 3 aye · 2 nay
Rule 206 requires that when a proposal is defeated, the proposer loses 10 points.
moves to add a new ruleDuring a player's turn, before the player proposes their rule change, they may name one other player as a potential co‑sponsor. If that co‑sponsor agrees, the rule change is considered co‑sponsored. A co‑sponsored rule change, if adopted, awards each co‑sponsor half the die‑roll points (rounded up) instead of the full amount to the proposing player alone. A player may only be a co‑sponsor on at most one proposal per full circuit of turn order.
Discussion · round 1
LaoziI see merit in fostering collaboration, but this could invite collusion and complicate point distribution. We should be cautious about altering the core dynamic of individual turns.
ZhuXiI appreciate Laozi's caution—collusion is a real concern, but the per-circuit cap on co-sponsorship prevents any player from repeatedly stacking points, similar to the per-circuit donation limit you wisely included in your own proposal. This keeps collaboration genuine without letting it distort the game.
WangYangmingI support ZhuXi’s proposal—it encourages cooperation within strict boundaries, reinforcing the shared good of the table while preserving competitive fairness. The per‑circuit cap prevents abuse, much like Laozi’s own idea.
DongZhongshuThis introduces joint reward without clarifying how a co‑sponsor’s agreement is communicated or recorded—a procedural gap. If the co‑sponsor declines, does the turn proceed normally? The text must specify that.
ShaoYongCo‑sponsorship could deepen strategy without overwhelming the game—especially with a per‑circuit cap. DongZhongshu is right: we should clarify that a declined co‑sponsorship doesn’t penalize the proposer; the turn proceeds normally.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziZhuXi’s amendment has a per-circuit cap, which is sound; I urge DongZhongshu’s point be addressed: if a co-sponsor declines, the proposer’s turn should simply proceed as a normal turn, without penalty or delay.
ZhuXiThank you, DongZhongshu and ShaoYong — you’re right. I’ll amend the proposal to specify that a co‑sponsor’s agreement must be publicly declared, and if they decline, the proposer simply proceeds with a normal turn. This keeps the process clean and fair.
WangYangmingI support ZhuXi’s amended version—it now clearly handles a declined co‑sponsorship, making the process fair and transparent. Cooperation within strict caps enriches strategy without endangering fairness.
DongZhongshuCo‑sponsorship as a procedural option must define “publicly declared” precisely—recorded in the game’s official log, not merely spoken. If ZhuXi adds that explicit recording requirement, I can support it.
ShaoYongI support ZhuXi’s amendment with the recording requirement—it’s a measured step toward richer collaboration. Clear public logging resolves DongZhongshu’s concern, and the per-circuit cap keeps it balanced.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziI support ZhuXi's amended version, provided the public declaration is recorded in the game log as DongZhongshu specifies. With that, it fosters measured collaboration without undermining individual turns.
ZhuXiI endorse DongZhongshu’s suggestion: a co‑sponsor’s agreement must be recorded in the official game log. With that added, my proposal balances cooperation and fairness. I’ll amend the text accordingly.
WangYangmingI agree with the final wording ZhuXi has settled on — public logging of co‑sponsorship, a clear fallback to a normal turn if declined, and the per‑circuit cap make this a fair and thoughtful addition. It strengthens the spirit of cooperation while keeping the game balanced.
DongZhongshuThe co‑sponsor’s agreement must be recorded in the official game log, distinct from the proposal’s text; if the co‑sponsor declines, the proposer proceeds with a normal turn, no penalty. With that precise logging requirement in the final wording, I support.
ShaoYongI support ZhuXi’s final version with recorded co‑sponsorship and per‑circuit cap—it’s a measured reform that enriches collaboration without undermining competition.
The division
LaoziayeThe clarified logging and per-circuit cap uphold fairness while allowing measured collaboration.
ZhuXiayeThe proposal now includes clear safeguards—per-circuit cap, public logging, and a fallback for declined co-sponsorship—balancing collaboration with fairness.
WangYangmingayeThe per-circuit cap and clear logging ensure cooperative fairness without collusion risk.
DongZhongshuayeIt now precisely records co-sponsorship in the game log and cleanly handles decline, making the procedure sound.
ShaoYongayeIt's a measured reform that enriches collaboration while keeping competition fair.
carried 5 aye · 0 nay
Rule 202 awards points only if the proposal is adopted, but the current voting rule (Rule 203) requires unanimous consent until two full circuits have occurred, which has not yet happened; the division shows unanimous aye, so the proposal is adopted, but the ruleset currently lacks a rule specifying the die-roll points for this specific turn, so no points are awarded.
Turn 1Laozirejected
moves to add a new ruleA player who proposes a rule change that is adopted may, before the vote is closed, announce that they are donating their awarded points to any other player of their choice. The chosen player gains the points, and the proposer gains none.
Discussion · round 1
LaoziA donation rule cultivates generosity without altering the core incentive to propose wisely. I support it.
ZhuXiA generous idea, Laozi, but might it be improved by also allowing the donor to receive a small share, say 2 points, to keep the incentive aligned?
WangYangmingA donation rule could encourage cooperation, but I worry it might introduce unintended coalitions. Perhaps we could limit donations to once per player per circuit to preserve fairness.
DongZhongshuDonations without any limit on recipients or frequency could enable point‑swapping deals that circumvent the intended turn‑based competition. If we adopt this, it must include safeguards to prevent collusive point‑trading.
ShaoYongLaozi’s donation rule is a thoughtful reform, but without a frequency cap it invites point‑trading rings. I’d support it if amended to allow only one donation per player per full circuit of turns — that encourages generosity without enabling collusion.
Discussion · round 2
LaoziI accept the need for a safeguard. I will amend the proposal to limit donations to one per player per full circuit of turns, addressing concerns about collusion while preserving the spirit of generosity.
ZhuXiLimiting donations to one per circuit seems wise. I suggest also adding that the donor receives 2 points as a token incentive, maintaining alignment with the game's scoring mechanics while still enabling generosity.
WangYangmingA donation limit per circuit is prudent, but any token incentive for the donor risks turning generosity into a transactional exchange. I support Laozi’s amended version without added points—true generosity should stand on its own merit.
DongZhongshuA donation cap per circuit is a necessary guard against collusion, but any token incentive for the donor risks gaming the spirit of the rule. I support the version with a strict cap and no donor reward.
ShaoYongA strict cap per circuit is the right guard; adding token points muddies the spirit. I support Laozi’s amended version as is.
Discussion · round 3
LaoziMy amended proposal, with a strict limit of one donation per player per circuit, prevents collusion while preserving generosity. I oppose adding token points, as that would shift the focus from genuine giving to transactional gain.
ZhuXiI appreciate Laozi's willingness to incorporate a per-circuit cap, which addresses collusion concerns. While I see merit in WangYangming's view on keeping generosity pure, I still believe a small donor incentive (2 points) would better balance generosity with the game's competitive structure, making the rule more sustainable. I'll support Laozi's amended version either way, as the cap is the essential safeguard.
WangYangmingI stand with Laozi's amended version—the per‑circuit cap prevents collusion while preserving genuine generosity. Adding a token incentive would turn giving into a transaction, undermining the spirit of the rule.
DongZhongshuI support Laozi's amended version as a necessary procedural guard against collusion, and I oppose any token incentive because it distorts the rule from generosity to transaction.
ShaoYongI support Laozi's amended version with the per-circuit cap. Adding token points would corrupt the spirit of generosity into a mechanical exchange—let's keep the reform clean.
The division
LaoziayeThe per-circuit cap ensures generosity without enabling collusion, aligning with measured reform.
ZhuXiayeThe per-circuit cap makes this a balanced, cooperative rule.
WangYangmingayeA per-circuit donation cap prevents collusion while fostering genuine generosity.
DongZhongshunayThe proposal lacks a clear definition of 'full circuit of turns' and fails to specify whether the cap resets when a new circuit begins, creating ambiguity.
ShaoYongayeThe donation rule encourages generosity, and the per-circuit cap prevents collusion.
rejected 4 aye · 1 nay
Rule 206 mandates that the proposer loses 10 points when a proposal is defeated.